



1998. 12

**Kipf** 한국조세연구원

30

IMF

가

가

가

가

가

가

가가

가가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

2

가

가

1998 12

韓國租稅研究院

院長 柳 一 鎬

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--------	------------------	----

I.

가 30

IMF

가 가  
가

가

(On the

Mechanics of Economic Development, 1988)”

“

1960

1980

가

1.4%,

3.4%,

7.0%,

7.1%,

2.3%,

3.6%

가

가

가

가

가

가 , ‘ , ’  
가  
가

가 .

가 .

OECD , 가  
.

가 . ,

“  
가?”

2

3

가

가

가

4

가

5

2

가

6

II.

가

가

( )가 (embody)

(capacity;

)

6

10%

가

가가

가

가

가

가

1.

가.

가

가 가?

가가

. Machlup(1984)

3가

, R&D

“ ”

가

가 가

가

(+)

가 가  
(stock)

가

가

1990

가

가

가

, MAI

(norm)

가

가

. < 2>

가

가 , 1990

가 가

1997

가

가

< 1>

( : %)

							가		
1985	3.2	3.8	1.9	2.3	2.2	5.0	- 1.6	5.6	6.5
1986	2.9	4.3	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.6	1.8	12.6	11.6
1987	3.1	4.8	2.3	1.4	2.8	4.1	9.7	12.7	11.5
1988	3.9	5.0	4.5	3.6	2.7	6.2	11.6	7.8	11.3
1989	2.5	2.2	4.3	3.7	2.4	4.7	9.6	8.2	6.4
1990	0.8	0.4	2.5	5.7	1.4	4.8	9.0	5.4	9.5
1991	- 1.0	- 2.0	0.8	13.2	- 1.7	3.8	7.3	7.6	9.1
1992	2.7	- 0.5	1.2	2.2	- 1.4	1.0	6.3	6.8	5.1
1993	2.2	2.1	- 1.3	- 1.2	- 2.2	0.3	10.4	6.3	5.8
1994	3.5	4.3	2.8	2.9	2.6	0.6	10.1	6.5	8.6
1995	2.0	2.0	2.1	1.9	3.0	1.4	8.8	6.0	8.9
1996	2.4	2.1	1.5	1.3	2.5	3.6	7.3	5.7	7.1
1997	3.8	3.4	2.3	2.0	-	0.9	6.2	6.8	4.9

: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, 1998. 11.

가

가가

가

. OECD 가

10.5%

3.8%

<

1> 가

(< 2>

). OECD 가

가가

가

가 1980

가 OECD 가

< 2>

( : %)

1980	3.9	1.4	2.7	7.4	4.2	6.3	8.8	10.7	9.3	5.6	9.2	6.2	6.2	3.5	5.2
1985	2.6	0.6	1.5	5.3	1.8	4.1	6.3	5.0	5.9	5.9	10.1	6.6	5.0	2.4	4.0
1990	1.2	0.3	0.7	2.3	1.1	1.8	3.5	3.1	3.4	4.1	5.3	4.4	2.9	1.8	2.4
1991	1.1	0.3	0.6	2.0	1.2	1.7	3.1	3.5	3.2	3.3	4.5	3.6	2.5	1.9	2.3
1992	1.0	0.3	0.6	2.3	1.4	1.9	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.0	4.7	3.4	2.6	2.1	2.4
1993	1.3	0.4	0.8	2.7	1.5	2.2	3.7	3.3	3.6	3.7	4.7	4.0	3.2	2.2	2.8
1994	1.2	0.5	0.8	2.4	1.2	1.9	3.1	2.7	3.0	3.3	4.2	3.6	2.7	1.9	2.4
1995	1.2	0.4	0.7	2.0	1.0	1.6	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.5	3.3	2.7	2.3	1.7	2.0
1996	1.1	0.4	0.7	1.9	1.2	1.6	2.7	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.9	2.6	2.3	1.6	2.0

: , 『 』,

OECD 가  
OECD 가 GDP 50%<sup>1)</sup>

1)

30%

가

가 . . . . . < 3> <

4> , 가 가

가 1981

1992

가 가가 가

가

가 .

가 (< 5> ).

OECD 가

가

OECD 가 가

가

가 가

가?

가

가

가가 .

가

가

가

---

가 ( , (1998), ).

< 3>

(25~34 , 1992 )

( : %)

	21.9	20.8	11.8	10.3	6.5	11.9
	13.3	19.6	8.9	5.7	3.0	8.2
	-	14.7	8.7	5.8	3.7	10.0
	21.5	7.8	8.2	5.6	5.0	10.3
	24.6	10.6	6.3	3.1	3.4	8.6
	-	23.0	10.5	7.2	7.8	13.6
	-	18.0	9.5	5.6	6.8	11.3
	-	10.2	6.1	4.6	4.3	6.1
	38.9	21.1	9.7	6.4	5.0	15.0
	18.9	12.1	14.1	-	17.2	13.7
	15.1	6.6	4.2	-	5.2	5.8
	6.6	6.4	6.0	2.7	2.5	6.1
	-	22.3	18.7	16.7	17.5	21.1
	25.5	21.2	9.8	3.8	3.8	10.2
	10.3	12.7	7.4	4.1	2.8	6.8
	-	9.6	6.4	3.2	3.7	6.1
	0.6	1.9	3.3	-	3.4	2.4

: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, 1998. 11.

< 4>

( =100, 1992 )

( : %)

	160(156)	155(144)	100	92(81)	54(54)	10(5.6)
	183(158)	190(153)	100	64(69)	40(37)	6.6(5.8)
	175(158)	87(101)	100	61(95)	49(94)	8(2.3)
	-	170(155)	100	63(68)	52(38)	10.6(6.3)
	146(126)	180(159)	100	63(68)	60(68)	8.8(5.6)
	109(110)	125(110)	100	89(-)	70(58)	14.7(8.2)
	-	176(150)	100	40(54)	44(47)	8.4(8.5)
	-	123(140)	100	47(-)	28(-)	11.4(3.7)
	145(104)	145(191)	100	57(55)	37(64)	4.6(1.3)
	-(147)	108(194)	100	53(38)	47(38)	3.8(2.2)
	18(29)	58(69)	100	-	103(68)	2.4(4.5)

: ( ) 1981 .

: OECD, *Education and Employment*, 1995.

, 『 , 1996.』

< 5> OECD 가 가 : . (1991)  
( : %)

	(A)	(B)	A - B
(12)	74.1	35.7	38.4
(20)	85.3	54.2	31.1
(20)	90.6	69.3	21.3
(16)	93.1	80.6	12.5
(20)	94.0	84.2	9.8

: ( ) 가 .  
: OECD, *Education and Employment*, 1995.

(embody)

가 가

. , 가  
.가

가

가

가

가 가

가 가 가 (

).

가 “ 가 ”

가

,  
 . ,  
 ,  
 가  
 ( )  
 .  
 가  
 (skill) 가  
 가  
 가  
 가  
 (separation, )  
 가  
 가  
 가  
 ( , Becker specific human capital)  
 .  
 가  
 , 가 가  
 가  
 (positive externality)  
 가  
 (consumption benefits) ,

, , .  
 .  
 가 .  
 . ( 가 , )  
 , )  
 (GDP , , )  
 .  
 .  
 가 .  
 OECD  
 .  
 가 , , 가 ,  
 . 가 . 가  
 가  
 UN  
 가 , , , ,  
 가 가 .  
 .  
 (new theory of economic growth)  
 ,  
 가

가 , 가  
가

가 가

가 가  
3 (異見) 가  
가

(1)

(2) (4)

(3)

R&D

가

가

(2).



(1)  $Y_t = A_t F(K_t, L_t)$ .  $A$

(2)  $Y_t = A(R_t) F(K_t, L_t)$ .  $R$  R&D

R&D

$$(3) Y_t = A_t F(K_t, E_t).$$

$$(E_t = H_t L_t),$$

$$(4) Y_t = A(H_t) F(K_t, L_t). \quad (3) \quad \text{가}$$

2.

가.

가

(Malthus)

. 1980

가

(endogenous growth theory)

가

가

가

가

가

가  
가

1) (neoclassical growth theory)

(steady-state) 1 GDP 가  
가 가 가  
가 1 가 (convergence)  
가 , 1 가  
가 가 가 가  
가 가 가 가  
가가 가  
(TFP: Total Factor Productivity)  
가가  
가 가  
, 가  
( , )

2)

가

가

R&D

(flow)

가 (stock)

2). ,

가 (variable input)

가 ,

가

(+)

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

(increasing returns to scale)

가

가

(convergence) 가

2)

(flow)

(stock)

1

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

, 가

가

(

가

가)



= a ·

+ (1-a) ·

+

a

가

, , 가

가가

가

가 가

가가 가

가

가

< 6> (Young, 1995)

< 6>

( : %)

				가
	10.3(100)	4.1(40)	4.5(44)	1.7(16)
가	8.7(100)	5.6(65)	2.9(33)	0.2( 2)
	9.4(100)	3.2(34)	3.6(39)	2.6(27)
	7.3(100)	3.0(41)	2.0(27)	2.3(32)
	3.6(100)	0.7(19)	1.4(39)	1.5(42)

: 1. 가 Young(1995), Denison(1979)

Young

2. ( )

3. 가 가 1972~1982 26%, 1982~1992 (Kim&Park(1985), KDI

53%

가

).

