


# EU 국가들의 재정관리제도

(EU Fiscal Governance Survey Database)

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# 유럽의 Fiscal Governance Dataset

## I. 데이터베이스 소개

### 1. 도입

- 1970년대 중반 이후, EU 회원국들의 GDP대비 부채비율을 꾸준한 상승세를 보이며 미래세대의 부담이 증가하는 모습을 보여 왔음.
- 최근의 전세계적인 금융위기로, 각국의 재정상황은 더욱 악화되었고, 사회의 고령화로 인한 재정수요의 지속적 증가는 각국의 재정건전화의 필요성에 대한 관심을 더욱 고조시킴.
- 재정건전화 정책에 있어, 강력한 재정관리(fiscal governance)의 효용은 기존의 많은 경험을 통해 알려져 왔음.
  - 국가의 재정관리, 혹은 재정체제(fiscal framework)는 재정과 관련된 계획, 승인, 그리고 집행·관리에 영향을 미치는 규칙·규율이나 절차 등을 의미.
  - 주로 3가지 측면에서 많이 논의가 됨.<sup>1)</sup>
    - 수치적인 재정준칙(numerical fiscal rules)
    - 독립적인 재정기구(independent fiscal institutions)
    - 중기재정제도(MTBF, medium-term budgetary framework)
- 2005년 안정과 성장 협약(SGP, Stability and Growth Pact)의 개정과 함께, EU위원회에서는 회원국들의 재정관리제도에 대한 survey를 실시
  - Survey는 1차로 2005년 말에 두 가지가 실시되고, 추가로 2006년에 2차가 이루어짐.
    - 1차 survey는 1990~2005년까지 각 회원국들이 운용하고 있는 재정준칙과 독립적인 재정기구들에 관한 것

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1) 이 외에 예산 등과 관련 절차에 관한 규칙(Procedural rules)들도 중요한 측면이나, 이미 많은 논의가 이루어져 이 survey에서는 대상에서 제외.

- 2차는 각 회원국의 중기재정 제도에 관하 것.
- 이후에, 2008년에는 앞서의 3가지 survey에 대해 다시 한 번 survey를 실시하여 2005~6년 결과에 대한 update가 이루어짐.
- 본 보고서는 이 세 가지 영역에서의 survey들의 결과들을 재정리한 것.
  - Survey결과들은 II절에서 3개 섹션으로 나누어 각 토픽별로 정리.
  - 각 섹션의 처음에 제시된 질문들은 survey결과가 정리된 표에 대응되도록 정리되었고, 몇몇 경우 원래의 설문지 질문에서 표에 맞도록 순서 및 내용을 재조정.
- ※ 데이터가 survey질문의 모든 답을 포함하고 있지는 못하여, 몇몇 질문의 경우 자료가 없는 경우가 있음.

## 2. 수치적 재정준칙(Numerical Fiscal Rules)

- 재정준칙/규칙에서는 회원국들이 실행하고 있는 주요 재정지표에 대한 수치적 제약을 정리.
- ‘재정준칙’은 여러 가지 방식으로 정의될 수 있으나, 가장 널리 통용되는 정의는 Kopits & Symansky(1998)<sup>2)</sup>에 의한 것.
 

"... a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt or a major component thereof."
- 위의 정의에 나타난 재정준칙의 몇 가지 중요한 요소는, ‘종합재정지표(summary indicator)’에 대한 ‘항구적 제약(permanent constraint)’이라는 점.
- 실제 적용에 있어서는 몇 가지 측면에서 결정되어야 할 요인들이 있음.
  - 제약되는 재정정책(fiscal policy)의 주체, 즉 중앙정부, 지방정부, 일반정부 등 제약이 효력을 가지는 범위에 대한 결정.
  - 제약되는 재정정책의 시간적 범위

2) Kopits, G. and S. Symansky(1998) "Fiscal Policy Rules," *IMF Occasional Paper* #162

- 제약되는 재정 지표(들)
- 제약의 강제성 정도 혹은 법적 지위 등.

□ 데이터는 1990~2008년의 기간에 회원국들이 사용하는 여러 재정준칙에 대한 자료를 포함.

- 주요 재정 지표 중 재정수지, 부채, 지출, 그리고 수입의 측면에서의 재정준칙들을 고려.
- 다양한 범위의 정부를 고려: 일반정부(General Government), 중앙정부(Central Government), 지방정부(Regional/Local Government), 사회보장기금(Social Security)
- 재정 준칙의 종류, 범위, 법적인 위치, 강제장치 및 감독장치 등 준칙과 관련된 여러 제도적 특징이 조사됨.

□ 재정준칙과 관련 새로이 두 가지 지수들을 분석에 도입

- The Fiscal Rule Strength Index(FRSI)
  - 준칙의 준수/강제성 정도를 계량화하는 지표. 더 '강한' 준칙일수록 더 효과적일 것이고, 이 '강함'의 정도는 제도적 요인에 의해 크게 좌우.
  - 계량화를 위해 (i)법적인 위치, (ii)준칙 준수 여부의 감독을 담당하는 기관 (iii)준칙을 강제하는 것을 담당하는 기관, 그리고 (iv)준칙의 강제 메커니즘의 정보를 사용.
- The Fiscal Rule Index(FRI)
  - 회원국의 각각의 준칙에 대한 FRSI를 기반으로, 각 준칙의 적용범위에 대한 정보를 추가하여 계산.

### 3. 독립된 재정기구(Independent Fiscal Institutions)

□ 여기서 '독립된 재정기구'는 정당에 속하지 않은 공공기구로, 중앙은행이나 정부, 혹은 의회에 포함되지 않고, 예산에 대한 거시전망을 제공하고, 재정성과를 검토

하고, 정부 재정정책에 조언을 하는 역할을 수행하는 기구들을 의미.

- 이 기구들은 주로 공공자금으로 운영되지만, 재정당국과는 독립적 기능을 수행하고, 다른 정치적 편향도 없어야 함.
- 감사원도 단순 회계감사의 역할 이외에, 위에 나열된 기능(들)을 수행한다면 독립된 재정기구로 간주.
- 의회의 특별위원회나, 임시적인 전문가 조직 등을 통해 위의 기능을 때때로 수행하는 경우는 제외.

□ 여러 EU회원국들은 이러한 기구(Fiscal Council이라고도 지칭)들을 재정정책을 개선 위해 다양한 방면에서 이용하고 있음.

- 예산편성 시 사용되는 거시전망이 정부 측의 낙관적 전망경향을 배제하고, 독립적인 기구들에서 제공하는 전망이 정부 전망을 대체하는 경우가 많음.
- 또한, 재정 집행을 감독하는데 있어 재정목표의 준수 등을 공정하게 감독하는 것이 가능.
- 예산 정책의 장·단기적 비용-효과에 대해 분석하고 정책 대안도 분석함으로써 정책당국 뿐 아니라 일반 대중에게도 정책의 인지도를 높이는 역할이 가능.
- 재정정책에 대한 규범적 분석이나 평가, 혹은 정책 제안의 역할을 하여, 재정정책이 준칙이나 지속가능성 등의 여러 목표에 부합되도록 하는 역할.

□ 데이터는 2006년과 2008년에 이루어진 2번의 survey결과를 정리

- 각 회원국들이 운영하는 기구들을 상기 특징들을 중심으로 분류.
  - 그러나 각 기구들이 가지는 다양한 특성으로 인해 전체 특성들을 총망라하기는 불가능.
- 각 기구들의 (정관상의) 역할과 다양한 기능, 구성과 평판 및 영향력 등에 관한 결과가 정리.

#### 4. 중기재정(MTBFs, Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks)

□ 중기재정제도는 정부가 재정 정책을 설립함에 있어 예산의 회계연도를 초월하여 재정의 시계를 넓히게 하는 재정제도를 말함.

- 비록 정부의 재정정책이 매년 편성되는 예산의 승인을 통해 이루어지기는 하지만, 대부분의 정책 실행에는 일반적 예산의 회계연도를 넘어서는 기간 동안의 재원조달이 필요.
- 따라서, 매년 다음 회계연도의 예산을 통해서만 정책을 바라보는 것은 그 정책이 가지는 재정적 효과와 비용에 대해 잘못된 시각을 가지게 되고, 전체적으로 균형 잡힌 계획을 세우는데 장애가 됨.
- 중기재정제도는 일반적으로 다년도 예산계획을 세우고, 그에 대한 집행 및 감독을 포괄하는 제도로서, 지출과 수입 그리고 재정수지에 대한 예측을 포함.
- 또한, 이러한 중기재정제도는 재정준칙의 도입과 같은 제도적 개혁을 효율적으로 도입하기 위한 제도적 장치로서의 역할.

□ EU 회원국들의 2006년과 2008년 두 번에 걸친 survey 결과를 정리

- 각 회원국들이 개별적으로 운영하고 있는 중기재정제도 외에, EU위원회에 매년 제출하는 SCP(Stability and Convergence Programme)도 일종의 중기재정 제도로 간주.
- 각 국의 예산절차, 중기재정/SCP의 준비 및 집행, 그리고 단년도 예산과의 연계 등에 관한 자료.

□ 중기재정지수(Quality of Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index)

- 중기재정제도의 유무와 성격, 그리고 SCP의 국가 내 성격 등의 내용을 기초로 작성
- 주요 기준으로는 중기재정제도의 존재여부, 단년도 예산과의 연계, 중기재정 편성에 있어 국회의 역할, 지방정부와의 협의 구조, 그리고 감독과 강제장치 .

[참고] 자료에 사용된 공통 약어표

A	Annual	GS	Governmental structure
BA	Budgetary accounting system	IND	Independent
BBR	Budget balance rule	L	Legal act
BC	Business cycle (multiannual)	LG	Local government
C	Constitution	M	Multiannual
CA	Coalition agreement	MF	Ministry of finance
CC	Coordination committee	MIN	Ministry/ministries
CG	Central government	MTBF	Medium-term budgetary framework
CM	Council of Ministers	n/a	Not applicable
CO	Council Opinion	NP	National parliament
CoA	Court of auditors	O	Other
DR	Debt rule	p.a.	Per annum
ER	Expenditure rule	PA	Political agreement
ESA	ESA95 system of accounts	PF	Public finances
FC	Fiscal Council	R	Replaced
FCRI	Fiscal rule coverage index	RG	Regional government
FRSI	Fiscal rule strength index	RR	Revenue rule
GG	General government (includes CG, RG, LG, SS)	SCP	Stability and Convergence Programme
GOV	Government	SS	Social security

## II. Survey 결과

### 1. 재정준칙(Numerical Fiscal Rules)

#### 가. Questionnaire

**Please specify the nature of the rule:**

- Revenue rule
- Expenditure rule
- Budget Balance rule (this includes balanced budget rules, golden rules and rules In relation to the budget balance)
- Debt rule
- Other rule, please specify:

**Please Provide a general description of the rule:**

- a. Please indicate the relevant general government sub-sector to which the rule applies.
- The whole of the general government sector
  - Central government (The State and other central government entities)
  - The State / Federal Government
  - Regional governments (autonomous regions of the federated states)
  - Local governments
  - Social security
  - Additional information:
- b. Target/Constraint
- 1) In case of expenditure rules:
- The rule targets a nominal expenditure ceiling (level)
  - The rule targets a real expenditure ceiling (level)
  - The rule targets a nominal expenditure growth rate
  - The rule targets a real expenditure growth rate
  - The rule targets a specific expenditure to GDP ratio
  - Others, please describe:
- 2) In case of revenue rules:
- The rule imposes constraints on the allocation of higher-than-expected

revenues in good times. Please describe:

- The rule imposes constraints on the developments in the tax-to-GDP ratio. Please specify:
- Other, please describe:

3) In case of budget balance rules:

- The rule targets a specific budget balance in nominal terms
- The rule targets a specific budget balance as a percentage of GDP
- The rule targets a specific budget balance as percentage of GDP in cyclically-adjusted or structural terms.
- The rule targets a specific budget balance as a percentage of GDP within a range of possible values depending on growth
- The rule targets a given improvement of the budget balance (as a % of GDP).
- The rule targets a given improvement of the structural or cyclically-adjusted budget balance (as a % of GDP).
- Other, please describe:

4) In case of debt rules:

- The rule targets a specific amount of debt in nominal terms
- The rule targets a specific debt-to-GDP ratio
- The rule targets a given reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio
- The rule establishes a ceiling for the government (or a specific sub-sector) debt in level or as a % of GDP
- Other, please describe:

c. Please specify whether the aggregate targeted by the rule (expenditure, revenues, balance budget etc) is defined in terms of ESA95 accounting or in terms of another accounting system (cash/budgetary accounting). If you consider that some relevant information on this aspect should be pointed out, please use the box below:

- ESA95 accounting
- Other cash/budgetary accounting basis, please specify:
- Additional information:

d. Please indicate the time span covered by the rule. Notably, does the rule extend the time horizon beyond the yearly budgetary cycle? For instance, in

case of a multi-annual expenditure rule, please indicate the time horizon covered by the rule:

- e. Please, indicate which of the following best describes the statutory base of the rule:

Medium term arrangement:

- Coalition agreement.
- Political agreement or commitment made by the relevant authority (e.g. commitment made by the government, the Minister of Finances or the President of a regional government) other than a coalition agreement.
- Other, please describe:

Long term arrangement:

- Provisions related to the rule are enshrined in a legal act (e.g. rule incorporated in Public Finance Act, in a Fiscal Responsibility Law or in any other similar statutory act).
- Pact or agreement reached by different general government tiers not necessarily enshrined in any legal act but which makes up a domestic stability commitment.
- Provisions related to the rule are enshrined in the Constitution.
- Other, please describe:

In case the answers given in this questionnaire refer to a reformed fiscal rule, and the changes introduced are related to question e, please explain the main motivations of these changes.

- f. Who is responsible for monitoring respect of the rule?

- No body in charge of monitoring.
- The Ministry of Finance.
- Governmental structure (politically dependant) other than the Ministry of Finance. Please specify:
- National Parliament
- Independent authority (e.g. Fiscal Council, Court of Auditors). If yes, please specify:
- Other, please specify:

- g. In case of non-compliance with the rule, could you please indicate which of the

following options best describes who / which body enforces the rule observance:

- No body in charge of enforcement.
- Internal enforcer - Ministry of Finance.
- Governmental structure (politically dependant) other than the Ministry of Finance. Please specify:
  - National Parliament
  - Independent enforcer, e.g. judiciary branch or an independent fiscal body / review panel created to ensure the rule enforcement. Please specify:
  - Other, please specify:

h. Could you please specify what option best describes the actions taken in case of non-compliance or risks of non-compliance with the targets implied by the rule (more than one option is possible).

- There are no ex-ante defined actions.
- The government or the relevant authority is obliged to prepare a proposal to the Parliament or to the body which enforces the rule observance with corrective measures.
- The ministry/official body/government or relevant authority responsible for the overrun is obliged to correct it by taking appropriate actions. Please specify:
  - There is an automatic correction mechanism (e.g. a link between non-compliance in the current year and the resource allocation in the budget of the following year). If so, please describe the mechanism:
  - There is a possibility of imposing sanctions. If so, please describe the mechanism (who imposes what sanctions on whom and whether their imposition seems credible):
  - There is an automatic mechanism for sanction imposition in case of non-compliance. If so please describe the mechanism (who imposes what sanctions on whom):
  - Other, please specify:

i. Please indicate what elements (if any) are excluded from the rule coverage in each of the following cases:

- 1) In case of expenditure rules, please indicate if some expenditure items are excluded from the rule coverage and please estimate their share in total

general government expenditure:

- Interest expenditure:
- Cyclically-sensitive items (such as unemployment related expenditure)  
please specify:
- Public investment. Please specify the relevant definition of public investment applied (e.g. gross or net public investment, including only some specific items etc.):
- Other items, please specify, including their share in general government expenditure:

2) In case of revenue rules, please indicate if some categories of receipts (e.g. some particular taxes) are excluded from the rule coverage and please estimate their share in total general government revenue:

- No specific revenue item is excluded
- Yes, some specific revenue item(s) are excluded, please specify:

3) In case of budget balance rules, please indicate if some budgetary elements are explicitly excluded from the rule coverage and please estimate their share in total general government expenditure:

- Interest expenditure. If relevant, please specify their share in general government expenditure:
- Public investment. Please specify the relevant definition of public investment applied (e.g. gross or net public investment, including only some specific items etc.):
- Others, please specify:

4) In case of debt rules, please indicate the following:

- Some types of government liabilities are excluded from the rule. Please, specify and give the percentage of debt excluded as a percentage of total general government gross debt:
- Other exclusions. Please specify and give the amount of debt excluded as a percentage of total general government gross debt:

j. In force since:

k. In force until:

## 나. 재정수입에 관한 준칙(Revenue Rule)

### (1) Summary Table

Item Country	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
Austria											
Belgium	CG	Growth of revenues in relation to GDP growth	BA	4	CA	No body	MF, GS	No predefined action	Y	1992	1999
Bulgaria											
Czech Republic											
Germany											
Denmark	GG	Limits on direct or indirect tax rates	n/a	n/a	PA	MF	MF	No predefined action	N	2001	2008+
Estonia											
Spain											
Finland	SS	Allocation of revenue surpluses	ESA	BC	L	GS	IND	No predefined action	N	1999	2008+
France											
Hungary											
Ireland											
Italy											
Lithuania	CG	Allocation of higher than expected revenues to deficit reduction	ESA	M	L	MF, IND, NP	MF, NP	Possibility of sanctions and non-approval of the budget	N	2008	2008+
Luxembourg											
Latvia	CG, SS	Actual revenues must cover special budgets	BA	A	L	MF, GS	GS	No predefined action	N	1994	2008+
Netherlands	GG	Allocation of higher-than-expected revenues	ESA	4	CA	MF	MF	MF proposes corrective measures	N	1994	2008+
Poland											
Portugal											
Romania											
Sweden											
Slovenia											
Slovakia											
United Kingdom											

## (2) Additional Information

### Belgium

	Growth of fiscal revenues has to be in line with GDP growth (both in nominal terms).
	Rule in the process leading to EMU qualification.

### Denmark

	Direct and indirect taxes cannot be raised.
	Introduced in November 2001.

### Finland

	Counter-cyclical regulation of unemployment security contributions and earnings-related pension contributions using so-called EMU-buffer funds that exist in the unemployment insurance fund in the private sector pension scheme.
f	GS body: MIN of Social Affairs and Health.

### Lithuania

Item	
	The deficit of the approved State budget shall be reduced by excess revenue of the current year.
f	IND: National Audit Office.

### Latvia

Item	
	The CG and SS budgets are divided into base and special budgets. The latter must be fully financed by earmarked revenues. Special budgets are devoted to social needs, mainly pension payments. Borderline case.
f, g	GS body: State Treasury.

The Netherlands

	At the beginning of the electoral period, coalition agrees on the desired development of the tax base. This multi-year path is adhered to during the period. Additional tax increases are compensated through tax relief and vice versa. Only changes in statutory tariffs are taken into account. Increases in the tax income due to economic developments are not considered. The rule obliges the government to preallocate higher than expected revenues.
	In addition to the allocation of extra revenues, the rule also defines tax burdens as % of GDP.

다. 재정지출에 관한 준칙(Expenditure Rule)

(1) Summary Table

Item Country		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
Austria												
Belgium	1	CG	Real expenditure growth rate	BA	4	CA	IND, NP	GS	No pre-defined action	Y	1993	1998
	2	SS	Real expenditure growth rate	BA	4	L	IND, NP	GOV, possibly social partners	Automatic mechanism of sanction	Y	1995	2008+
Bulgaria		GG	Expenditure ceiling as % of GDP	ESA	M	PA	MF	MF	No pre-defined actions	Y	2006	2008+
Czech Republic		CG	Nominal expenditure ceiling	BA	3	L	MF	GOV	No pre-defined action; government provides explanations in case of non-compliance	Y	2005	2008+
Germany*		CG, RG	Nominal expenditure growth rate	BA	5	PA (CG, RG)	GS	Financial Planning Council	No pre-defined action	N	2008	2008+
Denmark*		GG	Public consumption growth rate in real terms	ESA	M	PA	MF	MF	No pre-defined action	N	2007	2008+
Estonia												
Spain												
Finland*		CG	Real expenditure ceiling	BA	5	PA	MF	GS	GS proposes corrective measures	Y	2007	2008+
France	1*	CG	Real expenditure growth rate	BA	A	PA	IND, NP	n o body	No pre-defined action	N	2006	2008+
	2*	SS	Ceiling in volume for expenditure growth rate	ESA	M	PA	IND	IND, GOV	IND proposes corrective measures	N	2006	2008+
Hungary												
Ireland	1	CG	Allocation of expenditure	BA	A	L	MF	MF	No pre-defined action	N	2000	2008+
	2	CG	Nominal expenditure ceiling	BA	5	L	GS, MF	MF	No pre-defined action	N	2004	2008+
Italy	1*	CG, RG	Nominal expenditure ceiling	ESA	A	L	MF, GS	GS	Corrective actions	N	2008	2008+
	2*	RG, LG	Nominal expenditure growth rate	ESA	M	L	MF	GOV	Automatic sanction mechanism	Y	2007	2008+
Lithuania		CG	Expenditure growth rate	ESA	M	L	MF, IND	MF, NP	Possibility of sanctions and non-approval of the budget	N	2008	2008+

Luxembourg	CG	Nominal expenditure growth rate	BA	M	CA	No body	No body	No pre-defined action	N	1999	2008+
Latvia											
Netherlands	GG	Real expenditure ceiling	ESA	4	CA	MF	MF	MF proposes corrective measures	Y	1994	2008+
Poland											
Portugal											
Romania											
Sweden	CG, SS	Nominal expenditure ceiling	BA	M	Parliamentary decision	IND (CoA), GOV, NP, MF	GOV	Obligation to correct by appropriate actions	Y	2007	2008+
Slovenia											
Slovakia	CG	Nominal expenditure ceiling	BA	A	PA	IND, GOV, NP	IND, NP	Obligation to take effective measures	N	2002	2008+
United Kingdom											

\* Rule with previous version(s). See additional information below for the details.

## (2) Additional Information

### Belgium

Rules	Item	
1		Real growth of primary expenditure for CG ought to be equal or lower than 0%.
		Rule in the process leading to EMU qualification.
	f	IND body: CoA, High Council of Finance.
2		Real growth of health care expenditure must be equal or lower than a pre-established figure.
		Maximal growth rate of health expenditure: 1.5% (1995-1999); 2.5% (2000-2003); 4.5% (2004-2011).
	c	consistent with ESA.
	f	IND body: CoA, High Council on Finance.
	g	GOV body: MIN of Health

### Bulgaria

		Ceiling on the size of the government sector: 40% of GDP.

Czech Republic

	Inserted in a medium term expenditure framework (MTEF), covers 2 years beyond the budget year. Expenditure limits are set to achieve a pre-defined deficit target.
	Gov has to explain the reason why it exceeds its expenditure ceilings.

Germany

Item	
	Until a balanced structural budget is reached, the growth rate of expenditures must be lower than the growth rate of overall revenues
f	GS body: Financial Planning Council with CG, RG, LG members.
j	In force since the early 1980s.
	*1990~2007: Maximum expenditure growth of annually 1% on average for federal government and Lander.

Denmark

	Real public consumption on a national account basis must not increase by more than certain amounts per year. Besides, total ceiling of 26.5% of cyclically adjusted GDP in 2015.
	The rule is part of the 2010 plan, target revised in 2015 plan (August 2007). Real public consumption on a national account basis must not increase by more than 1.75% in 2008, 1.2% in 2009-2012 and 0.75% in 2013-2015.
	*1994~2006: Real public consumption on a national account basis must not increase by more than 0.5% p. a. Gradual implementation since 1994.

Finland

	At the beginning of the electoral period, CG sets a ceiling for expenditure over this period.
	The time frame was M in former rule.
	*1999~2006 (d) Time frame : M

France

Rules	Item	
1		Targeted increase of CG expenditure in real terms.
		Higher media visibility in the period 2006–2008.
		*1998~2005 Amendments in 2004: (1) expenditure growth rate limited at 0% (2000–2002: 1% allowed); (2) change of the reference period for the growth rate from three years to one year.
2		Annual vote of the NP on the national ceiling for health expenditure in terms of volume.
	f	IND bodies: Alert Committee, CoA.
	g	IND body: Alert Committee.
	h	IND body: Alert Committee.
		*1997~2005 Annual vote of the Parliament on the national ceiling for health expenditure

Ireland

Rules	Item	
1		1% of GNP is set aside from GOV expenditure and automatically paid into the National Pension Reserve Fund for investment on behalf of the State. Borderline case.
2		Rolling 5-year multi-annual capital envelopes set out capital investment (Exchequer and PPP funded) by Ministerial Group for each year in the 5 year period. The envelopes are based on a commitment to keep capital investment around 5% of GNP. Borderline case.

Italy

Rules	Item	
1		Expenditure ceiling for pharmaceutical products: 16.4% (14% territorial, 2.4% hospital) of the financing level for the National Health Service contributed by the State.
	f	GS: Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco, AIFA.
	g	GS: regions; AIFA.
	h	Corrective action undertaken by regions and Aifa. Otherwise, MIN of Economics imposes sanctions. When the 14% ceiling is exceeded, regions charged for 30% of the excess, AIFA of 70%. 2.4% ceiling: regions must fully finance excess expenditures. These changes did not affect the index value.
		*2001~2007 (f) GS body: Italian Pharmaceutical Agency (AIFA); MIN of Health. (h) Absorption of deficit: AIFA: 60%; regions: 40%.
2		Internal Stability Pact provides LG with measures to limit expenditure. Expenditure evolution depends on kind of entities (regions, municipalities, provinces) and year to which it refers to.
		ESA applies to targets, BA to monitoring. Pact changed every year; major amendments in 2007.
		In case of non compliance, the independent committee of auditors nominated by the local entities informs MF and MIN of Interior so that automatic sanctions apply promptly.
		*1999~2006 ESA applies to targets, BA to monitoring. Pact changed every year; major amendments in 2007. (g) In case of non compliance, the independent committee of auditors nominated by the local entities informs MF and MIN of Interior so that automatic sanctions apply promptly.

Lithuania

Item	
	If the GG budgets showed a deficit on average over the past 5 calendar years, then the annual growth rate of the planned State budget appropriations may not exceed 0,5% of the average growth rate of the State budget revenue of those 5 years.
f	IND: National Audit Office.

Luxembourg

Item	
	In the course of the legislative period, public expenditure growth is maintained at a rate compatible with the medium term economic growth prospects (no formal quantified target, but implicit).
	1999 It is the starting date of the previous gov programme (1999-2004)

The Netherlands

Item	
	Any setbacks against the expenditure ceilings must be compensated within the sector; windfalls have first to be used to compensate for setbacks within that sector. Windfalls can be used for new expenditure as long as total expenditure is below the ceiling.

Sweden

Item	
	Nominal expenditure ceiling for CG and extra-budgetary old-age pension system targeted.
	*1996~2006 (d) Time frame: 3 years (e) Statutory base: legal act

Slovakia

Item	
	Expenditure not considered in the State budget law can only be executed if its total amount does not exceed 1% of total expenditure approved in the budget law and the deficit is not increased. Allows increasing expenditure in good times. Initially, the rule set a limit of 15%.
	Expenditure limits: 15%(2002),5%(2004),1%(2005).
f, g	IND body: Supreme Audit Office.