(Young, 1995)

가

가

가

.3)

가

. < 7> 1993

가 . < 3>

가 1985 IMF 가

가

< 7> 가

( : %)

			가	가가 가
1985	4.6	-	-	-
1986	10.0	-	8.3	7.8
1987	10.3	-	7.7	8.1
1988	6.3	-	10.4	10.0
1989	2.6	12.9	7.5	7.8
1990	1.5	27.8	12.7	12.2
1991	2.2	24.5	13.8	11.8
1992	3.0	14.0	10.7	8.8
1993	-0.7	-1.3	8.0	7.6
1994	2.3	36.7	10.1	9.3
1995	4.1	37.9	10.4	9.1
1996	1.5	15.7	13.1	11.8
1997	3.0	-6.9	13.4	12.7

:

3)

가 (Young)

(adjusted)

가 1.7%

가

(+)

< 8 >

1975~1980 1.7%

1980~1985 , 1985~1990 2.4%

2.6%

1975 가 1980

가

가

가

(threshold) 4)

가

---

4) (majority voting theory) 가

가

< 8> 1960~1990

( : %)

	가		가				
60~66	0.077	0.069	0.070	0.062	0.072	0.005	0.690
66~70	0.144	0.167	0.194	0.095	0.103	0.013	0.690
70~75	0.095	0.121	0.118	0.052	0.055	0.019	0.661
75~80	0.093	0.158	0.178	0.040	0.052	0.002	0.694
80~85	0.085	0.102	0.099	0.031	0.047	0.024	0.729
85~90	0.107	0.105	0.108	0.061	0.072	0.026	0.739
<b>66~90</b>	<b>0.103</b>	<b>0.129</b>	<b>0.137</b>	<b>0.054</b>	<b>0.064</b>	<b>0.017</b>	<b>0.703</b>
60~66	0.123	0.105	·	0.115	0.115	0.013	0.504
66~70	0.204	0.205	·	0.104	0.108	0.048	0.504
70~75	0.165	0.133	·	0.084	0.088	0.053	0.477
75~80	0.127	0.207	·	0.047	0.062	-0.007	0.503
80~85	0.106	0.075	·	0.019	0.039	0.051	0.547
85~90	0.118	0.147	·	0.069	0.082	0.008	0.572
<b>66~90</b>	<b>0.141</b>	<b>0.151</b>	·	<b>0.063</b>	<b>0.074</b>	<b>0.030</b>	<b>0.521</b>
60~66	0.127	0.188	·	0.082	0.097	-0.012	0.537
66~70	0.176	0.258	·	0.165	0.166	-0.033	0.537
70~75	0.085	0.104	·	0.006	0.014	0.028	0.528
75~80	0.117	0.180	·	0.051	0.071	0.010	0.672
80~85	0.089	0.131	·	0.051	0.051	0.014	0.693
85~90	0.119	0.058	·	0.040	0.050	0.066	0.674
<b>66~90</b>	<b>0.115</b>	<b>0.142</b>	·	<b>0.058</b>	<b>0.067</b>	<b>0.019</b>	<b>0.624</b>
60~66	0.059	0.052	0.048	0.040	0.054	0.007	0.804
66~70	0.118	0.142	0.163	0.079	0.089	0.014	0.804
70~75	0.083	0.124	0.131	0.043	0.042	0.022	0.782
75~80	0.073	0.140	0.139	0.033	0.045	0.009	0.796
80~85	0.074	0.107	0.113	0.034	0.047	0.016	0.828
85~90	0.099	0.096	0.098	0.060	0.069	0.025	0.821
<b>66~90</b>	<b>0.088</b>	<b>0.121</b>	<b>0.127</b>	<b>0.048</b>	<b>0.057</b>	<b>0.017</b>	<b>0.806</b>

: Young(1995)

3.

가

가

가

가

가

가.

가

R&D

67%

R&D

가

가

가

가 (1988)

가 5) 1909~1957

(1995)

< 9>

가 64% 가

36%

가

가

16%

84%

< 9>

가

( : %)

	1)	가	가
(1963~1982)	4.53	0.72(16%)	3.81(84%)
(1909~1957)	1.4	0.9(64%)	0.5(36%)

: 1) = 가 .

: (1995)

, 1992 「 」 300

80% 가

가 , 12% 가

5) 가

가 .

, 8%가

. 3,000

59%가

, 32%

가

가

8%가 가

가

5

가

. 90

OECD 가 GDP

(1998)

< 11>

GDP

가

< 10> OECD 가 /GDP (1993)

	1)	2)
	7.3	0.3
	6.8	0.2
	6.0	0.5
	4.9	-
	7.2	1.6
	6.1	0.2
	5.9	-
	5.1	-
	6.9	1.1
	5.73)	-

: 1) ( )  
 2)  
 3) GDP 5.3% .  
 : , 『 , 1998.』  
 OECD, *Education at a Glance*, pp.67, 1996.

< 11>

( : , %)

	(GNP )	(GNP )	(GNP )	(GNP )	(GNP )	(GNP )
1988	3,587(1.94)	133,740(2.77)	76,279(2.58)	35,294(2.86)	21,929(2.31)	18,398(2.21)
1989	4,146(1.99)	140,763(2.68)	79,037(2.69)	33,986(2.84)	22,500(2.33)	20,146(2.21)
1990	4,676(1.95)	151,544(2.63)	83,492(2.74)	41,270(2.72)	28,859(2.42)	21,266(2.21)
1991	5,670(1.93)	160,096(2.80)	102,231(2.97)	44,903(2.61)	28,906(2.41)	21,880(2.16)
1992	6,391(2.08)	164,493(2.73)	100,826(2.94)	48,892(2.48)	31,995(2.42)	22,782(2.18)
1993	7,666(2.30)	165,849(2.61)	123,283(2.88)	46,405(2.43)	30,675(2.45)	20,739(2.20)
1994	9,826(2.58)	169,100(2.51)	133,020(2.84)	47,769(2.33)	31,628(2.38)	22,365(2.19)
1995	12,240(2.69p)	171,000(2.40)	153,181(2.96)	55,000(2.27)	-	-

: 1. p .  
 2. .  
 : , 『 , 1996; (1997) .

< 12 >

GNP

( : , %)

	122	1,710	1,532	550	316	224
1)	1	14.0	12.5	4.5	2.6	1.8
GNP	2.692)	2.40	2.96	2.27	2.38	2.19

: 1.

1)

1

2)

:

, 『

』, 1996;

(1997)

가

가

가

1)

가

가

가

(Pigovian Corrective Taxation)

가

가

가

가

가

가

OECD

가

가

가

가

2)

가  
가 가  
(flow) (stock)  
(R&D flow),  
가  
R&D  
가  
( )  
가

가  
가

가

가

Ⅲ.

Davies Whalley(1989)

3

Becker(1996)

가

가

(externality)

가

가

6)

가

가

3

가

4

6)

population

)

(skill)

가 가

( ,

1.

가 OECD 가 가

가

(1994)

가 30

IMF

가 가

가

Lucas(1988, 1993) Becker(1975)

가

가

가

가 가

가

가가 가

3 가 가

Trostel(1993)

CGE(Computable

General Equilibrium)

2.

가. (benchmark case)

가 가

가 가 가

(Becker(1975)) , 가

(Hausman(1981), Triest(1992))

가 가

(Lucas(1988, 1993)).

, 가  
가

( )

Ben-porath(1967)

( , , )

가

가



• :

:

$$= (1 - t)w_f,$$

$w_f$

• :

$$\text{가 가} = (1 - t)w_f$$

가

(wedge)

(deadweight loss)

가

(utilization)

Trostel(1993) Rebelo(1991)가

Trostel(1993)

Rebelo(1991)

가

$$U = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(c, l) dt. \tag{III-1}$$

scale)

(constant returns to  
가 가가

$$F(LH, K) = wLH + rK. \tag{III-2}$$

,  $K(t)$  ,  $H(t)$

$r(t)$  .

(utilization intensity)

가

$w(t) = L(t) \cdot H(t)$  .

가

$$\dot{K} = (1 - t_K)rK + (1 - t_L)(wLH - ky) + S - c - (1 - k)(1 - \Psi)y.$$

(OJT)

Becker(1975)가

(general human capital)

(General human capital trainings are financed by trainees).