라. 재정수지에 관한 준칙(Budget Balance Rule)

(1) Summary Table

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
Austria*	CG, RG, LG	Budget balance as % of GDP	ESA	4	L	GS	GS	Possibility of sanctions	N	2005	2008+
Belgium	1 LG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	A	L	IND, RG	GS (RG)	GS (RG) corrects possible slippages by appropriate actions	N	1990	2008+
	2 RG	Budget balance in nominal terms	ESA	5	PA (CG, RG)	IND	GS	Possibility of sanctions	Y	Applied since 1990. Formerly approved from 1995	2008+
	3 SS	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	4	CA	GS	GS	No pre-defined action	N	1992	2008+
Bulgaria											
Czech Republic											
Germany	1 CG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	A	C, L	MF, NP	No body	No pre-defined action	Y	1990	2008+
	2 LG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	A	L	GS	GS	Clear actions foreseen	N	.	2008+
	3 RG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	A	C	Länder MF and Länder Parliaments	No body	No pre-defined action	Y	1990	2008+
Denmark*	GG	Budget balance as % of GDP in structural terms	ESA	M	CA	MF	MF	No pre-defined action	Y	2007	2008+
Estonia	GG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	M	CA	MF	MF, NP	No pre-defined action; possibility of cuts in expenditure if revenue shortfall	N	1993	2008+
Spain*	GG	Budget balance as % of GDP	ESA	M	L	MF, NP	MF,GS, NP	possibility of sanctions	N	2006	2008+
Finland	1* CG	Budget balance as % of GDP	ESA	M	PA	MF	GS	No pre-defined action; political pressure to ensure compliance	N	2003	2008+
	2* LG	.	BA	M	.	.	.	.	N	2001	2008+
France	LG	Budget balance	BA	A	L	IND	National level: GS; regional level: prefet	Obligation to propose corrective measures	Y	1983	2008+
Hungary	GG	Budget balance	ESA	A	L	MF	no body	No pre-defined action	Y	2007	2008+

Ireland		LG	Budget balance in nominal terms	ESA	A	PA	MF, GS	MF, GS	Limits imposed on borrowing of local authorities	N	2004	2008+
Italy	1	RG, LG	Budget balance (LG)	ESA	M	L	MF	GOV	Automatic sanction mechanism	Y	2007	2008+
	2	RG, LG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	M	C	IND, MF	MF	No pre-defined action	Y	2001	2008+
	3*	RG	Budget balance in nominal terms	ESA	M	L	Board of Performance Assessors (with CG&RG members)	GS	Appointment of a commission to reduce deficits	N	2007	2008+
Lithuania*		LG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	A	L	GS	GOV, NP	Possibility of sanctions and of claim to the Court	Y	2006	2008+
Luxembourg*		SS	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	A	PA + L	GOV	GS	Obligation to take effective measures	N	1999	2008+
Latvia												
Netherlands												
Poland		CG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	M	PA	MF, IND, NP	GS, NP, IND	GOV proposes corrective measures	N	2006	2007
Portugal	1	CG	Budget balance in nominal terms	BA	A	L	MF	MF	No pre-defined action	N	2002	2008+
	2*	LG	Budget balance in nominal terms	ESA	A	L	MF, GS (Directorate General for LG)	MF	No pre-defined action and possibility of imposing actions	Y	2007	2008+
	3	RG	Debt ceiling #	ESA	A	L	MF	MF	Automatic sanction mechanism	N	2007	2008+
Romania		LG	Budget balance ##	BA	A	L	MF	MF	Corrective measures	Y	1990	2008+
Sweden	1	LG	Budget balance ##	BA	A	L	CoA	No body	Corrective measures	N	2000	2008+
	2*	GG	Budget balance as % of GDP in structural terms	ESA	M	GOV commitment, endorsed by NP	IND (CoA), NP, MF	IND	No pre-defined action	N	2007	2008+
Slovenia												
Slovakia												
United Kingdom		GG	Budget balance as % of GDP	ESA	BC	L	IND, MF, GS, NP	MF	Appropriate actions have to be taken	Y	1997	2008+

\* Rule with previous version(s). See additional information below for the details.

## (2) Additional Information

### Austria

Item	
	Deficit targets for the CG, RG (Länder), and LG contained in a National Stability Pact within a multiannual budgetary setting.
e	Statutory base based on C.
f	GS body: committee with CG, RG, LG representatives.
	*1999~2000: <b>Replaced by the NSP 2001.</b>
	*2001~2004: <b>Replaced by the NSP 2005.</b>

### Belgium

Rules	Item	
1		Balanced budget rule for LG: mandatory balance of budgetary accounts.
	f	IND body: High Council of Finance.
	j	Rule in force since 1982; enforcement since 26 December.
2		Regional governments must register a surplus or, at least, a balanced budget by 2010 at latest.
	f	IND body: High Council of Finance.
3		Balanced budget rule for SS sector.
	f, g	GS MIN: Budget, Social Affairs.

### Germany

Rules	Item	
1		Golden rule: public borrowing is only allowed if it does not exceed public investment. Exceptions allowed for stabilization purposes only.
	g	Possibility of challenge at the Constitutional Court.
	j	Introduced with an amendment of the constitution 1969.
2		Balanced budget rule for LG ('administrative' and capital accounts).
		Financial sustainability for LG by nominal budget balance. Sanctions in case of violation imposed by the communal supervisory agency: possibly refuse to authorize the budget; impose consolidation programmes; take over the administration of the commune. To achieve a balanced budget, communes can either rise or reduce expenditures.
	f	GS body: Communal Supervisory Agencies of the Länder.
	j	Rule was in force already before 1990.
3		Golden rule: the credit volume must not exceed the investment volume, except for dealing with adverse macroeconomic developments.
		Reform in the early 1970s.
	g	Possibility of challenge at the Constitutional Court.

### Denmark

	Structural budget surpluses in the interval 0.75 - 1.75% of GDP in the years towards 2010, surpluses or at least balance up to 2011-2015.
	The rule is part of the 2010-plan, target published/revised in 2015-plan, August 2007.
	*1992~2006
	Structural budget surpluses in the interval 0.5 - 1.5% of GDP.
	Since 2007, a reformed rule has been in force

Estonia

	Balanced budget rule for GG.
	If a proposal decreases revenues or increases expenditures, it has to be compensated so that the budget is balanced. Amendments: 1993-1999: revenue to equal expenditures. 2002: introduction of financial transactions into the state budget.

Spain

	The budgetary objectives take into account the economy's cyclical position, allowing budget deficits in periods of slow growth but requiring surpluses in periods of high growth. The overall deficit during downturns must not exceed 1% of GDP. In addition, a deficit of up to 0,5% of GDP is allowed to finance public investment under certain conditions.
	The rule applies individually to each sub-sector of the public administration therefore covering the whole general government.
	*2002~2005 In "normal" economic conditions, GG and its sub-sector must show a balanced budget or a surplus. This is embedded in a medium-term fiscal framework (3 years) consistent with the Stability Programme. (a) The rule applies individually to each sub-sector of the public administration therefore covering the whole general government.

Finland

Rules	
1	Target of structural surplus of 1% by the end of the parliamentary term. Cyclical or other short-term deviations allowed, if they do not jeopardize the reduction of the CG debt ratio. CG deficit must not exceed 2,5% of total output.
	If the deficit is to exceed 2.5% of GDP even in a weak economy, it should be reined in. *1999~2002 Balanced CG finances to be secured under normal conditions of economic growth at the end of the electoral period. Cyclical or other short-term deviations allowed, if they do not jeopardize the reduction of the CG debt ratio. CG deficit must not exceed 2,75% of total output.
2	Local Government Act. Regulates municipalities in bringing their budgets in balance. Contains provisions on budget and financial plans, financial statements, reporting on operations, and financial supervision. *1995~2001 Balanced budget rule for LG: in the case of a deficit, the budget should be balanced in the next 4 years; measures to cover the deficit to be proposed. (f, g) IND body: auditing committees. GS: MIN of Interior. (j) Issued in March 1995. Reforms of the rule 2001 and 2006: a target has to be formulated on the quality and financing of services in the beginning of the council period; a balanced or surplus budget has to be reached in the next 4 years.

France

Item	
	Golden rule: voted budgets must be in balance; ex post deficits cannot exceed 5% of current revenues (10% for small municipalities).
	The rule has been in force since 1983 for communes and departments, and since 1988 for the regions.
f	IND body: regional CoA.

Hungary

	GOV presents a budget bill to the NP that ensures the primary balance, in the Maastricht sense, being in sufficit.

Ireland

	From 2004 onwards, for any given year, LG must have a net total deficit (in EDP terms) of no more than a fixed nominal amount (€160m in 2004 and 2005, €200m in 2006). In addition, the Health Boards (also part of the LG sector) could have a net total deficit of no more than €40m in 2004. (These latter bodies were abolished on 1 January 2005, replaced by the Health Service Executive, which is part of CG and is prohibited from borrowing or running a deficit.)

Italy

Rules	Item	
1		Internal Stability Pact provides LG with measures to limit expenditure. Expenditure evolution depends on kind of entities (regions, municipalities, provinces) and year to which it refers to.
2		According to article no. 119 of Italian constitution, Local and Regional bodies are allowed to carry on deficit only for financing investments
	f	IND body: CoA.
		Healthcare pact; Agreement to regulate transfers from GOV to regions to finance the National Health Care System. The level of the transfers is subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions.
3		*2001~2006 ESA applies to targets. Agreement in March 2005, amended September 2006. (d) Time frame : 3 years (g) Enforcement body : government (h) Non-compliance actions : Automatic correction mechanism and possibility of financial sanctions

Lithuania

Item	
	LG must approve balanced budgets.
f	GS body: Council of Municipality.
	*1990~2005 (f) GS body: Council of Municipality. (h) Administrative responsibility: the supervisor authorized by GOV has right to submit a claim to the Court in the case of infringement of a legal act.

Luxembourg

	Annual budget balance rule with constitution of reserve funds for healthcare, long-term healthcare and pension private sector schemes.
f	GOV body: MIN of Social Security.
g	GS: MIN Social Security; General Inspectorate of Social Security.
	* 1992~2008+ (j) The rule came in force in 2 steps: a first one in 1993, a second one in 1995. From 1993 onwards this rule is contained in the next one. * 1993~2008+ From 1998 onwards this rule and the previous one are included in the next one.

Poland

	Anchor of budget.
	4-year nominal anchor of 30 billion PLN (or 3% of GDP) for the CG budget.

Portugal

Rules	
1	Budgets of services with financial and administrative autonomy must be in balance or positive.
2	The target is a nominal budget balance. Net indebtedness for LG capped at 125% of previous year's revenues, a ceiling for medium and long term loans (100%) and short-term loans (10%). Net debt growth ceiling for LG capped at 0%. *2003~2006 Aims at stabilizing the nominal budget balance by capping LG net debt growth at 0%. (b) Target/constraint : Ceiling on net borrowing
3	Net indebtedness ceilings for autonomous RG are defined annually in the State budget. Targets the stabilization of a nominal budget balance. the rule is described as a BBR and not a DR because it refers to ceilings to the net and not gross debt.

Sweden

Rules	Item	
1		Local Government Act: LG are obliged to balance their budgets.
	f	Local and national CoA.
2		A surplus for the GG in terms of 1% of GDP over the cycle targeted.
	g	IND: Fiscal Policy Council.
		*2000~2006 (d) Time frame: BC (g) Enforcement body: government

United Kingdom

Item	
	Golden rule: GG borrowing only allowed for investment, not to fund current spending. Performance against the rule is measured by the average surplus on the current budget as % of GDP over the economic cycle.
f	IND body: National Audit Office. GS body: Treasury.

마. 부채에 관한 준칙(Debt Rule)

(1) Summary Table

Item		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k
Country												
Austria												
Belgium												
Bulgaria		GG	Debt/GDP ratio change	ESA	M	L	MF	MF	Automatic correction mechanism with possible sanctions	Y	2003	2008+
Czech Republic*		RG, LG	Debt ceiling in terms of debt service ratio	BA	A	PA	MF	MF	Corrective measures are proposed - possibility of sanctions	N	2004	2008
Germany		LG	Debt ceiling in nominal terms	BA	A	L	GS	GS	Permission for credits refused	Y	1990	2008+
Denmark												
Estonia		LG	Debt ceiling as % of budgeted revenues	BA	A	L	MF	MF	Proposition of corrective measures (possible reduction in transfers)	Y	1997	2008+
Spain	1	LG	Debt ceiling as % of current revenue	BA	A	L	MF, RG	MF	LG designs financial plan to be met in 3 years	N	1990	2008+
	2	RG	Debt ceiling #	BA	A	L	MF	MF	No pre-defined action	N	1990	2008+
	3	RG	Debt ceiling in nominal terms	ESA	A	Agreement (CG, RG)	MF	MF, CM	Possibility of sanctions	N	2003	2008+
Finland		CG	Debt/GDP ratio change	BA	5	PA	MF	GS	No pre-defined action; political pressure to ensure compliance	N	1995	2007
France		SS	Contain SS debt	ESA	A	L	L	NP	.	N	Approved in 2005 Introduced in 2008	2008+
Hungary		LG	Debt ceiling related to repayment capacity	BA	A	L	No official body	No body	No pre-defined action	Y	1996	2008+
Ireland												
Italy												
Lithuania		CG	Ceiling on net borrowing	BA	A	L	IND	MF	No pre-defined action	Y	1997	2008+
Luxembourg		CG	Debt ceiling in terms of debt/GDP ratio	BA	M	CA	No body	No body	No pre-defined action	Y	Although this specific rule was introduced in 2004, similar rules were in force in the previous period 1990-2003	2008+
Latvia		LG	Debt ceiling in nominal terms	BA	A	PA	IND	MF	No pre-defined action	N	1994	2008+

Netherlands												
Poland	GG	Debt ceiling in terms of debt/GDP ratio	BA	A	C, L	IND, NP	GOV, IND (Supreme Audit Office), NP	GOV proposes corrective measures	Y	1997	2008+	
Portugal												
Romania	LG	Debt ceiling as % of current revenue	BA	A	L	MF	MF	Corrective measures	Y	1999	2008+	
Sweden												
Slovenia	1	GG	Debt ceiling in terms of debt/GDP ratio	BA	4	CA	MF	MF	No pre-defined action	Y	2000	2008+
	2	LG	Debt ceiling; limit on repayment as % of revenue in previous budget year.	BA	A	L	IND (CoA), MF	MF	No pre-defined action	Y	1990	2008+
Slovakia	RG, LG	Debt ceiling and limit on repayment as % current of revenue in previous budget year in nominal terms	BA	A	L	IND, MF	GOV	Possibility of sanctions	N	2002	2008+	
United Kingdom	GG	Debt ceiling as % of GDP	ESA	BC	L	IND, MF, GS, NP	MF	Appropriate actions have to be taken	Y	1997	2008+	

## (2) Additional Information

### Bulgaria

	Outstanding portion of the consolidated government debt at the end of each year may not exceed the previous year, as a ratio to the projected GDP.
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### Czech Republic

	Debt service ratio (debt service/debt basis) should not exceed 30%.
	Corrective measures are proposed - possibility of sanctions
	*1998~2001 (k) Replaced by a similar rule 2004.

Germany

Item	
	Raising credits by the communes requires authorization by the supervisory agencies and must only be used to finance investments. Numerical limits and ceilings.
f	GS body: Communal Supervisory Agencies of the Länder.
h	Ceilings to be measured in terms of the financial capacity of the commune or the investment volume. Any credit above ceilings is refused.

Estonia

	Limited issuance of new debt: (1) From 1997: new debt must not exceed 75% of budgeted revenues. And from 2004 the debt ceiling is 60%. (2) From 1994: annual repayment must not exceed 20% of budgeted revenues (1994).
	Approved in 1994, amended since then with minor changes to cover all kinds of credit facilities. If a LG exceeds the allowed debt level, it must not increase its expenditures.

Spain

Rules	Item	
1		LG must register a balanced budget or a surplus. Total LG debt cannot exceed 110% of current revenues and must register positive savings.
	j	In force since 1988; adopted again in 2004.
2		Restrictions on possible loans.
	j	In force since 1980.
3		For each RG, indebtedness must be the same (nominal terms) at the beginning and at the end of each year (including 2003).

Finland

	CG debt must be reduced over the legislative period.

France

	Each increase in the SS debt has to be matched by an increase in revenues. Thus, the repayment of the SS debt should not be prolonged.
	Article 20 of the legal act LOLFSS of August 2005

Hungary

	The annual ceiling of the debt-creating commitments of LG (borrowing and related charges, bond issues, etc.) is set in proportion to the capacity to repay debt.
	Ceiling debt limit is proportional to GDP.

Lithuania

	Limits set on CG net borrowing.
	Changes: 1997: limit on total foreign nominal borrowing; 1999: limit on state spending; 2004: change in methodology; limit on net GOV borrowing.

Luxembourg

	CG maintains public debt at a low level. New public debt can be issued to finance rail infrastructure projects. No formal quantified target, but implicit.

Latvia

Item	
	LG can only increase borrowing and loan guaranties up to certain limits set by CG.
f	IND: Board monitoring and supervising municipal loans and loans guaranties.

Poland

Item	
	Public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP.
f	If the debt is between 55% and 60% of GDP, the draft central budget must not increase the ratio of central government debt to GDP in the following year and for local draft budgets a formula based on the restriction of the deficit-to-revenue ratio is applied. If the debt exceeds 60% of GDP, despite the previous safeguards, any government borrowing is forbidden in the subsequent year, which means that public accounts should be in balance or surplus.

Romania

	LG cannot contract or guarantee loans if their annual public debt service (principal payment, interest, commissions) including the loan they want to contract, is higher than 30% of their own revenue.
	Debt ceiling prior to 2006:20%.

Slovenia

Rules	Item	
1		The debt/GDP ratio of GG and non-financial public entities (classified outside GG) cannot exceed 40% of GDP.
	d	From 2000 to 2004.
	i	Municipalities may borrow for certain purposes (to finance housing construction, water supplies, disposal and treatment of waste water) if the total level of existing and anticipated new debt exceeds 10% of the revenues of the previous year, provided that the total payment of principal and interest in an individual year does not exceed 3% of the revenues.
2		The total payment of principal and interest in each year must not exceed 8% of revenues of the previous year. LG cannot borrow abroad,. Any LG borrowing needs approval of MF.
		Already in force before 1990. Amendments 1990, 1995, 1999, 2005, 2008. Description refers to present version. No info about amendments.

Slovakia

	Borrowing limits for RG and LG: 1) total debt cannot exceed 60% of current revenue in the previous budget year in nominal terms (i.e. capital revenues and revenues from financial transactions are excluded); 2) annual instalments to reimburse debt cannot exceed 25 % of revenue in the previous budget year in nominal terms.
f	IND body: Supreme Audit Office.

United Kingdom

Item	
	Sustainable investment rule: public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held at a stable and prudent level over the economic cycle. Other things equal, net debt will be maintained below 40% of GDP over the economic cycle.
f	IND body: National Audit Office. GS body: Treasury.
h	According to the Code for Fiscal Stability, GOV may depart from its fiscal objectives and operating rules temporarily, provided that it specifies: (1) reasons for departing from previous objectives and operating rules; (2) approach and period of time that GOV intends to take to return to the previous objectives and rules; (3) objectives and rules to apply over the respective period.

바. 표준화된 재정준칙 지수(Standardized Fiscal Rule Index)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
Belgium	-0.2	-0.2	0.3	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	
Bulgaria	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.8	1.8	1.8
Czech Rep.	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-0.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	
Denmark	-1.0	-1.0	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	
Germany	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	
Estonia	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	
Ireland	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	
Greece	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	
Spain	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	
France	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.7	0.8	
Italy	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-0.5	-0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	
Cyprus	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	
Latvia	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Lithuania	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.7	
Luxembourg	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	
Hungary	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	0.4	0.4	
Malta	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	
Netherlands	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	
Austria	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	
Poland	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.2	
Portugal	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-0.8	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.5	-0.5	
Romania	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	
Slovenia	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	
Slovakia	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Finland	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	0.9	
Sweden	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	
United Kingdom	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	

## 2. 독립된 재정관련 기관(Independent Fiscal Institutions)

### 가. 일반(General Description of the Institution)

#### (1) Questionnaire

<p>1. Please provide an overall description of the institution in charge of providing analysis, forecasts, assessments or recommendations of fiscal policy. Please specify the name, nature, status, mandate and objectives of this institution (referred to as the "Fiscal Council" in the following questions):</p> <p>2. Please indicate the main motivations for the introduction of the Fiscal Council. In particular, please indicate whether the creation of the Fiscal Council was related to particular events such as a broad institutional reform, changes in legislation to adapt the budgetary policy making to the requirements established by EMU etc:</p> <p>3. Please indicate the relevant dates for the Fiscal Council considered:</p> <p>3.1. When it was first created:</p> <p>3.2. Please specify and describe the major changes (if any) to the mandate/status of the Fiscal Council in the period 1990-2005:</p>
--

#### (2) Summary Information

Country	1.1 Name	1.2 full name	3.1	3.2
Austria	WIFO	Austrian Institute of Economic Research	1927	N
	IHS	Institute for Advanced Studies	1963	N
	STA	Government Debt Committee	2002	N
Belgium	HRF-CSF	High Council of Finance-Section "Public sector borrowing requirement"	1989	N
	NRI-ICN	National Accounts institute	1994	N
Germany	WB-BMF	Advisory Board to the Federal Ministry of Finance	1950	N
	PG	Joint Economic Forecast project group	1950	N
	AKS	Working party on Tax Revenue Forecasting	1955	N
	SVR	German Council of Economic Experts	1963	N
Denmark	DOR	Danish Economic Council	1962	Y <sup>c</sup>
Estonia	NAO-EE	National Audit office of Estonia	1990	N
Greece	KEPE	Centre for Planning and Economic Research	1959	N
Spain	CA	Court of Auditors	1978	N
	CNAL	National Committee of Local Administration	1985	N

France	CC-FR	Court of Accounts	1807	Y <sup>c</sup>
	CEN	Commission Economique de la Nation	1952	Y
Hungary	ASZ	State Audit Office	1989	N
Italy	ISAE	Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses	1999	N
Lithuania	NAOL	National Audit Office of Lithuania	1990	N
Luxembourg	CC-LU	Court of Auditors	1999	N
Netherlands	CPB	Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Anaysis	1945	N
Portugal	TC	Court of Auditors	1990	Y <sup>c</sup>
	UTAO	Unidade Técnica de Apoio Orçamental	2006	N
Sweden	KI	National Institute of Economic Research	1937	N
	FR	Swedish Fiscal Policy Council	2007	N
Slovenia	IMAD	Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development	1991	Y
United Kingdom	NAO	National Audit Office	1983	Y <sup>c</sup>

Note: Y's with superscript 'c' indicate further details in the additional information section.

### (3) Additional Information

#### Denmark

Question	DOR
3.2	Mandate extended, 1994; merged with IMV, 2007.

#### France

Question	CC-FR
3.2	Role extended 2005.

#### Portugal

Question	TC
3.2	Role extended 2006.

#### United Kingdom

Question	NAO
3.2	Mandate extended 1998, 2000.

## 나. 기능(Specifications on the Role of the Fiscal Council)

### (1) Questionnaire

4. Could you specify whether the mandate of the Fiscal Council:
  - Is circumscribed to fiscal policy / general government finances issues
  - Goes beyond fiscal policy issues and covers other economic policy dimensions. If yes, please specify:
  
5. Among the following objectives, please identify those to which the Fiscal Council contributes (more than one option is possible):
  - 5.1. Ensuring that government policy is consistent with the sustainability of government finances
  - 5.2. Ensuring that government policy is adequate in the prevailing cyclical conditions (stabilisation function of fiscal policy)
  - 5.3. Providing an independent assessment of compliance with existing national fiscal rules
  - 5.4. Providing an independent assessment of compliance with the SGP fiscal rules
  - 5.5. Ensuring greater transparency in the conduct of fiscal policy, for instance by analysing the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the government
  - 5.6. Assessing the quality of government finances, notably the composition of expenditure and the structure of the tax system
  - 5.7. Others. Please specify:
  
6. Please specify whether the Fiscal Council fulfils one or several of the following tasks (not mutually exclusive):
  - 6.1. The Fiscal Council provides independent analysis on fiscal policy developments
  - 6.2. The Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts and projections of macroeconomic or / and budgetary assumptions
  - 6.3. The Fiscal Council makes normative statements on the conduct of fiscal policy
  - 6.4. The Fiscal Council issues recommendations in the area of fiscal policy
  - 6.5. Others. Please specify:

7. Concerning the role of the Fiscal Council in the budgetary process, please specify whether:

7.1. The draft Budget submitted by the government has to be approved by the Fiscal Council.

7.2. The government has to consult the Fiscal Council in the course of the budgetary process.

7.3. The Fiscal Council is generally consulted (no obligation) by the government in the course of the budgetary process.

7.4. The Fiscal Council has to be auditioned by the Parliament in the course of the budgetary process. NB: In case the Fiscal Council deals with regional and/or local governments, the Parliament in this option and the next one would refer to the regional parliament and/or the local legislative bodies.

7.5. The Fiscal Council is generally auditioned (no obligation) by the Parliament in the course of the budgetary process.

7.6. The Budget has to be approved by the Fiscal Council.

7.7. Others. Please specify:

## (2) Summary Information

Country	Name	4	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.7	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5	7.1	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.6	7.7
Austria	WIFO	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
	IHS	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
	STA	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Belgium	HRF-CSF	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>
	NRI-ICN	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Germany	WB-BMF	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	PG	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	AKS	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
	SVR	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Denmark	DOR	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Estonia	NAO-EE	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Greece	KEPE	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Spain	CA	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	CNAL	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
France	CC-FR	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	CEN	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Hungary	ASZ	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
Italy	ISAE	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
Lithuania	NAOL	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	N	N	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>
Luxembourg	CC-LU	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N
Netherlands	CPB	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Portugal	TC	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
	UTAO	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Sweden	KI	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
	FR	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Slovenia	IMAD	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>
United Kingdom	NAO	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N

### (3) Additional Information

Austria

Question	WIFO, IHS
5.7	Independent forecasts.

Belgium

Question	HRF-CSF
7.7	Important input for the budget; chairman often auditioned.

Lithuania

Question	NAOL
5.7	Promoting accountability in the public sector as well as management oriented towards results and public needs, and progress in financial management and control systems.
6.5	The NAOL supervises the lawfulness and effectiveness of the management and use of State property and the execution of the State budget.
7.7	The NAOL submits an opinion to the Parliament concerning the account of the execution of the State budget and on the draft State budget.

Slovenia

Question	IMAD
7.7	As determined by the Decree on the Criteria and Procedures for Preparing the Draft National Budget, IMAD's macroeconomic forecasts serve as a basis for drawing up the national budget.

## 다. 정책분석(Independent Analysis on Fiscal Policy Development)

### (1) Questionnaire

#### III-1. In case the Fiscal Council provides independent analysis on fiscal policy developments, please answer to the following questions.

8. Please specify whether the fiscal Council (more than one option is possible) ...
- 8.1. Has the mandate to analyse the budget. Please specify:
  - 8.2. Has the mandate to monitor the implementation of budget plans. Please specify:
  - 8.3. Has the mandate to quantifying short-term and long-term effects of envisaged measures and reforms. Please specify:
  - 8.4. Has the mandate to verify whether budgetary plans and outcomes are in accordance with existing budgetary rules. Please specify:
  - 8.5. Is not explicitly in charge of any of the above tasks, but fulfils some of them in the context of its regular analysis and monitoring of fiscal developments. Please specify:
9. The Fiscal Council is in charge of the analysis of fiscal developments in (more than one answer is possible)...
- 9.1. The whole of the general government sector
  - 9.2. sub-sectors
    - Central government (The State and other central government entities)
    - The State / Federal Government
    - Regional governments (autonomous regions of the federated or quasi-federated states)
    - Local governments
    - Social security
    - Any other sector, please specify:
10. Does the Fiscal Council produce regular public reports on budget execution, developments or / and plans?
- No, most of the analyses of the Fiscal Council are confidential
  - Yes, the Fiscal Council regularly produces such reports. Please specify frequency and overall description of such reports:

11. In case such reports are issued, please specify whether...

11.1. The government is obliged to take into account the analysis prepared by the Fiscal Council and adopt measures to correct some aspects of fiscal policy deemed inappropriate in these reports

11.2. The government has to publicly respond to the analysis prepared by the Fiscal Council

11.3. The government is not obliged to publicly respond to the analysis prepared by the Fiscal Council

11.4. Other, please specify:

## (2) Summary Information

Country	Name	III-1	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.5	9.1	9.2	10	11.1	11.2	11.3	11.4
Austria	WIFO	N												
	IHS	N												
	STA	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Belgium	HRF-CSF	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	NRI-ICN	N												
Germany	WB-BMF	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	PG	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	N	N	Y	N
	AKS	N												
	SVR	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
Denmark	DOR	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	C	C	Y	N	N	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>
Estonia	NAO-EE	N												
Greece	KEPE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
Spain	CA	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	CNAL	N												
France	CC-FR	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	CEN	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Hungary	ASZ	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	N	N	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>
Italy	ISAE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
Lithuania	NAOL	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>
Luxembourg	CC-LU	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N <sup>c</sup>	Y	N	N	Y	N
Netherlands	CPB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
Portugal	TC	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	UTAO	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
Sweden	KI	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
	FR	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N
Slovenia	IMAD	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>
United Kingdom	NAO	N												

### (3) Additional Information

Germany

Question	PG
9.2	SS.