가

$t_K$   $t_L$  (lumpsum transfer),  $S(t)$

$\Psi$

$$\dot{K} = (1 - t_K)rK + (1 - t_L)(wLH - ky) + S - c - (1 - k)(1 - \Psi)y. \quad (\text{III-3})$$

(III-3)

$$wLH = y(t), \quad k$$

$$(1 - k)y(t), \quad y(t)$$

$$(1 - k)(1 - \Psi)y \quad (\text{III-4}) \quad \text{가 } l, \quad x,$$

$L$

$$l + \chi + L \equiv 1. \quad (\text{III-4})$$

가 Ben-Porath(1967)

가

$$\dot{H} = \phi(\chi H)^\alpha y^\beta - \delta H, \quad \alpha, \beta, \delta, \phi > 0, \alpha + \beta < 1. \quad (\text{III-5})$$

가 . 가 가  $\alpha, \beta < 1$  가  
 (learning by doing effect) (exponentially)

가

$$H = e^{-\rho t} u(c, l) + \lambda [(1 - \tau_K)rK + (1 - \tau_L)(wLH - ky) + S - c - (1 - k)(1 - \Psi)y] + \mu [\phi(\chi H)^\alpha y^\beta - \delta H] + \nu [1 - (l + \chi + L)] \quad (\text{III-6})$$

$l = c$

$$\frac{u_l}{u_c} = (1 - \tau_L)wH = \frac{\alpha \nu y}{\beta \chi}, \quad (\text{III-7})$$

$$\dot{\lambda} = \lambda [\rho - (1 - \tau_K)r], \quad (\text{III-8})$$

$$\dot{\mu} = \mu [\rho + \delta - \alpha \phi \chi^\alpha H^{\alpha-1} y^\beta] - \frac{\lambda(1 - \tau_L)wL}{\mu} \quad (\text{III-9})$$

$$G + S + \Psi(1 - k)y = \tau_K rK + \tau_L (wLH - ky), \quad (\text{III-10})$$

(III-2)

$$\dot{K} = F - c - y - G. \quad (\text{III-11})$$

(III-5), (III-8), (III-9) (III-10)  
 (5) , (III-11) , (III-11)  
 - 8) (III-9) 가 (shadow price)

3.



7),  
 . 0~1,000 , 1,000~4,000 , 4,000~8,000 ,  
 8,000 4 (tax bracket) 10%, 20%, 30%,  
 40% . 1997  
 146 4 가  
 10% 8).  
 (Lee(1998)) 1995  
 16%  
 10% 가 가  
 가 가  
 9%  
 2~8% 9). 가 가  
 < 13> 1997 가  
 . IMF  
 가  
 $t_L$  20% 가 10%, 30%  
 40% ( )  
 30% 50% )

7) , , ,  
 8)  
 9)

< 13> 1997

( : , %)

, I			
$I \leq 1000$	10	50	20%
$1,000 < I \leq 4,000$	20		
$4,000 < I \leq 8,000$	30		
$I > 8,000$	40		

: , 『 』, 1998.

< 14> 1995

( : , %)

, I			
$I \leq 400$	5	50	20%
$400 < I \leq 800$	9		
$800 < I \leq 1,600$	18		
$1,600 < I \leq 3,200$	27		
$3,200 < I \leq 6,400$	36		
$6,400 < I$	45		

: , 『 』, 1995.

$t_K$

10%

2.2%가

22%

24.2%

가  
 16%, 28% 가 (1997)  
 10%

가  
 가  
 가  
 2  
 (heterogeneity)  
 24.2% 10%

30%  
 y(t)

가  $\psi$  가  
 , , 가  
 Kendrick(1976)  
 40% 가 60% ,  
 80% ,  
 70% .

가 10) 1996  
 (  $E_p$  )가 가 (C)

---

10) , , .

가 10.2% .

$$\frac{E_p}{C} = 10.2\% . \quad (\text{III-12})$$

10 7.7% 2.5% 가  
 $E_g$  1994 20.1

GNP 303 6.7% .

$$\frac{E_g}{GDP} = 6.7\% . \quad (\text{III-13})$$

$$\frac{E_g}{GDP} / \frac{E_p}{C} = \frac{E_g}{E_p} \frac{C}{GDP} \quad (\text{III-14})$$

, 가 GDP  
 (C/GDP) 30% 가

$$(E_g / E_p \simeq 1).$$

$$50\% (E_g / (E_g + E_p) \simeq 0.50)$$

가 .

가

80% .

40%

가

가

0.40

, 0.50

0.65  $\Psi$

(upper bound)

$k$   
 가  
 가  
 Mincer(1989)  
 ) 3 1 가  
 가  
 '99 1  
 70  
 0.1~0.5%  
 100%  
 가 10% 40% 가  
 1(unitary)  
 가  
 가  
 $\alpha$

Haley(1976) Heckman(1976)

가

가  $\alpha$

0.6

(scale effect)

Cobb- Douglas  $xH$   $y$   $\alpha/(\alpha + \beta)$

$\beta/(\alpha + \beta)$

Becker(1975) Boskin(1977) 3 1

$\alpha$   $\beta$  0.45 0.15 가

가 Heckman(1976) Haley(1976) 4%

가 가

가

Groot(1998) 가 11~17%

가 4% 8% 가

( $\rho$ )

1~4%

“ ” 7%

가 0.04 0.12

(intertemporal substitution elasticity)

0.1 1

Trostel(1993) 0.25 1

0.7 가

가 가

Ghez and Becker(1975), Smith(1977)

MaCurdy(1981), Altonji(1986), Ham(1986) Ball(1990) 0.0~0.2

Lee(1996) 가

0.5

Lee(1998) 0.3

“(compensated)”

(wealth)가 0.4

4.

(closed form)

CGE (iterated search)

(III- 5), (III- 8), (III- 9) (III- 10)

( , log- linearization),

가 가 (bar →)

,  $\bar{\lambda} \equiv d \hat{\lambda} / \lambda$  (hat, ^)

( ,  $\hat{r} \equiv dr/r$ ,  $\hat{\tau} \equiv d\tau/(1-\tau)$  ).

$\theta_i$   $i$ 가  $\theta_K \equiv rK/F$

$$\bar{\lambda} = \rho(\hat{\tau}_K - \hat{\gamma}).$$

$$\bar{\mu} = -\alpha\delta[\alpha\hat{\chi} + (\alpha-1)\hat{H} + \beta\hat{y}] - (\rho + \delta - \alpha\delta)(\hat{\lambda} - \hat{\mu} - \hat{\tau}_L + \hat{\omega} + \hat{L}),$$

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{K} &= r \hat{K} + \left(\frac{r}{\theta_K}\right) (\theta_L \hat{L} + \theta_L \hat{H} - \theta_c \hat{c} - \theta_y \hat{y}), \\ \bar{H} &= \delta[\alpha \hat{\chi} + (\alpha - 1) \hat{H} + \beta \hat{y}],\end{aligned}\tag{III-15}$$

가  $\bar{\lambda}, \bar{\mu}, \bar{K}, \bar{H}$   $\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{K}, \hat{H}$   
 $\hat{c}, \hat{y}, \hat{x}, \hat{L}, \hat{w}$   
 $\hat{\lambda}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{K}, \hat{H}$   
 $(\hat{c}, \hat{y}, \hat{x}, \hat{L}, \hat{w})$   
가 .

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{c} &= -\gamma \hat{\lambda}, \\ \hat{y} &= \{-[m + \nu + \eta(1 - \alpha)] \hat{\lambda} + (m + \eta + \nu) \hat{\mu} - \alpha \hat{K} \\ &\quad + \alpha(1 + m + \eta) \hat{H} + [\alpha\nu + \alpha m + \alpha(\eta + \nu)(1 - \alpha) \hat{\tau}_L] \gamma z, \\ \hat{\chi} &= \{-(\beta\eta + \nu) \hat{\lambda} + (\eta + \nu) \hat{\mu} - (1 - \beta) \hat{K} \\ &\quad + [1 - \beta + \alpha\eta - \nu(1 - \alpha - \beta)] \hat{H} \\ &\quad + [\nu(1 - \beta) + \alpha\beta(\eta + \nu)] \hat{\tau}_L \gamma z, \\ \hat{L} &= (\nu[m + \eta(1 - \alpha - \beta)] \hat{\lambda} + [m(1 - \beta) + \eta(1 - \alpha - \beta)] \hat{K} \\ &\quad - \{m(1 - \beta) + [\eta - (m + \eta)\nu](1 - \alpha - \beta)\} \hat{H} \\ &\quad - \nu[m(1 - \beta + \alpha\beta) + \eta(1 - \alpha + \beta)] \hat{\tau}_L \gamma z, \\ \hat{w} &= \{-[m + \eta(1 - \alpha - \beta)] \hat{\lambda} + m \hat{\mu} + (1 - \alpha - \beta) \hat{K} \\ &\quad - (1 + m + \eta)(1 - \alpha - \beta) \hat{H} \\ &\quad + [m(1 - \beta + \alpha\beta) + \eta(1 - \alpha - \beta)] \hat{\tau}_L \gamma z, \\ \hat{r} &= \{[m + \eta(1 - \alpha - \beta)] \hat{\lambda} - m \hat{\mu} - (1 - \alpha - \beta) \hat{K} \\ &\quad + (1 + m + \eta)(1 - \alpha - \beta) \hat{H} \\ &\quad - [m(1 - \beta + \alpha\beta) + \eta(1 - \alpha - \beta)] \hat{\tau}_L \gamma z,\end{aligned}$$