Denmark

Question	DOR
9.2	The council is not "in charge" of any of the mentioned areas, but can choose to analyse all.
11.4	The Finance and Economy Ministers are FC members: they can comment on the report, but recommendations are not changed.

Hungary

Question	ASZ
9.2	CG, SS.
11.4	The government has prepared reports occasionally.

Lithuania

Question	NAOL
11.4	The GOV generally decides to follow the recommendations of the NAOL reports.

Luxembourg

Question	CC-LU
9.2	CG.

Slovenia

Question	IMAD
11.4	The GOV adopts the Spring and Autumn Reports , but it is not obliged to present measures as an answer for potential criticism of its policies.

라. 독립적인 거시/재정 전망(Independent Forecasts and/or Long-term Projections of Macroeconomic and/or Budgetary Variables)

**(1) Questionnaire**

**III.2. In case the Fiscal Council provides independent projections of macroeconomic and/or budgetary variables, please answer to the following questions.**

12. Please indicate whether (more than one option is possible) ...
- 12.1. The Fiscal Council provides independent macroeconomic forecasts.
  - 12.2. The Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts for government expenditures based on the announced policy measures (e.g. the budget law or specific economic policy decisions). Please specify the aggregates forecast:
  - 12.3. The Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts for government revenues. Please specify the aggregates forecast:
  - 12.4. The Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts for the government balance and debt level. Please specify the aggregates forecast:
  - 12.5. The Fiscal Council provides independent long-term projections for government finances. Please specify the aggregates projected:
13. In case the Fiscal Council makes forecasts / projections for developments in government finances, do these projections concern (more than one option is possible):
- 13.1. The whole of the general government sector
  - 13.2. sub-sectors
    - Central government (The State and other central government entities)
    - The State / Federal Government
    - Regional governments (autonomous regions of the federated or quasi-federated states)
    - Local governments
    - Social security
    - Any other sector, please specify:
    - Additional information:
14. In case the Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts of macroeconomic variables, could you please indicate whether ...

- (4) The macroeconomic forecasts have to be used in the preparation of the budget (legal or constitutional obligation) and / or the Stability or Convergence Programme. Please specify:
  - (3) The macroeconomic forecasts are generally used in the preparation of the budget (political agreement within executive or between executive and legislative powers) and / or the Stability or Convergence Programme. Please specify:
  - (2) The government is free to prepare the budget and / or the Stability or Convergence Programme using its own macroeconomic assumptions, but deviations from the macroeconomic projections of the Fiscal Council have to be justified publicly. Please specify:
  - (1) The government is free to prepare the budget and / or the Stability or Convergence Programme using its own macroeconomic assumptions, without having to provide any justification:
  - (0) Other, please specify:
15. In case the Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts / projections for government expenditures based on the announced policy measures (e.g. the budget law or specific economic policy decisions), could you please indicate whether ...
- (4) The expenditure projections have to be used in the preparation of the budget (legal or constitutional obligation). Please specify:
  - (3) The expenditure projections are generally used in the preparation of the budget (political agreement within executive or between executive and legislative powers). Please specify:
  - (2) The government has to justify any deviation of its expenditure projections from those of the Fiscal Council. Please specify:
  - (1) The government is free to prepare the budget using its own projections, without having to provide any justification
  - (0) Other, please specify:
16. In case the Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts / projections of tax revenues, could you please indicate whether ...
- (4) The revenues projections have to be used in the preparation of the budget (legal or constitutional obligation). Please specify:
  - (3) The revenues projections are generally used in the preparation of the budget (political agreement within executive or between executive and legislative

powers). Please specify:

(2) The government has to justify any deviation of its revenues projections from those of the Fiscal Council. Please specify:

(1) The government is free to prepare the budget using its own revenues projections, without having to provide any justification

(0) Other, please specify:

17. In case the Fiscal Council provides independent forecasts / projections for the government balance

(4) The budget balance objective presented in the budget cannot deviate from the one projected by the Fiscal Council (legal or constitutional obligation). Please specify:

(3) The budget balance objective presented in the budget is generally in line with the one projected by the Fiscal Council (political agreement within executive or between executive and legislative powers). Please specify:

(2) The government has to justify any deviation in its budget balance objective from the projection of the Fiscal Council. Please specify:

(1) The government does not have to provide any justification

(0) Other, please specify:

18. Access to inside information – please specify whether ...

(3) When preparing its projections, the Fiscal Council has full access to inside information and administrations have to respond to its requests

(2) When preparing its projections, the Fiscal Council has a privileged access to inside information, without having access to all inside information

(1) The Fiscal Council has no privileged access to inside information

(0) Other, please specify:

## (2) Summary Information

Country	Name	III-2	12a	12b	12c	12d	12e	13a	13b	14	15	16	17	18
Austria	WIFO	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	2	n/a	n/a	1	.
	IHS	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	1	1	1	1	.
	STA	N												
Belgium	HRF-CSF	N												
	NRI-ICN	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	.	.	4	n/a	n/a	n/a	3
Germany	WB-BMF	N												
	PG	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	1	1	1	1	1
	AKS	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	n/a	n/a	3	n/a	2
	SVR	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	2	n/a	n/a	1	C
Denmark	DOR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	1	1	1	1	1
Estonia	NAO-EE	N												
Greece	KEPE	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	1	1	1	n/a	1
Spain	CA	N												
	CNAL	N												
France	CC-FR	N												
	CEN	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	1	n/a	n/a	1	1
Hungary	ASZ	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	1	1	1	n/a	3
Italy	ISAE	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	1	1	1	1	2
Lithuania	NAOL	N												
Luxembourg	CC-LU	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	N	Y	N <sup>c</sup>	1	1	1	1	3
Netherlands	CPB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	C	3 <sup>c</sup>	3 <sup>c</sup>	3 <sup>c</sup>	2
Portugal	TC	N												
	UTAO	N												
Sweden	KI	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	1	1	1	1	1
	FR	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	1	1	1	1	2
Slovenia	IMAD	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	.	.	4	n/a	n/a	n/a	2
United Kingdom	NAO	N												

(Note) Superscript 'c' implies further details in the additional information below.

### (3) Additional Information

Germany

Question	PG
13.2	SS.
Question	AKS
13.2	CG, LG.
Question	SVR
18	When drafting its Annual Report, the Council holds talks with the federal government in which it poses technical questions. In addition, it submits a catalogue of written questions, which are answered by the federal government.

Hungary

Question	ASZ
13.2	CG, SS.

Luxembourg

Question	CC-LU
12.3	Only for current year.
13.2	CG.

Netherlands

Question	CPB
14	There is no formal obligation that the CPB forecasts are used in the preparation of the budget, but it is a good and long-standing tradition. All government parties use these forecasts as a basis for alternative budget proposals. The macro-economic forecasts of the CPB are fully taken over in the budget preparation and in the Stability Programme. The government is free to use its own macroeconomic projections, but nearly never does so. If it would occur, an explanation would be expected.
15	There is no legal obligation. The coalition remains responsible for its own forecasts on expenditure, but there is intensive discussion with the CPB. Normally, there are no major differences in the forecast. If there would be, an explanation would normally be expected.
16	Same as (15).
17	There are usually no large differences between the EMU-balance in the budget and the one that is projected by the CPB. If there would be, an explanation would be expected.

마. 규범적 평가/제안(Normative Statements and Recommendations)

(1) Questionnaire

**III-3. In case the Fiscal Council does normative statements and issues recommendations, please answer to the following questions.**

19. Please specify whether the Fiscal Council (more than one option is possible) ...
- 19.1. Provides normative judgement on the budgetary plans and respect of the fiscal policy rules. Please specify (notably indicate at what stage of the budget process the judgement is formulated):
  - 19.2. Is in charge of assessing the draft budget prepared by the Government and formulating an opinion on the budget or providing alternative quantifications of the measures therein. Please specify (notably indicate at what stage of the budget process the opinions are formulated):
  - 19.3. Recommends changes in the budgetary plans formulated by the government, in order for instance to ensure that a specific government balance objective is met. Please specify (notably indicate at what stage of the budget process the recommendations are formulated):
  - 19.4. Provides normative judgement on the implementation of fiscal plans and/or respect of fiscal policy rules. Please specify:
  - 19.5. Has an 'alert function' to signal a possible deviation from initial plans. Please specify:
  - 19.6. Formulates recommendations in case it identifies a slippage compared to initial fiscal plans. Please specify:
20. The assessments / recommendations formulated by the Fiscal Council concern public finances developments in (more than one option is possible):
- 20.1. The whole of the general government sector
  - 20.2. sub-sectors
    - Central government (The State and other central government entities)
    - The State / Federal Government
    - Regional governments (autonomous regions of the federated or quasi-federated states)
    - Local governments
    - Social security
    - Any other sector, please specify:
    - Additional information:

21. The Government / Parliament / Local Authorities ...

- (3) Have to follow the recommendations of the Fiscal Council (legal or constitutional obligation). Please specify:
- (2) Generally decide to follow the recommendations of the Fiscal Council (political agreement within executive or between executive and legislative powers). Please specify:
- (1) Can decide not to follow the recommendations of the Fiscal Council, but has to provide public justifications. Please specify:
- (0) Other, please specify:

22. In practice, would you say that advices and recommendations formulated by the Fiscal Council are ...

- (4) Always followed by the government
- (3) Generally followed by the government
- (2) Generally not followed by the government
- (1) Generally ignored by the government
- (0) Other, please specify:

## (2) Summary Information

Country	Name	III-3	19.1	19.2	19.3	19.4	19.5	19.6	20.1	20.2	21	22
Austria	WIFO	N										
	IHS	N										
	STA	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	0 <sup>c</sup>	0 <sup>c</sup>
Belgium	HRF-CSF	Y	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	0 <sup>c</sup>	1
	NRI-ICN	N										
Germany	WB-BMF	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	1	0
	PG	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	1	0
	AKS	N										
	SVR	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	Y	2	0 <sup>c</sup>
Denmark	DOR	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	1	0 <sup>c</sup>
Estonia	NAO-BE	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	2	3
Greece	KEPE	N										
Spain	CA	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	Y	3	3
	CNAL	Y	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	3	3
France	CC-FR	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	0	0
	CEN	N										
Hungary	ASZ	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	3	3
Italy	ISAE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0	0
Lithuania	NAOL	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	3	3
Luxembourg	CC-LU	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	3 <sup>c</sup>	3
Netherlands	CPB	N										
Portugal	TC	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	1	3
	UTAO	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	1	0
Sweden	KI	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	1	·
	FR	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	·	·
Slovenia	IMAD											
United Kingdom	NAO	N							Y	N	3	3

(Note) Shaded Areas: Subquestion answers are provided while the answer to III-3 is NO.

### (3) Additional Information

Austria

Question	STA
21	FC recommendations can be ignored. However, political/public judgement seems always necessary.
22	Depends.

Belgium

Question	HRF-CSF
19.3	Not for the federal level, but could be the case for the federated entities.
21	For the federated entities, there is a legal obligation to follow FC recommendations in some circumstances (cfr. Special Law related to the financing of the Communities and the Regions)(answer score 4). The Communities and the Regions generally decide to follow the recommendations, as since 1996, by a cooperation agreement or convention the governments of these entities committed themselves to respect the medium-term path for the budgetary targets laid out by the Council (answer score 3). This commitment was globally respected. For the federal government the way to take the recommendations into account is more informal.

Germany

Question	PG
20.2	CG, SS.
22	Usually the federal government can feel confirmed in essential parts of its policy and will carefully consider the recommendations as a whole.

Question	SVR
19.6	The Council identifies ways to correct undesirable trends but does not formulate concrete recommendations.
22	Due to the body's authority, its basic statements receive a lot of attention in the public debate. Thereby it exerts influence on policy making.

Denmark

Question	DOR
22	The recommendations enter the decision process primarily through the public debate. Their impact depends on the soundness of the proposals, and on how well they fit the current political agenda.

Spain

Question	CA
19.6	Ex post only.

Question	CNAL
19.2	For local finances only - assesses draft budget.
20.2	CG, LG.

Luxembourg

Question	CC-LU
21	CG.

바. 구성 및 인사 절차(Composition of the Fiscal Council and Appointment Procedures)

**(1) Questionnaire**

23. The (governing / high-level management) members of the Fiscal Council include (more than one option is possible):
- 23.1. Academics
  - 23.2. Policy experts
  - 23.3. Civil servants (from the central or regional/local levels of governments)
  - 23.4. Politicians (central or local levels of governments)
  - 23.5. Members of a Monetary Policy Committee (Central Bank)
  - 23.6. Representants from Trade unions
  - 23.7. Others, please specify.
24. The (governing / high-level management) members of the Fiscal Council are appointed by
- 24.1. The government
  - 24.2. The Parliament, please provide information on the appointment procedure:
  - 24.3. Other, please specify.
25. The (governing / high-level management) members of the Fiscal Council:
- 25.1. Cannot hold political posts
  - 25.2. Any other constraint. Please specify:
26. Could you please provide the following information on the members of governing / high-level management board of the Fiscal Council:
- 26.1. Number of members in the governing/high-level management board
  - 26.2. Specify the number of years of the terms of office of governing board members
  - 26.3. Specify whether all governing members' terms start and end simultaneously or not
  - 26.4. Specify how the governing board members adopt decisions and/or release opinions (e.g. majority, unanimity etc)
27. Apart from the governing board, could you please specify the approximate size of the staff of the Fiscal Council?

## (2) Summary Information

Country	Name	23.1	23.2	23.3	23.4	23.5	23.6	23.7	24.1	24.2	24.3	25.1	25.2	26.1	26.2	26.3	26.4	27
Austria	WIFO	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	. <sup>c</sup>	.	.	4	. <sup>c</sup>	.	.	100
	IHS	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	. <sup>c</sup>	N	N	1	. <sup>c</sup>	.	.	90
	STA	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	N <sup>c</sup>	. <sup>c</sup>	4	.	1	C
Belgium	HRF-CSF	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	12	5	Y	1 <sup>c</sup>	6
	NRI-ICN	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	7	C	N	1	0
Germany	WB-BMF	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	Y	25	C	N	2	0
	PG	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	6	n/a <sup>c</sup>	N <sup>c</sup>	2	60
	AKS	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
	SVR	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	5	5	N	1	20
Denmark	DOR	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	4	3	N	3	30
Estonia	NAO-EE	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y <sup>c</sup>	1	5	Y	.	100
Greece	KEPE	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	N	N	Y	N	5	3	Y	.	.
Spain	CA	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	13	9	Y	1	800
	CNAL	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	28	C	N	1	.
France	CC-FR	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	.	1	n/a	N	.	210
	CEN	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	30	n/a	N	.	.
Hungary	ASZ	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	C	12	N	n/a	600
Italy	ISAE	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	9	4	Y	1	150
Lithuania	NAOL	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	Y	N	Y	N	.	.	.	.	330
Luxembourg	CC-LU	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	5	6	N	1	34
Netherlands	CPB	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	3	.	N	.	170
Portugal	TC	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	19	4	N	1	568
	UTAO	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	.	.	.	.	2
Sweden	KI	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y <sup>c</sup>	N	Y <sup>c</sup>	Y	N	1	6	n/a	.	65
	FR	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	n/a	3-5	N	1	2
Slovenia	IMAD	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	n/a	5	N	3 <sup>c</sup>	60
United Kingdom	NAO	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	1	.	.	.	5 to 10

### (3) Additional Information

Austria

Question	WIFO
23	Financed by contributions from club members, by commissioned research, and by selling data and publications.
24.3	Private organization, independent of politics and business.
26.2	Unlimited.
Question	IHS
23	At present 1/3 of the Institute's budget is accounted for by commissioned research. The remaining funding is provided by subsidies from the Federal Ministry of Education and Science, the Austrian National Bank, the City of Vienna, and other institutions.
24.3	Private organisation, independent of politics and business.
26.2	Unlimited.
Question	STA
23.7	Experts in finance/budgetary activities.
24.3	Austrian Chamber of Commerce. Members appointed by the Association of Municipalities, Association of Austrian Cities and Conference of Provincial Governors have no voting rights.
25.2	National Council, Federal Council, a provincial assembly, federal government, or provincial government members cannot be appointed.
26.1	12 members + 3 without voting rights.
27	Austrian central bank provides necessary personnel.

Belgium

Question	HRF-CSF
26.4	In principle majority, but in practice typically unanimity.
Question	NRI-ICN
24.3	The government at the federal level. Half of the members are proposed by the central bank, the federal planning bureau and the National Statistics Institute.
25.2	"The members of the board coming from the central bank aren't allowed to hold political posts, according to the Maastricht Treaty; for the other members, it depends on what you mean by political posts: of course, they cannot be members of a government, a parliament or a cabinet."
26.2	Depends on members: unlimited for the senior civil servant from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, of the NIS, of the Planning Bureau and of the Central Bank; 4 years renewable for the 3 other members.

Germany

Question	WB-BMF
24.3	By the federal minister of finance; suggestion of the board.
26.2	Unlimited.
Question	PG
26.2 ~26.3	Participation in the PG is tied to occupational position (head of the forecasting department), there is thus no appointment of a specific person and no corresponding term of office.
Question	SVR
24.3	Federal president on suggestion of federal government.
25.2	Members must not belong to trade association or trade unions.

Denmark

Question	DOR
24.3	Chairmanship appointed by minister of economic and business affairs.
25.2	Chairman should be independent from political and commercial interest.

Estonia

Question	NAO-EE
25.3	A number of constraints to ensure independence.

Greece

Question	KEPE
23.7	Researchers.

Spain

Question	CNAL
26.2	CG representatives: as long as they hold the post that led to their appointment. LG representatives: as long as the main national local association decides.

Hungary

Question	ASZ
26.1	undefined (president and vice-presidents).
26.1	NP which confirms or not ASZ President proposals.

Lithuania

Question	NAOL
23.7	The Auditor General.

Sweden

Question	KI
23.7	Researchers.
24.1	Director general appointed by GOV.
24.3	All other staff appointed by KI.

Slovenia

Question	IMAD
26.4	The prevailing method of decision is unanimity. When this cannot be reached even after the debate, the final decision is with the director.

## 사. 기구의 지위(Status of the Fiscal Council)

### (1) Questionnaire

28. Please indicate whether the provisions related to the existence of the Fiscal Council are ...

(2) Enshrined in the Constitution. Please specify:

(1) Enshrined in a legal act (e.g. rule incorporated in Public Finance Act, in a Fiscal Responsibility Law or in any other similar statutory act) . Please specify:

(0) Other, please describe:

29. Is the mandate/role of the Fiscal Council explicitly defined in any official document (Constitution, Law or text endorsed by the Parliament or Government)?

- No.

- Yes. Please specify:

30. The Fiscal Council...

(2) Is attached to the Parliament

(1) Is attached to the government (Ministry of Finance, or Economics or the Prime minister office). Please specify:

(0) Is not formally attached to the government or the Parliament. Please specify.

31. Do political parties have to submit or do they generally submit their economic programme to the Fiscal Council ahead of the elections, for assessment?

- No

- Yes

32. Has the Fiscal Council access to other sources of financing than the direct funding by the national government?

- No

- Yes. Please specify the share of these sources of financing in the total budget of the Fiscal Council:

## (2) Summary Information

Country	Name	28	29	30	31	32
Austria	WIFO	0	N	0	.	Y
	IHS	0	N	0	N	Y
	STA	1	Y	0	N	.
Belgium	HRF-CSF	1	.	1	N	N
	NRI-ICN	1	Y	1	N	N
Germany	WB-BMF	0	Y	0	N	N
	PG	0	N	0	N	N
	AKS	0	N	1	N	N
	SVR	1	Y	0	N	N
Denmark	DOR	0	Y	1	N	Y
Estonia	NAO-EE	2	Y	0	N	N
Greece	KEPE	0	Y	1	N	N
Spain	CA	2	Y	0	N	N
	CNAL	1	Y	1	N	N
France	CC-FR	1	Y	0	N	N
	CEN	1	Y	0	N	N
Hungary	ASZ	2	Y	2	N	Y
Italy	ISAE	1	Y	0	N	Y
Lithuania	NAOL	2	Y	0	N	N
Luxembourg	CC-LU	2+ 1	Y	0	N	N
Netherlands	CPB	1	N	1	Y	Y
Portugal	TC	2	Y	0	N	Y
	UTAO	.	Y	2	N	N
Sweden	KI	.	Y	1	N	Y
	FR	1	Y	1	N	N
Slovenia	IMAD	1	Y	1	N	Y
United Kingdom	NAO	1	Y	0	N	N

### (3) Additional Information

Hungary

Question	ASZ
32	Marginal

Italy

Question	ISAE
32	10%.

The Netherlands

Question	CPB
32	Up to 10%.

Portugal

Question	TC
32	Own revenues: 37%.

## o}. Media Visibility and Influence of the Fiscal Council

### (1) Questionnaire

33. Please indicate which of the following options best describes the average level of media coverage and public opinion reaction to the analysis / forecasts / recommendations issued by the Fiscal Council:

- (1) Modest interest of media and public opinion
- (2) High level of media activity, but not likely to invoke public debate
- (3) High level of media activity, resulting in public debate on the subject, likely to induce government to publicly justify the non-compliance or to change its policy

- Additional comments:

34. Please indicate how the quality / reputation of the analysis carried out by the Fiscal Council compare with respect to those published by other public/private institutions:

- (5) Well above standard
- (4) Above standard
- (3) Same standard
- (2) Below standard
- (1) Well below standard

- Additional comments:

35. Could you please indicate your view on whether the existence of the Fiscal Council rule has significantly contributed to budgetary discipline and / or improving the quality of government finances?

35.1. There was hardly any contribution to fiscal discipline

35.2. There is a perception that the Fiscal Council has significantly contributed to fiscal discipline

35.3. The Fiscal Council has definitely contributed to fiscal discipline

35.4. The Fiscal Council has contributed to improve the quality of government finances

- Additional comments:

## (2) Summary Information

Country	Name	33	34	35.1	35.2	35.3	35.4
Austria	WIFO	2	5	.	.	.	.
	IHS	2	.	.	.	.	.
	STA	.	3	N	Y	N	N
Belgium	HRF-CSF	1	.	N	N	Y	N
	NRI-ICN	3	5	N	N	Y	N
Germany	WB-BMF	2	4	N	Y	N	N
	PG	2	5	Y	N	N	N
	AKS	3	5	.	.	.	.
	SVR	3	5	.	.	.	.
Denmark	DOR	.	5	Y	N	N	N
Estonia	NAO-EE	1	5	N	N	Y	N
Greece	KEPE	1	3	.	.	.	.
Spain	CA	2	4	N	N	Y	N
	CNAL	1	3	N	N	N	Y
France	CC-FR	3	5	N	N	N	Y
	CEN	1	3	Y	N	N	N
Hungary	ASZ	3	4	N	Y	N	N
Italy	ISAE	2	5	Y	N	N	N
Lithuania	NAOL	2	n/a	N	N	N	Y
Luxembourg	CC-LU	1	3	N	Y	N	N
Netherlands	CPB	3	5	N	N	Y	Y
Portugal	TC	1	3	N	Y	N	N
	UTAO	1	3	N	Y	N	N
Sweden	KI	2	4	.	.	.	.
	FR	1	.	N	Y	N	N
Slovenia	IMAD	2	3	N	N	Y	N
United Kingdom	NAO	1	3	N	N	N	Y

## (3) Additional Information

Denmark

Question	DOR
35	Indirect impact: public debate, quality analysis.

[참고] 각국의 재정기관

Country	Name	Name in national language	Link
Austria	WIFO	Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung	<a href="http://www.wifo.ac.at">http://www.wifo.ac.at</a>
	IHS	Institut für Höhere Studien	<a href="http://www.ihs.ac.at/">http://www.ihs.ac.at/</a>
	STA	Staatsschuldenausschuss	<a href="http://www.staatsschuldenausschuss.at">http://www.staatsschuldenausschuss.at</a>
Belgium	HRF-CSF	Hoge Raad van Financiën/Conseil Supérieur des Finances	<a href="http://docufin.fgov.be/intersalgen/hrfcsf/onzedienst/Onzedienst.htm">http://docufin.fgov.be/intersalgen/hrfcsf/onzedienst/Onzedienst.htm</a>
	NRI-ICN	Instituut voor de Nationale Rekeningen/Institut des Comptes Nationaux	<a href="http://www.inr-icn.fgov.be">http://www.inr-icn.fgov.be</a>
Germany	WB-BMF	Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (Bundesministeriums der Finanzen)	<a href="http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_3264/DE/Wirtschaft_und_Verwaltung/Finanz_und_Wirtschaftspolitik/Wissenschaftlicher_Beirat/node.html?__nnn=true">http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_3264/DE/Wirtschaft_und_Verwaltung/Finanz_und_Wirtschaftspolitik/Wissenschaftlicher_Beirat/node.html?__nnn=true</a>
	PG	Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose	<a href="http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/a-winfo/d2kprog/20kproggd">http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/a-winfo/d2kprog/20kproggd</a>
	AKS	Arbeitskreis "Steuerschätzungen"	<a href="http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_2144/DE/Wirtschaft_und_Verwaltung/Steuern/Steuerschaetzung_einnahmen/Grundlagen/2294_en.html">http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_2144/DE/Wirtschaft_und_Verwaltung/Steuern/Steuerschaetzung_einnahmen/Grundlagen/2294_en.html</a>
	SVR	Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung	<a href="http://www.sachverstaendigenrat.org">http://www.sachverstaendigenrat.org</a>
Denmark	DOR	Det Økonomiske Råd	<a href="http://www.dors.dk">http://www.dors.dk</a>
Estonia	NAO-EE	riigikontroll	<a href="http://www.riigikontroll.ee/">http://www.riigikontroll.ee/</a>
Greece	KEPE	Κέντρο Προγραμματισμού και Οικονομικών Ερευνών	<a href="http://www.kepe.gr">http://www.kepe.gr</a>
Spain	CA**	Tribunal de Cuentas	<a href="http://www.tcu.es/">http://www.tcu.es/</a>
	CNAL	Comisión Nacional de la Administración Local	<a href="http://www.map.es/ministerio/organos/cnal.html">http://www.map.es/ministerio/organos/cnal.html</a>
France	CC-FR	Cour des comptes	<a href="http://www.ccomptes.fr">http://www.ccomptes.fr</a>
	CEN	Commission économique de la Nation	<a href="http://www.dgtpe.minefi.gouv.fr/organismes_associes.htm#cen">http://www.dgtpe.minefi.gouv.fr/organismes_associes.htm#cen</a>
Hungary	ASZ	Állami Számvevőszék	<a href="http://www.asz.hu">http://www.asz.hu</a>
Italy	ISAE	Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses	<a href="http://www.isae.it">http://www.isae.it</a>

Lithuania	NAOL	Valstybės Kontrolė	<a href="http://www.vkontrole.lt">http://www.vkontrole.lt</a>
Luxembourg	CC-LU	Court de Comptes	<a href="http://www.cour-des-comptes.lu">http://www.cour-des-comptes.lu</a>
The Netherlands	CPB	Centraal Planbureau	<a href="http://www.cpb.nl">http://www.cpb.nl</a>
Portugal	TC	Tribunal de Contas	<a href="http://www.tcontas.pt">http://www.tcontas.pt</a>
	UTAO	Unidade Técnica de Apoio Orçamental	<a href="http://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XLEG/5COFposRAR/Paginas/UTAO.aspx">http://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XLEG/5COFposRAR/Paginas/UTAO.aspx</a>
Sweden	KI	Konjunkturinstitutet	<a href="http://www.konj.se">http://www.konj.se</a>
	FR	Finanspolitiska rådet	<a href="http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se">http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se</a>
Slovenia	IMAD	Urad RS Slovenije za makroekonomske analize in razvoj	<a href="http://www.umar.gov.si">http://www.umar.gov.si</a>
United Kingdom	NAO	National Audit Office	<a href="http://www.nao.org">http://www.nao.org</a>

※Official abbrev. : TC

### 3. 중기재정(MTBFs; Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks)

#### 가. 예산절차와 중기재정(1)

##### (1) Questionnaire

1. Could you please provide a brief description of the main steps followed for the preparation of the annual Budget in your country?
2. Could you please provide information on when the crucial decisions are taken in the preparation of the budget?
  2. (a) Beginning of the budget preparation (date and brief description of this first step)
  2. (b) Preparation (and release) of the macroeconomic assumptions of the Budget
  2. (c) If relevant, important intermediate steps in the budget preparation (other than those mentioned in this list; e.g. decision on an expenditure ceiling, coordination with other levels of government). Please indicate when these steps take place and if they are marked by a public announcement):
  2. (d) Discussion of the draft budget by Government:
  2. (e) Date (or deadline) of submission of the draft budget to Parliament:
  2. (f) Date (or deadline) for the adoption of the budget by Parliament:
  2. (g) Date (or deadline) for when the accounts audited by the Supreme Audit Institution are publicly available:
  2. (h) Other:
3. Does the Budget Law include fiscal targets only for the central government or also for other government tiers (i.e. regional and local governments and social security) and/or for the whole of the general government sector?
  - The Budget Law includes fiscal targets for the central government
  - The Budget Law includes fiscal targets for the general government and all other government tiers
  - Other (please specify)
4. If the Budget Law includes fiscal targets for various layers of government, please explain whether there is any co-ordination/consultation mechanism between central and sub-central governments to set these objectives. If such a mechanism exists, please briefly describe how it works:

## (2) Summary Information

Fiscal Targets of the Budget Law (Question 3)

Country	General government	Central government	Social security	Regional governments	Local governments
Austria					
Belgium					
Bulgaria					
Cyprus					
Czech Republic					
Germany					
Denmark					
Estonia					
Greece					
Spain					
Finland					
France					
Hungary					
Ireland					
Italy					
Lithuania					
Luxembourg					
Latvia					
Malta					
The Netherlands					
Poland					
Portugal					
Romania	.	.	.	.	.
Sweden					
Slovenia					
Slovak Republic					
United Kingom					

(Note) Missing answers for Romania.