(III-16)

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \gamma = \eta, \quad v \equiv \sigma' \theta_K, \\
 & \sigma, \quad m \equiv \chi' L, \quad a \equiv \chi(1 - \tau_L)/p \\
 & z \equiv m(1 - \beta) + (\eta + v)(1 - \alpha - \beta) \\
 & (\hat{c}, \hat{y}, \hat{x}, \hat{L}, \hat{w}) \quad \bar{\lambda}, \bar{\mu}, \bar{K}, \bar{H} \\
 & Y \equiv [\bar{\lambda}, \bar{\mu}, \bar{K}, \bar{H}]
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\dot{Y}(t) = JY(t) + V, \quad (\text{III-17})$$

Laitner(1990)

$$Y(t) = N_e^{\Omega} D - MV, \quad (\text{III-18})$$

,  $N$   $J$  (eigen vector)  $\Omega$  (eigen value)  
 ,  $D$  ,  $M$   $J$

$$Y(t) = N_e^{\Omega} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ N_{22}^{-1} M_2 V \end{bmatrix} - MV, \quad (\text{III-19})$$

$N_{22}$   $2 \times 2$   $M_2$   $2$   
 . (III-17) (time path)  
 (state variables,  $K$   $H$ )

Judd(1987) ,  $Y(t)$  가 ,  $L\{Y\}$

$$L\{Y\} = (\rho I - J)^{-1} \left[ \frac{V}{\rho} + Y(0) \right]. \quad (\text{III-20})$$

CGE(computable general equilibrium)

가

5.

< 15>

< 16>

< 15>

$\alpha$	$xH$	.45
$\beta$	$y$	.15
$\gamma$	$c$	.80
$\delta$	$H$ 가	.04
$\eta$	$L$	.40
$\theta G$	$G/F$	.11
$\theta L$	$wHL/F$	.62
$k$		.25
$\rho$		.07
$\sigma$		1.0
$\tau K$		.242
$\tau L$		.20
$\Psi$	$y$	.40
$\theta c$	$c/F$	$1 - \theta y - \theta G$
$\theta K$	$\gamma K/F$	$1 - \theta L$
$\theta y$	$y/F$	$\beta m \theta L(1 - \tau L) / \alpha p$
$v$		$\sigma / \theta K$
$m$	$x/L$	$\alpha \delta / (\delta + \rho - \alpha \delta)$
$r$		$\rho / (1 - \tau K)$
$p$	가	$k(1 - \tau L) + (1 - k)(1 - \Psi)$

가

1% ( , 20% 20.2% ) 0.17%

20%

40% 17%

1% 0.67% 가

20% 가 22.5%

가

가 1%

0.034%

2~9% 가

LH

LH -0.2

( , )

< 16 >

		가
H	-.172	-.034
y	-.520	-.322
xH	-.199	-.099
LH	-.199	-.111
K	-.667	-.242
w	-.178	-.050
r	.290	.081

가

가

가

10% 가 9.6%

20%

< 18> 가

$\hat{z}_K = 0$

가

- .135 - .172

$\hat{z}_K > 0$

가

가

$t=100$

가

가

가 ( ,  $LHt$  ) ,




( ,  $w_t$ )

$y_t$


$KLHt$   $Ft$




		가
	- .172	- .034
$\alpha = .35$	- .136	- .029
.60	- .263	- .044
$\beta = .10$	- .116	- .024
.25	- .325	- .058
$\gamma = .40$	- .086	- .027
1.20	- .231	- .084
$\delta = .08$	- .169	- .042
.12	- .167	- .065
$\eta = .20$	- .157	- .023
.60	- .182	- .042
$\theta G = .20$	- .155	- .029
$\kappa = .10$	- .188	- .039
.40	- .157	- .029
$\rho = .01$	- .171	- .048
.12	- .173	- .024
$\sigma = .50$	- .211	- .047
1.50	- .132	- .023
$\tau K = .10$	- .149	- .037
.30	- .189	- .031
$\tau L = .10$	- .096	- .012
.30	- .272	- .063
$\Psi = .50$	- .169	- .033
.65	- .161	- .031

		가
a. $\hat{\tau}_K = 0$	- .172	- .034
	- .135	- .040
b. $\hat{\tau}_L = 0$	- .036	.006
c. $\eta = 0$	- .132	- .007
d. $k = 1$	- .111	- .015
e. $k = 0$	- .199	- .042
f. $\beta = 0, \alpha = .45$	- .031	- .007
$\alpha = .60$	- .061	- .010
g. $\alpha = 0, k = 0 \beta = .15$	- .098	- .041
$\beta = .60$	- 0.813	- .285
h. $\eta = 0, \hat{\tau}_K = 0$	- .091	- .031
i. $\eta = 0, \hat{\tau}_L = 0$	- .045	.008
$k = 1$	- .044	.010
	- .053	- .024
j. $\beta = 0, \hat{\tau}_K = 0, \alpha = .45$	- .087	- .036
$\alpha = .60$	- .000	.013
k. $\beta = 0, \eta = 0, \alpha = .45$	- .000	.017
$\alpha = .60$	- .000	.000
l. $\beta = 0, \eta = 0, \hat{\tau}_K = 0$		






인적자본의 형성과 조세





인력자본의 형성과 조세



6.

가

가

가

1

가

가

가

#### IV.

4 가

(heterogeneity)

가

가  
가 가

가

가

, 가 ,

1.

가  
가 가

가

가

“ ”가

Becker(1968)

, Sandmo Alinghum(1975)

Weber(1989),

(1998),

(1998) )

( , Pissarides and

가

100%

0.3%, 가가 0.1%

가 10%

100%

11).

(bargaining)

Allingham and Sandmo(1972)

가 가

가

가

가

가

가

가

( , ) 가

가 가

가

11) 가

(1997)

(1997)

가 . 가  
가 . 가  
가 가 .  
. 2 가 가  
. 3 가 가  
4 .

2.

가.

가 .  
가 .  
가 .  
가 가 .  
가 가 .  
1980 . < 19> . < 19>  
가 가  
가 가  
가 가  
가 가

< 19> , , , 1

	( )	( )	( )	/	1 (1985=100) ( )
1980	-	13,251	42,177	-	-
1985	100,673,010	14,852	89,416	88.79	6,778
1986	111,554,901	14,869	100,990	90.49	7,298
1987	123,041,921	14,878	120,159	97.69	7,773
1988	145,672,861	14,878	150,838	103.53	8,688
1989	169,552,057	15,391	180,780	106.59	9,289
1990	210,613,846	16,481	226,778	107.68	9,369
1991	267,148,721	16,481	269,854	101.03	10,785
1992	312,993,679	16,945	320,853	102.51	11,581
1993	351,327,666	17,305	363,747	103.54	12,121
1994	400,455,653	17,491	436,905	109.09	12,950
1995	478,034,574	17,491	517,487	108.26	14,662
1996	546,197,933	17,838	591,997	108.38	16,383
1997	598,648,062	17,625	636,459	106.32	17,535
1998	634,614,048	17,253	-	-	18,502

: 『 』, .

가

( ,

)

가

가

. < 20> .

19> 가 가

< 20> 1,000 (1998. 12)

	1998	1997/98	1997	1996/97	1995/96	1997	1998	1997	1998
	17,253	113,041	57,202	63,980	5,451	17,245	39,000	25,066	1,700
( )	46,430	271,648	125,638	58,200	3,602	18,250	30,194	15,661	3,491
	0.372	0.416	0.455	1.099	1.513	0.945	1.292	1.600	0.487

: 1. (52,252 ) (22,235 )  
 (11,728 )  
 2.  
 3. 가 가 가  
 Infra가  
 : Annual Report, Data Book, Sgatar Ciat , ( ).  
 , 『 50 』, pp.364~366, 1998( ).