### (3) Additional Information

#### Austria

Question	
3	In the annex to the Budget Law, MF informs the wider public about the budgetary obligations of the GG tiers. Thus, an overall perspective for the GG sector and fiscal policy developments is given with a view to fit into the Maastricht approach.
4	Targets for sub-CG and coordination mechanisms do not exist in the Budget Law (this would exceed the jurisdictional powers of the federal level). Coordination between the 3 layers takes place through the Austrian Stability Pact (ASP) that includes a consultation mechanism. In addition the MF is entitled to have the Draft Budgets and accounts of territorial authorities and can require additional information. This is the basis for the annual report on financial situation of sub-CG issued by the MF and the Statistical Office.

#### Belgium

Question	
4	CC made up of GG subsectors that agree budgetary objectives for a particular period. Negotiation based on HCF recommendations. SS budgeted following a linked but different scheme.

#### Cyprus

Question	
4	The Budget Law does not include explicit fiscal targets, but takes into account non-binding guidelines for certain expenditure categories of the Central Government. Local authorities are expected to prepare balanced budgets.

#### Czech Republic

Question	
3	The Budget Law includes a GG budget balance target. Expenditure framework applies to a narrowly defined CG.
4	The Budget Law includes a GG budget balance target. Expenditure framework applies to narrowly defined CG.

#### Germany

Question	
4	A legally not binding coordination of budgetary policy between central government and Länders is carried out within the Financial Planning Council (FPC).

Denmark

Question	
4	No formal. But negotiations between CG and LG on consumption, overall expenditure, and taxation.

Estonia

Question	
3	The CG fiscal targets are derived from the GG targets. Thus, de facto the Budget Law sets the targets for the GG, although de jure they are not specified in the law.

Greece

Question	
4	Most of the activities carried out by local governments (municipalities, communes and prefectures) are regulated or delegated by CG. CG can only delegate tasks to municipalities if there is an adequate provision of resources.

Spain

Question	
3	It usually also includes budget balance targets for RG and LG, but no additional information on these subsectors is provided.
4	The coordination mechanisms are those applied for the MTBF preparation. Objectives in the MTBF and in the Budget Law are the same.

Finland

Question	
4	Actually, fiscal targets for the CG are not included in the Budget Law but in the "Government Programme". As for LG, this tier is obliged to prepare balanced budgets. Coordination between CG and LG is ensured by the "Advisory Committee on LG Finances and Administration" that monitors CG's transfers to LG and supervises their overall relationship.

France

Question	
4	The CG and the SS are budgeted separately but they are discussed at the same time by the NP. There is an increasing coordination in the budget preparation for the State and the SS. A report on the financial situation of the whole GG (RESF) is annexed to State Budget for the Parliamentary discussion.

Hungary

Question	
4	Apart from CG and SS targets, the budget law includes targets for intra-budgetary funds (e.g. labour market funds, nuclear funds etc.).

Ireland

Question	
3	Legally, there is no Budget Law in Ireland, and fiscal targets are not defined in legislation. However, the "White Paper on Receipts and Expenditure" includes balance projections for GG and CG.

Italy

Question	
4	Territorial governs. give their opinion on the DPEF, and specifically on the fiscal targets for sub-central levels before the NP approval. Since 1999 there is an internal stability pact (ISP) to coordinate budgetary policy of different layers and ensure the fiscal targets set for RG and LG.

Lithuania

Question	
1	<p>April t-1: The Minister for the Budget sends out a circular letter containing general budgetary and economic data in view of t;</p> <p>April-May t-1: Ministries elaborate their proposals for the government, jointly with the "Inspection générale des Finances" (IGF) which depends on the Minister for the Budget;</p> <p>May-June t-1: The "Inspection Générale des Finances" re-examines the proposals and submits final ones to the Government;</p> <p>June-July t-1: The IGF submits a list of questions open for decisions to be taken by the Government;</p> <p>September t-1: The Government drafts the budget;</p> <p>Beginning of October t-1: the draft Budget is introduced in Parliament. It consists of 3 documents: the draft budget itself with an introductory note on the general economic context, a second volume presenting capital spending for the 4 years to come, and a third volume explaining the passage from the budgetary result presented in the draft budget (based on budgetary accounting = working balance) to the budgetary result presented in the SCP (based on ESA95).</p>
4	There are agreements and co-ordination mechanisms between the CG and LG on municipal debt.

Luxemburg

Question	
2	2c: Major decisions are taken in September t-1 when the Government drafts the budget shortly before it is introduced in Parliament, in the light of the latest macroeconomic forecasts. No public declarations are made until the formal presentation of the budget in Parliament.
4	The LG (communes and syndicats de communes) borrowing capacity is strictly regulated by law. The Interior Ministry is responsible for the budgetary surveillance of local governments. In the area of social-security, non-fulfillment of the reserve targets that have to be set up for the future in one year have to be immediately corrected. This is provided for by laws to which government, employers' and employees' representatives monitor the financial situation closely on an annual basis.

Malta

Question	
4	The GG sector is made up of the CG and the LG. The Department for LG is entrusted with the role of co-ordinating, guiding and supervising Local Councils. At the same time this Department coordinates and consults with the Budgetary Operations Division within MF.

The Netherlands

Question	
4	Coordination is established through the METBF.

Poland

Question	
4	The Budget Law includes deficit and expenditure limits for the State for the budgetary year (State Budget deficit on a cash basis cannot exceed 30bn PLN). It also presents a 3-years medium term path for the general government balance debt ratio. The expenditure and deficit figures adopted in the LGs budgets are upper limits. There are some regulations on the debt ratio to revenues and spending ratio connected to debt servicing for LG. Based on current legislation, when GG debt ratio exceeds certain limits (50%, 55% and 60%) corrective measures must be adopted.

Portugal

Question	
4	Only indebtedness targets for regional and local governments. For CG and SS also budget balance objectives. No mechanism of coordination currently in place, although a consultation and coordination system is expected to be implemented from 2008 onwards.

Sweden

Question	
3	Spending ceiling for old pension system.
4	No formal mechanisms since territorial government not included. However, inter-relationship between layers to fulfil GG surplus rule and balanced budget rule for LG

Slovenia

Question	
3	Fiscal targets for LG are projections based on available information and taking into account legal limits to local authorities' indebtedness.
4	LG need the approval of the MF for borrowing, so there is a permanent coordination between them.

Slovak Republic

Question	
3	The Budget Law is a short piece of legislation that includes targets only for the CG in cash terms. The main target is the GG balance set in the "GG budget", which is a significant part of the information attached to the Budget Law and constitutes the MTBF. Thus the GG budget (MTBF) is closely linked to the Budget Law. By approving this Budget Law the fiscal target for the GG is also approved.
4	There is no coordination mechanism. Sub-CG prepare their budgets individually but they are supposed to be in accordance the GG balance target.

United Kingdom

Question	
3	The Code for Fiscal stability sets out requirements, like reporting against key fiscal aggregates, but leaves open the choice of fiscal rules and objectives to the government. GOV must set out and explain their fiscal policy objectives and rules and restate these in each Budget. The GOV fiscal rules are set for the whole public sector, which includes CG and LG (i.e. GG) and public corporations.
4	No coordination mechanisms

## 나. 예산절차와 중기재정(2)

### (1) Questionnaire

5. Please specify if, apart from the SCP, there is in your country a consistent medium-term budgetary framework setting targets or ceilings for various budgetary components (revenue, expenditure, budget balance, debt)?

- No
- Such a national framework exists. Could you please briefly describe how it works in the box below, and answer to questions 5.1 to 5.10?

5. (1) When are the medium-term budgetary targets set and revised?

- Every year
- Every 2 years
- At the end of the period covered by the previous medium-term projections
- After each election
- Every time a new Government is formed
- Other (please specify)

5. (2) General government tiers covered by the framework:

- The whole of the general government sector
- Central government (The State and other central government entities)
- Regional governments
- Local governments
- Social security

5. (3) If the medium-term budgetary framework includes fiscal targets for various levels of government, please explain whether there is any co-ordination / consultation mechanism between the different government tiers concerned in order to set these objectives:

5. (4) What are the budgetary aggregates targeted?

- Budget balance
- Debt
- Expenditure
- Revenue
- Other (please specify)

5. (5) How are the budgetary aggregates defined?

- (a) 1. Ceiling or level

- 2. Growth rate
  - 3. Both
  - (b) 1. Nominal
    - 2. Real
    - 3. Both
  - (c) 1. ESA95
    - 2. Cash or budgetary
    - 3. Both
5. (6) What is the time period covered by the medium-term budgetary framework?
- (a) years
  - (b) first year
5. (7) How is the respect of the medium-term budgetary objectives monitored (monitoring body, frequency of reporting)?
- No formal monitoring
  - Formal monitoring that takes place through:
    - Government reports to parliament
    - Independent monitoring/fiscal institute
    - Other (please specify)
5. (8) Could you please specify the corrective mechanisms in place and describe what is happening if there is a deviation from the medium-term targets?
- No pre-defined corrective mechanism
  - Corrective mechanism in place
5. (9) When is the revision of medium-term targets taking place?
- 1) Targets can only be changed at the end of the period covered by the medium-term planning
  - 2) The medium-term targets can be revised before the end of the medium-term planning (e.g. every year in the context of the preparation of the new medium-term planning). Could you please specify the procedure followed and whether targets are generally changed?
5. (10) How is the preparation of the Budget connected with this framework? Notably, how are the multi-annual targets taken into account in the preparation of the Budget?
- 1) Strong link
  - 2) Medium link
  - 3) Weak/no link

## (2) Summary Information

Country	5	5.						(3)
		(2)						
		General Government	Central Government	Regional government	Local Government	Social Security		
Austria	Y						Y	
Belgium	Y						Y	
Bulgaria	Y						Y	
Cyprus	N							
Czech Republic	Y						n/a	
Germany	Y						Y	
Denmark	Y						Y	
Estonia	Y						Y	
Greece	N							
Spain	Y						Y	
Finland	Y						Y	
France	Y						Y	
Hungary	N							
Ireland	Y						Y	
Italy	Y						N	
Lithuania	Y						N	
Luxembourg	N							
Latvia	Y						N	
Malta	Y						Y	
The Netherlands	Y						Y	
Poland	Y						N	
Portugal	N							
Romania	Y						Y	
Sweden	Y						Y	
Slovenia	Y						Y	
Slovak Republic	Y						N	
United Kingdom	Y						N	

Country	5.												
	(4)				(5)			(6)		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Budget balance	Debt	Expenditure	Revenue	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)				
Austria					1	1	2	C		Y	Y	2	1
Belgium					1	1	1	5	t+1	Y	N	2	2
Bulgaria					1	1	1	3	t+1	N	N	2	2
Cyprus													
Czech Republic					1	1	C	3	t+1	N	Y	2	1
Germany					1	1	1	3	t+1	N	N	2	1
Denmark					2	3	1	C	2007	Y	N	1	2
Estonia					1	1	.	4	t+1	N	N	2	2
Greece													
Spain					2	1	1	3	t+1	Y	Y	2	1
Finland					1	2	2	4	t+1	Y	N	1	1
France					3	3	3	3	t+1	Y	N	1	1
Hungary													
Ireland					1	1	2		t+1	Y	N	2	1
Italy					1	1	3	3	t+1	Y	N	2	1
Lithuania					1	1	3	3	t+1	N	N	2	1
Luxembourg													
Latvia					3	3	2	3	t+1	Y	N	2	2
Malta					2	1	1	3	t+1	Y	Y	2	1
The Netherlands					1	2	3	5	t+1	Y	Y	1	1
Poland					.	.	.	3	t+1	Y	N	2	2
Portugal													
Romania					.	1	2	3	t+1	N	N	2	3
Sweden					1	1	3	3	t+1	N	N	1	1
Slovenia					1	1	.	3	t+1	N	Y	2	1
Slovak Republic					.	1	1	3	t+1	Y	Y	2	1
United Kingdom					.	.	.	BC		N	N	2	1

(Note) BC - Business Cycle,  
. - Missing Answers

### (3) Additional Information

#### Austria

Question	
5	New GOV at the federal level has to present a Budget Programme with its fiscal strategy and targets for next 4 years. MTBF includes: (1)Medium term objectives and adjustment path on an annual basis for the budget balance as a % of GDP and debt ratio; (2) main macro assumptions; (3) budgetary measures to achieve the considered targets. MTBF is updated yearly on the basis of a report prepared by the MF that is released at the time of the presentation of the draft budget to the NP. This will be replaced by a rolling 4-year MTBF with expenditure ceilings for five headings. The current 2005 ASP is valid for CG and sub-CG until 2008 and sets targets for a maximum deficit level in order to respect the SGP provisions. This entails nominal expenditure ceilings. This is the 3rd "generation" of ASP (after 1998 and 2001), and reporting request is gradually strengthened. Targets are revised when a new ASP is agreed.
5.1	This applies to the MTEF as of 2009.
5.3	See the 2004 technical assessment of the SCP.
5.4	MTBF for Federal Government has a combination of a balanced budget over the cycle and a falling tax ratio. The MTEF consists of expenditure ceilings. For the 2005 ASP, budget balances are targeted explicitly and nominal expenditures ceilings implicitly.
5.6	Budget Programme: 3, MTEF: 4, ASP: 6.
5.8	Budget Programme: No formal monitoring. MTEF: Enacted into law. ASP: Early monitoring and reporting to the coordination committee. The Political Coordination Committee is responsible for the governance of information, consultation, coordination and monitoring. Members represent the MF, the state governments, the Association of Austrian Cities and Towns and the Association of Austrian Municipalities, which are also involved in the negotiations concerning the Fiscal Equalization Law.
5.9	If there is a deviation and Austria was penalized according to EU regulations, the ASP specifies that those government entities responsible for the excessive deficit had to shoulder the financial penalty. Most of times, deviations occur due to changing economic conditions or political necessities.
5.10	MTEF as of 2009: Revision only by law at any time or in the course of the yearly rolling planning, when the new year n+4 is defined.