가 가  
 1( X )  
 가 2( Y) 가  
 가 가

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{q_1, q_2} \quad & U(\bar{B}) - C(q_1, q_2; Q_1, Q_2) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \bar{R} = t_v \cdot (p_1 q_1 + p_2 q_2) \end{aligned} \tag{IV-1}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{B} & & , \quad \bar{R} & & , \quad q_i & & i \\ Q_i & & \cdot Q_i & & q_i & & \\ & & \cdot q_i \leq Q_i & & & & \end{aligned}$$

(

, )

,

가

가

$$\left( \frac{d(dC/dq_1)}{dq_2} = 0 \right) \quad C(\cdot, \cdot) = C_1(\cdot) + C_2(\cdot)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{q_1, q_2} \quad & C_1\left(\frac{q_1}{Q_1}\right) + C_2\left(\frac{q_2}{Q_2}\right) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \bar{R} = t_v \cdot (p_1 q_1 + p_2 q_2) \end{aligned} \tag{IV-2}$$

$$C_1\left(\frac{q_1}{Q_1}\right) \quad \text{가}$$

$q_1/Q_1$ 가

$$\cdot, C_1' > 0, C_1'' > 0 \cdot C_2\left(\frac{q_2}{Q_2}\right)$$

가

가  $q_2/Q_2$ 가

가 1 . . . ,  $C_2' > 0$ ,  $C_2'' > 0$ ,  $C_2''' > C_1'''$  .

$$L(q_1, q_2, \lambda; p_1, p_2, Q_1, Q_2, t_v) \tag{IV-3}$$

$$= C_1\left(\frac{q_1}{Q_1}\right) + C_2\left(\frac{q_2}{Q_2}\right) + \lambda\{\bar{R} - t_v \cdot (p_1 q_1 + p_2 q_2)\}$$

가 .

$$C_1' = \lambda \cdot t_v \cdot p_1 \tag{IV-4}$$

$$C_2' = \lambda \cdot t_v \cdot p_2 \tag{IV-5}$$

$$\frac{C_1'(q_1/Q_1)}{p_1} = \frac{C_2'(q_2/Q_2)}{p_2} = \lambda \cdot t_v \tag{IV-6}$$

(IV-6) 1 가가 .

가 (case 1) 1 가  
 ; , 1 . 2  
 가 (convex) .

$$\text{If } p_1 = p_2, C_1'(q_1/Q_1) = C_2'(q_2/Q_2) \Rightarrow q_1^*/Q_1 > q_2^*/Q_2 . \tag{IV-7}$$

$$q_i^* \quad i \quad q_i^*/Q_i \quad (\phi_i)$$

$$), \quad (1 - q_i^*/Q_i) .$$

가 (case 2)

가 ,  $p_1 > p_2$  가

$$C_1'(q_1/Q_1) > C_2'(q_2/Q_2) \quad q_1/Q_1$$

>  $q_2/Q_2$  가

가 가 2

(inter-

and intra- industry)

1)

가가

50%

가

가

가

가 가

가

. 가 가 가 ( )  
가 가

. 가 .

가 : ( , )가  
가 가 가 가  
, , 가 가 ,

( ) ( ) ( )

. 가 가  
가 .

[ 1] 가  
가 . ,

가

가  
가

2)

가 가 가  
가 가

5 < 22> 5 가  
( < 21> ). < 22> 가  
70% 가 30%  
65.5%,  
18.5% 10.2% [ 1]  
가 , , 가

< 21>

( : )

( )	1 5	4,800~1 5	2,400~4,800	2,400
	( ×10%)	×		
	- ( ×10%)	가가 ×10%	×2%	

: , 『 』, 1998.

< 22> 5


( : %)

		5.3
	71.8	46.0
가		28.3
	25.6	9.5
	1.4	3.1
		7.8
	1.2	-
	100	100

: , 『 』, 『 』, 1992.

[ 1] 1

(200- 600 )





가  
 가  
 가  
 가  
 가  
 가  
 가

3)

2 -2 , ,  
 가 . 가

A. 가 2 :

$$(1) Q_x = f(k_x, l_x) \quad (IV-8)$$

$$(2) Q_y = g(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(3) K = k_x + k_y$$

$$(4) L = l_x + l_y$$

$$(5) r = p_x f_k(k_x, l_x) = p_y g_k(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(6) w = p_x f_l(k_x, l_x) = p_y g_l(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(7) Q_x = d_x(p_x, p_y, M)$$

$$(8) Q_y = d_y(p_x, p_y, M)$$

$$(9) M = rK + wL + \pi_x(w, r, p_x, p_y) + \pi_y(w, r, p_x, p_y)$$

$p_x$  x 가 ,  $p_y$  y 가 ,  $f_l$  x l

$g_k \equiv \partial g / \partial k$  ,  $f_l \equiv \partial f / \partial l$  ,  
 (IV-8)

가  
 (numeraire) 가

B.

가 (tax wedge)가  
 $p_i^d = (1 + t_v) p_i^s$

2 :

- (1)  $Q_x = f(k_x, l_x)$  (IV-9)
- (2)  $Q_y = g(k_y, l_y)$
- (3)  $K = k_x + k_y$
- (4)  $L = l_x + l_y$
- (5)  $r = (1 - t_v) p_x^d f_k(k_x, l_x) = (1 - t_v) p_y^d g_k(k_y, l_y)$

$$(6) \quad w = (1 - t_v) p_x^d f_l(k_x, l_x) = (1 - t_v) p_y^d g_l(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(7) \quad Q_x = d_x [(1 + t_v) p_x^s, (1 + t_v) p_x^s, M]$$

$$(8) \quad Q_y = d_y [(1 + t_v) p_x^s, (1 + t_v) p_x^s, M]$$

$$(9) \quad M = rK + wL + \pi_x(w, r, (1 + t_v) p_x^s, (1 + t_v) p_y^s) + \pi_y(w, r, (1 + t_v) p_x^s, (1 + t_v) p_y^s) + t_v (p_x^s Q_x + p_y^s Q_y)$$

$$(10) \quad p_i^d = (1 + t_v) p_i^s \text{ for } i = x, y .$$

$t_v$  가가 .  
 가 가 가 가  
 가가 , 가 가  
 가 , 가  
 . 가가 .  
 (optimal taxation theory) (  $Q_x, Q_y$  )  
 12).

C. 가  
 가 , 가  
 가 (tax wedge)가 .  $i$  가 가  
 가  $p_i^d = (1 + t_v) p_i^s$ 가 가 가  
 가 . ,  $r, w$  가

---

12) 가 ,  
 가 가 .  
 가 , 가

가  $r_x, r_y, w_x, w_y$  가 가

$$r_x = r(1+t_c)(1+t_p), r_y = r(1+t_p)$$

$$w_x = w(1+t_p), w_y = w(1+t_p)$$

가

가 가 가 가

:

$$(1) Q_x = f(k_x, l_x) \quad (IV-10)$$

$$(2) Q_y = g(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(3) K = k_x + k_y$$

$$(4) L = l_x + l_y$$

$$(5)$$

$$r = (1-t_c)(1-t_p)(1-t_v)p^d_x f_l(k_x, l_x) = (1-t_p)(1-t_v)p^d_y g_l(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(6) w = (1-t_p)(1-t_v)p^d_x f_l(k_x, l_x) = (1-t_p)(1-t_v)p^d_y g_l(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(7) Q_x = d_x [(1+t_v)p^s_x, (1+t_v)p^s_y, M]$$

$$(8) Q_y = d_y [(1+t_v)p^s_x, (1+t_v)p^s_y, M]$$

$$(9)$$

$$M = rK + wL + \pi_x(w/(1-t_p), r/(1-t_c)(1-t_p), (1+t_v)p^s_x, (1+t_v)p^s_y) +$$

$$\pi_y(w/(1-t_p), r/(1-t_p), (1+t_v)p^s_x, (1+t_v)p^s_y) +$$

$$t_p(wL/(1-t_p) + rk_x/(1-t_c)(1-t_p) + rk_y/(1-t_p)) +$$

$$t_c rk_x/(1-t_c)(1-t_p) + t_v(p^s_x Q_x + p^s_y Q_y)$$

$$(10) p_x^d = p_x^s(1 - t_v), p_y^d = p_y^s(1 - t_v)$$

$t_p$  ,  $t_c$  . 가가  
가

(Harberger(1962)). 가

가 가  
가 .

D. 2 :

가 , 가  
가 (tax wedge)가 . 가  
가 가  
 . ( )

100% .

$\phi_{iv}$  가  $i$  가 가

$p_i^d = \{\phi_{iv}(1 - t_v) + (1 - \phi_{iv})\}p_i^s$ 가 .  $t_p$  ,

$t_c$  ,  $\phi$  .

가 가 가

. ,  $r$ ,  $w$  가 가

$r_x, r_y, w_x, w_y$  가 가 .

$$r_x = r(1 + \phi_{xc}t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk}t_p), r_y = r(1 + \phi_{yk}t_p) \tag{IV-11}$$

$$w_x = w(1 + \phi_{xl}t_p), w_y = w(1 + \phi_{yl}t_p)$$

가 . 가 .  
가 . 가 .

:

$$(1) Q_x = f(k_x, l_x) \quad (IV-12)$$

$$(2) Q_y = g(k_y, l_y)$$

$$(3) K = k_x + k_y$$

$$(4) L = l_x + l_y$$

(5)

$$\begin{aligned} r &= \{\phi_{xc}(1-t_c) + (1-\phi_{xc})\}\{\phi_{xk}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{xk})\}\{\phi_{xv}(1-t_v) + (1-\phi_{xv})\}p_x^d f_k(k_x, l_x) \\ &= \{\phi_{yk}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{yk})\}\{\phi_{yv}(1-t_v) + (1-\phi_{yv})\}p_y^d g_k(k_y, l_y) \end{aligned}$$

(6)

$$\begin{aligned} w &= \{\phi_{xl}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{xl})\}\{\phi_{xv}(1-t_v) + (1-\phi_{xv})\}p_x^d f_l(k_x, l_x) \\ &= \{\phi_{yl}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{yl})\}\{\phi_{yv}(1-t_v) + (1-\phi_{yv})\}p_y^d g_l(k_y, l_y) \end{aligned}$$

$$(7) Q_x = d_x [(1+\phi_{xv}t_v)p_x^s, (1+\phi_{yv}t_v)p_x^s, M]$$

$$(8) Q_y = d_y [(1+\phi_{xv}t_v)p_y^s, (1+\phi_{yv}t_v)p_y^s, M]$$

(9)

$$\begin{aligned} M &= rK + wL + \pi_x (w / \{\phi_{xl}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{xl})\}, r / [\{\phi_{xc}(1-t_c) \\ &+ (1-\phi_{xc})\}\{\phi_{xk}(1-t_c) + (1-\phi_{xk})\}], \{\phi_{xv}(1+t_v) + (1-\phi_{xv})\}p_x^s, \\ &\{\phi_{yv}(1+t_v) + (1-\phi_{yv})\}p_y^s) + \pi_y (w / \{\phi_{yl}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{yl})\}, \\ &r / \{\phi_{yl}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{yk})\}, \{\phi_{xv}(1+t_v) + (1-\phi_{xv})\}p_x^s, \{\phi_{yv}(1+t_v) + (1-\phi_{yv})\}p_y^s) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &+ t_p \sum_{i=x,y} \left[ \frac{w}{\{\phi_{il}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{il})\}} \phi_{il} l_i + \frac{r}{\{\phi_{ik}(1-t_p) + (1-\phi_{ik})\}} \phi_{ik} k_i \right] + \\ &t_v \sum_{i=x,y} \phi_{iv} p_i^d Q_i \end{aligned}$$

$$(10) p_x^d = p_x^s(1-\phi_{xv}t_v), \quad p_y^d = p_y^s(1-\phi_{yv}t_v)$$

$t_p$  ,  $t_c$  ,  $\phi$

$\{\phi_{xl}(1 - t_p) + (1 - \phi_{xl})\} X$

$\phi_{xl}$   $1 - \phi_{xl}$

$= t_i \phi_i$  .

(

가

(effective) 가가 가

가

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가

가

$\phi_{iv}, \phi_{il}, \phi_{ik}$  가

0 1

가 (CRS)

$\phi_{iv} \simeq \phi_{ik} \simeq \phi_{il}$

가

가

4)

4가

가

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가

2



13). Y 가  $\phi_y = \phi_{yi}, i=k,l,v$   
( X

) 가

$$\hat{p}_x^d - \hat{p}_y^d = \hat{p}_x^s - \hat{p}_y^s - t_v d\phi_y$$

$$\hat{Q}_x - \hat{Q}_y = -\sigma_d(\hat{p}_x^s - \hat{p}_y^s - t_v d\phi_y) \quad (IV-15)$$

$$\lambda^* \{-\sigma_d(\hat{p}_x^s - \hat{p}_y^s - t_v d\phi_y)\} = (\hat{w} - \hat{r})(a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y) \text{ 가} \quad (IV-14)$$

$$\lambda^* [-\sigma_d \{\theta^*(\hat{w} - \hat{r}) - 2t_v d\phi_y\}] = (\hat{w} - \hat{r})(a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y)$$

$$(\hat{w} - \hat{r})$$

$$(\hat{w} - \hat{r}) \{\lambda^* \sigma_d \theta^* + (a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y)\} = 2\lambda^* t_v d\phi_y \quad (IV-16)$$

가

[ 2] .

[ 2] Y  $\lambda^* < 0$  , Y

가

[ ]

(IV-16)

$$\frac{\hat{w} - \hat{r}}{d\phi_y} = \frac{2\lambda^* t_v}{\{\lambda^* \sigma_d \theta^* + (a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y)\}} < 0$$

13)  $\phi_{yv} \simeq \phi_{yk} \simeq \phi_{yl}$

$$\lambda^* \theta^*$$

$$a_x, a_y, \sigma_x, \sigma_y \quad . [ \quad 2 ]$$

가

Y

가

$$[ \quad 3 ] \lambda^* < 0, \quad Y$$

Y X

[ \quad ]

$$(4-2-4) [ \quad 2 ]$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\hat{Q}_x - \hat{Q}_y}{d\phi_y} &= \frac{\hat{Q}_x - \hat{Q}_y}{\hat{w} - \hat{r}} \frac{\hat{w} - \hat{r}}{d\phi_y} \\ &= \frac{(a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y)}{\lambda^*} \frac{2\lambda^* t_v}{\{\lambda^* \sigma_d \theta^* + (a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y)\}} \\ &= \frac{2t_v(a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y) \oplus}{\{\lambda^* \sigma_d \theta^* + (a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y)\} \oplus} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

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WTO

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IMF

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( : , %)

					가	
가	1996	20,764	62.8	27.9	9.3	-
	1996	2,012.7	84.2	15.3	0.6	-
	1994	2,972.6	87.4	9.9	0.7	1.9
	1996	64,860	82.1	11.8	5.9	0.2
	1994	27,483	41.7	36.2	13.7	8.4
	1996	1,748.1	85.3	13.5	1.2	-
	1996	35,226	58.9	28.7	12.3	0.1
	1996	126,708	91.6	8.3	0.1	-
	1995	866.7	67.5	28.5	4.0	-
	1996	3,709.8	85.2	10.6	3.3	-
	1996	2,627.3	90.6	9.4	-	-
	1996	2,123	85.8	13.6	0.7	-
	1996	35,982	89.5	9.5	1.1	-
	1994	22,680	62.8	21.4	4.0	11.8
	1994	2,151	85.3	8.1	0.9	5.7
	1996	4,467.2	71.7	26.6	1.7	-
	1996	3,963	89.0	10.6	0.4	-
	1996	1,687.5	78.8	19.8	1.2	0.2

: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1997.

가

가



가

- (1) X :  $\alpha = 0.7$ , Y :  $\alpha' = 0.4$ ,
- (2) X :  $\phi = 1.5$ , Y :  $\phi' = 1.0$ ,
- (3) :  $L\alpha = 1$ , :  $K\alpha = 1$ ,
- (4) X :  $t\alpha = 0.2$ , X :  $t\alpha' = 0.3$   
 Y :  $t\alpha = 0.2$ , Y :  $t\alpha' = 0.242$ ,
- (5) :  $\phi_{xc} \approx \phi_{xv} \approx \phi_{xk} \approx \phi_{xl} = 1$   $\phi_{yv} \approx \phi_{yk} \approx \phi_{yl} = 0.5$  1
- (6) X :  $\beta = 0.7$  0.5

< 25 >

	$\beta=0.7$		$\beta=0.5$	
	=100% (=0%)	=50% (=50%)	=100% (=0%)	=50% (=50%)
가	1.032	1.052	1.304	1.330
Qx	0.472	0.459	0.346	0.331
Qy	0.332	0.352	0.529	0.551
px 가	3.745	3.777	4.116	4.149
py 가	2.284	2.111	2.689	2.488
lx	0.571	0.550	0.364	0.344
ly	0.429	0.450	0.636	0.656
kx	0.817	0.801	0.656	0.633
ky	0.183	0.199	0.344	0.367
	0.425	0.424	0.428	0.427

가

Y

가 2%

Y

4%

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Y

4. 가

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(externality)

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OECD

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(1994)

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Lynch and Black(1995)

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< 1> (IV-13), (IV-14), (IV-15)

(constant retruns to scale) 가

$$w/\{\phi(1-t_p) + (1-\phi)\} \approx w(1+\phi t_p), \quad r/\{\phi(1-t_p) + (1-\phi)\} \approx r(1+\phi t_p)$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_x &= c_x \{r(1+\phi_{xc}t_c)(1+\phi_{xk}t_p), w(1+\phi_{xl}t_p)\} Q_x \\ c_y &= c_y \{r(1+\phi_{yk}t_p), w(1+\phi_{yl}t_p)\} Q_y \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

x y (envelope theorem)  
가

$$\begin{aligned} L_x &= c_{xl} Q_x, \quad L_y = c_{yl} Q_y \\ K_x &= c_{xk} Q_x, \quad K_y = c_{yk} Q_y \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

(2)

(3)

$$\begin{aligned} c_{xl} Q_x + c_{yl} Q_y &= L_0 \\ c_{xk} Q_x + c_{yk} Q_y &= K_0 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

가 가  
가

$$\begin{aligned}
p_x^s &= c_x \{r(1 + \phi_{xc} t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk} t_p), w(1 + \phi_{xl} t_p)\} \\
p_y^s &= c_y \{r(1 + \phi_{yk} t_p), w(1 + \phi_{yl} t_p)\}
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

가

$$Q_x = Q_x(p_x^d, p_y^d, M) \quad \text{and} \quad Q_y = Q_y(p_x^d, p_y^d, M) \tag{5}$$

$$p_x^d = p_x^s(1 - \phi_{xv} t_v), \quad p_y^d = p_y^s(1 - \phi_{yv} t_v)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
Q_x &= \frac{\partial e(p_x^d, p_y^d, U)}{\partial Q_x} \\
Q_y &= \frac{\partial e(p_x^d, p_y^d, U)}{\partial Q_y}
\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

(log- linearization)

가

가

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{Q}_x &= \epsilon_{xx} \hat{p}_x^d + \epsilon_{xy} \hat{p}_y^d + \eta_x \frac{DU}{M} e_u \\
\hat{Q}_y &= \epsilon_{yx} \hat{p}_x^d + \epsilon_{yy} \hat{p}_y^d + \eta_y \frac{DU}{M} e_u
\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

가

가

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_y \widehat{Q}_x - \eta_x \widehat{Q}_y &= (\eta_y \varepsilon_{xx} - \eta_x \varepsilon_{yx}) \widehat{p}_x^d - (\eta_x \varepsilon_{yy} - \eta_y \varepsilon_{xy}) \widehat{p}_y^d \\
&= (\eta_y \varepsilon_{xx} + \eta_x \varepsilon_{yy})(\widehat{p}_x^d - \widehat{p}_y^d) \\
&= \sigma_d (\widehat{p}_x^s - \widehat{p}_y^s + d\phi_{xv}t_v - d\phi_{yv}t_v)
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

$$\sigma_d \quad \text{가} \quad . \tag{IV-13}$$

$$\text{가} \quad \text{가} \tag{4}$$

$$\text{가} \quad \text{가} ,$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\widehat{p}_x^s &= \frac{w(1 + \phi_{xl}t_p)c_{lx}}{c_x}(\widehat{w} + d\phi_{xl}t_p) + \\
&\quad \frac{r(1 + \phi_{xc}t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk}t_p)c_{kx}}{c_x}(\widehat{r} + d\phi_{xc}t_c + d\phi_{xk}t_p) \\
\widehat{p}_y^s &= \frac{w(1 + \phi_{yl}t_p)c_{ly}}{c_y}(\widehat{w} + d\phi_{yl}t_p) + \frac{r(1 + \phi_{yk}t_p)c_{ky}}{c_y}(\widehat{r} + d\phi_{yk}t_p)
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

(share)

$$\theta_{xl} \equiv \frac{w(1 + \phi_{xl}t_p)c_{xl}}{c_x} \quad \theta_{yl} \equiv \frac{w(1 + \phi_{yl}t_p)c_{yl}}{c_y} \tag{10}$$

$$\theta_{xk} \equiv \frac{r(1 + \phi_{xc}t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk}t_p)c_{xk}}{c_x} \quad \theta_{yk} \equiv \frac{r(1 + \phi_{yk}t_p)c_{yk}}{c_y}$$

(4)

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{p}_x^d - \hat{p}_y^d &= (\theta_{lx} - \theta_{yl})\hat{w} + \theta_{xl}d\phi_{xl}t_p - \theta_{yl}d\phi_{yl}t_p \\
&- (\theta_{yk} - \theta_{xk})\hat{r} - \theta_{yk}d\phi_{yk}t_p + \theta_{xk}(d\phi_{xc}t_c + d\phi_{xk}t_p) \\
&= \theta^*(\hat{w} - \hat{r}) + \sum_{i=x,y} \sum_{j=l,k} d\phi_{ij}t_p + \theta_{xk}d\phi_{xc}t_c
\end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

$$\theta^* \equiv \theta_{xl} - \theta_{yl} = \theta_{yk} - \theta_{xk} \quad \text{Y}$$

가

(IV- 14)

$\theta^*$

가

(IV- 15)

$$\hat{c}_{xl} = \frac{(1 + \phi_{xl}t_p)c_{llx}}{c_{xl}}(\hat{w} + d\phi_{xl}t_p) + \frac{(1 + \phi_{xc}t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk}t_p)c_{lkx}}{c_{xl}}(\hat{r} + d\phi_{xc}t_c + d\phi_{xk}t_p) \tag{12}$$

$$(1 + \phi_{xl}t_p)c_{llx} + (1 + \phi_{xc}t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk}t_p)c_{lkx} = 0$$

$$(1 + \phi_{xl}t_p)c_{klx} + (1 + \phi_{xc}t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk}t_p)c_{kkx} = 0$$

$$(10) \quad \hat{c}_{xl}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{c}_{xl} &= - \left( \frac{(1 + \phi_{xc} t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk} t_p) c_{kk}}{c_x} \right) \left( \frac{(1 + \phi_{xl} t_p) c_{lx} c_x}{(1 + \phi_{xc} t_c)(1 + \phi_{xk} t_p) c_{lx} c_{kx}} \right) (\hat{w} + d\phi_{xl} t_p) - (\hat{r} + d\phi_{xc} t_c + d\phi_{xk} t_p) \\
&\equiv - \theta_{kx} \sigma_x (\hat{w} + d\phi_{xl} t_p) - (\hat{r} + d\phi_{xc} t_c + d\phi_{xk} t_p)
\end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{X} \quad \sigma_x &\equiv \left( - \frac{w c_{lx} c_x}{r c_{lx} c_{kx}} \right) \quad \phi_{xl} = \phi_{xk} \quad \text{가} \\
(13) \quad & \hat{c}_{ij} \quad .
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{c}_{yl} &= - \theta_{yk} \sigma_y ((\hat{w} + t_p d\phi_{yl}) - (\hat{r} + t_p d\phi_{yk})) \\
\hat{c}_{xk} &= \theta_{xl} \sigma_x ((\hat{w} + t_p d\phi_{xl}) - (\hat{r} + t_p d\phi_{xc} t_c + t_p d\phi_{xl})) \\
\hat{c}_{yk} &= \theta_{yl} \sigma_y ((\hat{w} + t_p d\phi_{yl}) - (\hat{r} + t_p d\phi_{yk}))
\end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

(3)

$$c_{xl} Q_x (\hat{c}_{xl} + \hat{Q}_x) + c_{yl} Q_y (\hat{c}_{yl} + \hat{Q}_y) = 0$$

$$\lambda_{xl} \equiv c_{xl} Q_x / L_0$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda_{xl} \hat{Q}_x + \lambda_{yl} \hat{Q}_y &= (\hat{w} - \hat{r})(\lambda_{xl} \theta_{xk} \sigma_x + \lambda_{yl} \theta_{yk} \sigma_y) \\
&+ \lambda_{xl} \theta_{xk} \sigma_x (d\phi_{xl} t_p - t_c d\phi_{xc} - t_p d\phi_{xk}) \\
&+ \lambda_{yl} \theta_{yk} \sigma_y (t_p d\phi_{yl} - t_p d\phi_{yk})
\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

$$\lambda_{xk} \equiv c_{xk} Q_x / K_0$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda_{xk} \hat{Q}_x + \lambda_{yk} \hat{Q}_y = & - (\hat{w} - \hat{r})(\lambda_{xk} \theta_{xl} \sigma_x + \lambda_{yk} \theta_{yl} \sigma_y) \\
& - \lambda_{xk} \cdot \theta_{xl} \cdot \sigma_x (\lambda_{yl} \theta_{yk} \sigma_y (t_p d\phi_{yl} - t_p d\phi_{yk})) \\
& - \lambda_{yk} \cdot \theta_{yl} \cdot \sigma_y (\lambda_{xl} \theta_{xk} \sigma_x (t_p d\phi_{xl} - t_c d\phi_{xc} - t_p d\phi_{xk}))
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

Y

가 (15) (16)

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda^* (\hat{Q}_x - \hat{Q}_y) = & (\hat{w} - \hat{r}) [\sigma_x (\theta_{xk} \lambda_{xl} + \theta_{xl} \lambda_{xk}) + \sigma_y (\theta_{yk} \lambda_{yl} + \theta_{yl} \lambda_{yk})] \\
& \equiv (\hat{w} - \hat{r}) (a_x \sigma_x + a_y \sigma_y)
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda^* \quad \lambda^* \equiv \lambda_{xl} - \lambda_{xk} = \lambda_{yk} - \lambda_{yl} \\
\theta^* \text{ 가 } \lambda^* \\
\text{가 } \tag{IV-15}
\end{aligned}$$

< 1>

( : %)

	25~34	35~44	45~64	
(1991)	32	35	23	30
(1990)	51	49	40	46
(1992)	43	27	11	27
(1991)	33	29	21	27
(1991)	40	42	30	37
(1993)	36	33	41	36
(1993)	42	41	34	38
(1991)	37	43	33	38

: OECD, *Education at a Glance*, 1995.

< 2>

( : %)

1980	68.8	100.0	146.3	228.5
1985	74.7	100.0	129.8	226.5
1986	77.6	100.0	129.0	222.0
1987	80.3	100.0	127.2	224.0
1988	82.1	100.0	121.1	202.7
1989	83.1	100.0	119.1	191.0
1990	83.8	100.0	117.4	185.5
1991	84.6	100.0	117.4	179.3
1992	87.3	100.0	113.8	168.8
1993	88.1	100.0	109.5	161.3
1994	86.9	100.0	107.4	155.7
1995	87.2	100.0	108.4	155.9
1996	85.3	100.0	107.5	156.0

: 『 , 『 , 1997.』

< 3 >

( : )

				가
1985	15,592	14,970	622	56.6
1986	16,116	15,505	611	57.0
1987	16,873	16,354	519	57.1
1988	17,305	16,869	435	58.3
1989	18,023	17,560	463	59.6
1990	18,539	18,085	454	60.0
1991	19,048	18,612	436	60.6
1992	19,426	18,961	465	60.9
1993	19,803	19,253	550	61.1
1994	20,326	19,837	189	61.7
1995	20,797	20,377	419	62.0
1996	21,188	20,764	425	62.0
1997	21,604	21,048	556	62.2
1998. 9	21,663	20,178	1,485	61.6

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< 4 >

( : %)

1995	85	1.2	226	2.5	108	2.7	419	2.0
1996	84	1.1	257	2.7	98	2.3	439	2.0
1997	120	1.5	329	3.5	112	2.6	561	2.6
1998. 9	411	5.7	755	8.1	319	6.3	1485	6.9

: .

( : % )

	1985			1986			1987			1988		
	(A)	(B)	A - B	(A)	(B)	A - B	(A)	(B)	A - B	(A)	(B)	A - B
	3.7	3.9	- 0.2	4.0	3.5	0.5	3.8	3.6	0.2	3.7	3.7	0.0
	3.2	3.1	0.1	2.8	2.8	0.0	2.5	2.6	- 0.1	2.0	3.0	- 1.0
	4.3	4.5	- 0.2	4.8	4.2	0.6	4.6	4.3	0.3	4.4	4.5	- 0.1
·가	1.5	1.3	0.2	1.7	1.8	- 0.1	1.2	1.1	0.1	1.4	1.0	0.4
	3.7	4.7	- 1.0	3.8	4.0	- 0.2	3.4	3.9	- 0.5	2.8	2.8	0.0
·	3.1	3.1	0.0	3.4	3.2	0.2	3.5	3.1	0.4	3.4	3.0	0.4
	2.9	3.0	- 0.1	2.7	2.3	0.4	2.3	2.2	0.1	2.1	2.0	0.1
· , ·	2.0	2.2	- 0.2	2.4	2.2	0.2	2.1	1.9	0.2	2.3	2.1	0.2
	1.9	1.7	- 0.2	1.7	1.5	0.2	1.7	1.4	0.3	2.1	1.8	0.3

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< 5 >

	1989			1990			1991			1992			1993		
	(A)	(B)	A - B	(A)	(B)	A - B	(A)	(B)	A - B	(A)	(B)	A - B	(A)	(B)	A - B
	3.01	3.23	-0.22	2.99	3.20	-0.21	3.09	3.25	-0.16	2.98	3.24	-0.26	3.01	3.14	-0.13
	2.05	2.50	-0.45	2.57	3.24	-0.67	2.36	3.68	-1.32	2.57	3.57	-1.0	3.23	3.63	-0.40
	3.38	3.82	-0.44	3.32	3.32	0.0	3.47	3.88	-0.41	3.33	3.85	-0.52	3.40	3.60	-0.20
· 가	1.44	1.10	0.34	1.41	0.88	0.53	1.28	0.97	0.31	1.40	0.96	0.44	0.83	0.98	-0.15
	3.31	2.89	0.42	3.05	2.42	0.63	2.92	2.33	0.59	2.75	2.47	0.28	3.93	3.98	-0.05
·	3.00	3.14	-0.14	3.20	3.15	0.05	3.26	3.25	0.01	3.18	3.30	-0.12	2.96	3.24	-0.28
	2.01	1.94	0.07	2.30	2.24	0.06	2.42	2.36	0.06	2.62	2.46	0.16	2.75	2.63	0.12
·	2.68	2.14	0.54	2.44	2.11	0.33	2.81	2.27	0.54	2.69	2.52	0.17	2.36	2.44	-0.08
	1.97	1.77	0.20	2.06	1.74	0.32	1.89	1.80	0.09	1.75	1.69	0.06	1.48	1.39	0.09

< 5 >

	1994			1995			1996			1997			1998. 10		
	(A)	(B)	A- B	(A)	(B)	A- B	(A)	(B)	A- B	(A)	(B)	A- B	(A)	(B)	A- B
	2.90	2.85	0.05	2.84	2.86	-0.02	2.77	2.86	-0.09	2.32	2.65	-0.33	1.87	2.34	-0.47
	2.19	3.11	-0.92	1.99	2.81	-0.82	2.63	2.99	-0.36	1.91	2.69	-0.78	0.95	1.45	-0.50
	3.21	3.11	0.10	3.03	3.11	-0.08	2.87	3.10	-0.23	2.45	2.93	-0.53	2.00	2.65	-0.65
·가	0.95	0.97	-0.02	1.47	1.12	0.35	1.00	0.89	0.11	0.82	0.94	-0.12	1.78	2.06	-0.28
	3.52	3.40	0.12	3.61	3.63	-0.02	2.67	2.99	-0.32	2.63	3.03	-0.40	2.57	2.54	0.03
·	3.14	3.18	-0.04	3.15	3.36	-0.21	3.41	3.45	-0.04	2.66	3.14	-0.48	1.65	2.61	-0.96
	2.62	2.74	-0.12	2.66	2.63	0.03	2.31	2.29	0.02	1.78	1.88	-0.10	1.78	1.88	-0.10
· ,	2.51	2.49	0.02	2.59	2.39	0.20	2.66	2.53	0.13	1.57	2.39	-0.82	1.57	2.39	-0.82
	1.54	1.37	0.17	1.57	1.44	0.13	1.80	1.57	0.23	1.88	1.80	0.08	1.89	1.81	0.08

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< Abstract >

## **Human Capital Accumulation and Taxes**

**Chul-In Lee**

This study addresses the effects of the Korean tax policy (including the tax system and tax administration) on the accumulation of human capital. Recently, a lot of attention has been paid to the role of human capital on economic growth. The main argument from the various studies on human capital and economic growth is that there are increasing returns to scale in human capital accumulation. In other words, a positive externality from human capital investment makes it possible for an economy to continuously grow faster than other economies. Therefore, it is important to encourage the positive externality and hence, this paper seeks to provide optimal tax incentives for human capital accumulation.

A simulation of a general equilibrium macro-economic model was conducted to evaluate the current tax structure in terms of its disincentive effects. Our results showed that relative to the income tax structures of developed countries, our tax treatment gives more rewards to the returns to human capital. These results, however, do not mean that we have room for strengthening our income taxation. On the contrary, given the rigidities in the labor market such as compensation based on seniority, low rewards for higher education, etc., more substantial incentives may be needed.

Our second analysis deals with the effects of the current tax administration practices on the efficiency of human resource allocation. One of the chronic problems faced by the Korean tax administration is tax evasion by the self-employed, which comprises almost half of the labor force. While there are many reasons for the high proportion of the self-employed in the total labor force, our theoretical analysis shows that tax evasion is a significant factor explaining this pattern. The resulting allocation of human resources in this manner can be

very inefficient, causing a loss in price competition relative to other countries. A more conscious effort is needed to improve tax administration, especially in the areas of the revenue collecting process, budget allocation to the National Tax Administration (NTA), the number of employees in NTA, and the value added tax rate.

In the last analysis, we evaluate the current government-run training programs in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The current system is based on a type of insurance system where individual firms pay contributions and receive a level of training subsidy when the demand for training occurs. However, since the demand for training is very low from small firms that would in fact seem to benefit most from training, therefore contributions by them result in a *de facto* tax. Meanwhile, the training demand from large firms is already high, so government intervention does not seem to be necessary to provide training for them. Overall, the financial assistance portion of the current training system does not provide any incentives for human capital accumulation. To encourage and reward human capital accumulation, we propose some tax deductions or reductions when a substantial amount of training is undertaken.