#### Belgium

Question	
5	Real health care expenditure growth cannot exceed 4,5% p.a. (current term). Reserve Fund for ageing should increase by 0,2% of GDP p.a. in 2008-2011. Revenues for the fund should stem from the GG budget surplus and other measures decreasing public debt without effects on the budget balance.
5.3	CC made up of GG subsectors that agree budgetary objectives for a particular period. Negotiation based on HCF recommendations. SS budgeted following a linked but different scheme.
5.4	Limit on real health care expenditure growth; continuous debt reduction linked to Reserve Fund for ageing.

5.6	Years covered: 2008–2012; similar to SCP.
5.8	CoA monitors the implementation of the budget law. The HCF assesses the last SCP implementation.
5.10	Possible revision depending on economic developments (changes for t and t+1). No precise calendar, but in general they are revised together with SCP preparation.

## Bulgaria

Question	
5	3-year budget forecast, expenditure ceilings on the budgets of the First Level Spending Units (FLSUs) and an updated government debt management strategy are approved every year by the Council of Ministers.
5.1	In the preparation of the draft budget, the approved expenditure ceilings by FLSU for the next three years are taken as a basis.
5.3	Consultations aimed at specifying 3-year budget forecasts and the expenditure ceilings between MF and FLSUs, then MF signs memoranda/agreements with FLSUs specifying their draft budget and a protocol with the National Association of Municipalities.
5.10	CoM considers and approves MTEF and main assumptions prepared by MF. During the procedure a revision of medium-term targets is possible, if it receives the approval of CoM.

## Czech Republic

Question	
5	Expenditure ceiling for the state. A fiscal objective is firstly set as GG balance in % of GDP. The balance target for the state is obtained as the difference between GG balance target and forecast balance for LG and SS. The expenditure ceiling for the state is calculated taking into account its balance target and forecast revenues. As a rule, the state budget must respect the MTEF ceilings. Balance budget target for GG, and expenditure ceiling for the CG.
5.1	According to the Law, the State Budget must comply with the MTEF. Budget preparation follows the top-down approach derived from the MTEF. The State Budget documentation also includes fiscal targets of the MTEF for the next two years.
5.4	Originally, the target is set for the GG balance in t+3. A numerical fiscal rule (MTEF) for t+3 is derived from this target and set as the nominal expenditure ceiling of the narrowly defined CG (state budget and the six state funds). Subsequently, only expenditure ceilings for this year are observed as a binding rule. The balance may fluctuate according to the development of revenue.
5.5c	Target definition: ESA95 (fiscal), cash or budgetary (expenditure).
5.8	It is not required by law. However, MF carries out a monitoring twice a year, in April (when a new target for t+3 is set), and September (as part of the state budget). Nevertheless, this monitoring focuses on the current year's state budget.
5.9	If there is a deviation (or risk), GOV must prepare an adjustment plan for the MTEF. The Cabinet presents the plan to NP simultaneously with the draft state budget (end-September).
5.10	The expenditure ceilings of the MTEF can selectively be changed due to specific causes (e.g. unforeseen circumstance, adverse inflation developments, programmes co-financed with the EU or amendment of tax assignment act).

Germany

Question	
5	Financial Plan is a MTBF adopted by the CG jointly with the budget draft and sent to the NP. The Länder also prepare a financial plan together with their budget proposals The Financial Plan is adopted annually.
5.1	The formulation of the draft budget and the new financial plan take place simultaneously. In this process the current or existing financial plan regularly forms the basis for the budget-negotiations. There the necessary readjustment and reorientations are discussed and if necessary incorporated into the new budget and financial plan. Thus the draft budget is generally consistent with the multi-annual-targets.
5.3	Territorial governments' targets are not included in the Financial Plan of Federal Government. However, coordination with Länders is undertaken within the FPC.
5.8	Together with the budget plan also the medium-term financial planning is subject of the negotiation process at the beginning of the budget cycle that leads to the formulation of and the cabinet-decision on the new draft budget and the new mid-term financial plan. This ensures that the new draft is in line with the either maintained or revised medium-term budgetary objectives.
5.9	In the event of minor deviations in the current budgetary year the existing legal instruments of budgetary execution are applied. Major deviations in the current budgetary year are either dealt with by a targeted readjustment of revenue and expenditure targets via a supplementary budget or by a temporary redefinition of overall ceilings and objectives. Deviations with an effect on subsequent years are dealt with in connection with the preparation of the next financial plan.
5.10	The procedure followed is the regular negotiation process taking place to formulate the new draft budget and the new financial plan (see answers to questions 1 and 5.8). While targets are - generally spoken - changed frequently on a detailed level the overall or major targets remain mostly unchanged during a legislative period.

Denmark

Question	
5	MTBF until 2015 MTO structural surplus of 0,75/1,75% of GDP towards 2010, at least balance 2011-15 Also: Real Public Consumption growth 1,75% in 2008, 1% in 2009-12 and 0,75% in 2013-15 or total ceiling of 26,5% of cyclically adjusted GDP up to 2015. Tax freeze.
5.1	CG determines overall allocation of real public consumption growth as when preparing the budget as specified in the MTBF.
5.3	Negotiation between CG and LG on real consumption growth.
5.4	Structural surpluses, real public consumption growth, public consumption as a share of cyclically adjusted GDP and tax level.
5.6	Sequential, covering 2007-2015.
5.8	Internal monitoring by MF that publishes implementation reports. Discussion in the NP.
5.9	There are no ex-ante defined actions.
5.10	The medium-term objective for the public balance (MTO) towards 2015 in the 2015-plan was published in August 2007. The 2015 - plan replaces the 2010-plan which was originally published by the former government in January 2001. However, medium-term and longer-term projections are updated rather frequently and at least once a year in SCP

Estonia

Question	
5	The MTBF is the so-called "State Budget Strategy". On a rolling basis it covers 4 years and set fiscal targets and expenditure ceilings
5.1	1st year of the MTBF covers next year's annual budget, which means that annual budget is the effective implementation of the MTBF in t+1. Annual budgets are set based on MTBF and its ceilings. However, adjustments on targets and ceilings in the Budget Law may be made depending on updated macro forecast.
5.3	In Estonia there are no regional RG. Thus the GG is made up of CG and LG, SS and health insurance fund. The Budgetary Working Group composed of CG and LG representatives discuss regularly the fiscal strategy and issues related to LG finances.
5.8	Control is done through the annual budget monitoring as the annual budget is considered the implementation of the MTBF. In the future, it is expected to move towards a specific and regular MTBF monitoring, including the setting up of a monitoring body.
5.9	The targets of the next MTBF are simply changed.
5.10	The MTBF is updated annually and the targets may be revised due to a changing economic outlook.

Spain

Question	
5	MTBF (t+1, t+2, t+3) for GG and subsectors, including balance targets and expenditure ceiling for central governments. On the basis of the MTBF objectives, MIN of Economy sets multiannual scenarios for CG+SS for expenditures and revenues. This scenarios must be in line with those of the MTBF and serve for the budget preparation.
5.1	The preparation of the Budget Law draft must comply with the budgetary stability objective approved by Parliament. Along the same line, the non-financial expenditure of the State cannot exceed the limit set. The budgetary stability objectives and the limit to the non-financial expenditure of the State are the reference during the annual budgetary process, as they cannot be surpassed. The Autonomous Communities and the Local Corporations act in the same way in their competence field.
5.3	Formal mechanism. CG and RG agree overall balance target for the whole subsector in the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council. Then bilateral negotiations between each RG and CG to set targets for each region consistent with the overall target for the sub-sector. FFPC issues a final report on the agreements and CG set the final objectives. Similar for LG in the National Commission of Local Administration.
5.4	The limit for the non-financial expenditure is set only for the CG.
5.8	In October, MF reports to CG on the fulfillment of the previous exercise. It also reports to the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (FFPC) and National Commission of Local Administration (NCLA) on the fulfillment of budgetary targets for RG and LG respectively.
5.9	When risk of deviation is detected, CG can warn the administration concerned and informs the FFPC/NCLA. If deviation is confirmed, a 3-year plan to restore financial situation is required. Deviations from the budgetary stability objectives of the MTBF can condition credit operations and debt issuance of regional and local governments.
5.10	Each year they are revised with the new MTBF. In between, the budgetary objectives are only revised by the SCP update.

Finland

Question	
5	2 main elements: (1) Medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) for CG that sets spending ceilings and covers 75% of its budget. These ceilings are in fact decided for the next 4 years at the start of the government's term of office, and are updated according to price developments. Interest payments and other cyclical expenditure items are excluded from these ceilings. The government is however free to change expenditure allocation between administrative branches. (2) CG is required to register balanced budgets under normal cyclical conditions at the end of the electoral period. Cyclical or other short-term deviations provided they do not jeopardize overall reduction of the central government debt-to-GDP ratio. Furthermore, CG deficit should not under any conditions exceed 2,5% of total output.
5.1	The multi-annual targets form the basis upon which the budget proposal is prepared. The spending limits have been used since 2003 and every year since then they have been respected.
5.3	Economic issues between the State and local authorities are considered in the Advisory Committee on LG Finances and Administration. Important tasks of the Committee include the integration of measures related to the finances of the State and local authorities from the viewpoint of overall economic development, monitoring the functioning of the system of CG transfers to LG and preparation of proposals for developing the system.
5.4	Expenditure level at 2004 prices on a cash basis. Balance budget and debt ratio on a national accounts basis. All them for CG.
5.8	Budget balance and debt ratio are reported in the macroeconomic forecasts made by the Economics Department (MF). Expenditure level is monitored in the ordinary and supplementary budgets.
5.9	No action or measured pre-established. However, it is said that CG deficit must not exceed 2,5% of GDP even in an adverse economic scenario and that the government should adopt the required measures to respect this provision.

France

Question	
5	Pluriannual framework for the whole GG sector incorporated in the RESF, which forms the basis of the SCP. Also: The SS Budget incorporates a pluriannual budgetary framework. These pluriannual frameworks are revised annually when the discussion on the State Budget takes place.
5.1	Before the budget preparation for t+1, MF prepares a Medium Term Budgetary Planning from t+1 to t+3, in order to assess the future impact of annual budgetary measures in t+1. The t+1 year of this pluriannual planning forms the basis for the annual budget.
5.3	The MTBF incorporated in the RESF is prepared by MF and covers the whole GG sector, while the SS Budget and its pluriannual framework is prepared by Social Affairs Ministry and applies to the SS sub-sector. Both Ministries are closely coordinated in the preparation of both frameworks. The new "Conseil National des Finances Publiques" (2006) coordinates GG tiers' budgetary policy and is consulted to set fiscal targets for sub-sectors.
5.4	The MTBF of the RESF contains balance targets (in % of GDP), a debt path, and expenditure and revenue ratios (objectives: a balanced budget for the GG and a debt ratio below 60% both in 2010). The pluriannual framework contained in the SS Budget includes revenue, expenditure and balance figures for each area of the SS.
5.6	Time period covered: also t+4, t+5.
5.8	Government reports to Parliament.

Hungary

Question	
5	Nevertheless, since 2007 the budget law determines the ESA primary balance figures for the next three years which are identical with the figures presented in the SCP.

Ireland

Question	
5	There are two Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF): (1) Since 2005 capital spending is based on a 5-year rolling framework that reflects investment priorities over medium-term and allow to carry over 10 % of capital savings to next year. The capital envelopes adopted aim at keeping capital investment at around 5% of GDP. Targets are revised annually for the 5-year period covered. (2) Local authorities' annual deficit limit is set within a 3-year multiannual framework. Targets are revised annually. Targets are set by MF in collaboration with MIN responsible for overseeing LG finances.
5.1	Capital envelopes are updated as a part of the Budget process. Local Governments' deficit is considered when forecasting GG budgetary figures.
5.3	Oversight by Department of Finance and Department of Environment, Heritage and LG of Local Authorities' transactions.
5.6	Capital spending :5-year rolling framework; LG deficit limit: 3-year rolling framework.
5.8	Capital spending framework: ongoing monitoring by the Department of Finance. LG deficit limit: ongoing monitoring by the Department of Finance, Department of Environment, Heritage and LG.
5.9	The Local Authorities net deficit limit was exceeded in 2007. The reported deficit was €265m. No immediate action has been taken, as the deviation was relatively minor. However, local authorities have been reminded of the deficit limit, and there will be continued close monitoring of the situation.
5.10	Targets are revised annually.

Italy

Question	
5	The main MTBF is the Economic and Financial Planning Document (DPEF). It contains targets on both cash and accrual basis for the CG and the GG. On top of that: The ISP sets budget balance targets for LG. RG adopt expenditure ceilings for the next 3 years.
5.1	Budget Law and Finance Law have to be fully consistent with the overall budgetary objectives of the DPEF. Any deviation must be specified by a note updating the DPEF to be presented to the NP before the presentation of the budget.
5.3	This answer refers to the main MTBF, i.e. the DPEF. Territorial governs. give their opinion on the DPEF, and specifically on the fiscal targets for sub-central levels before the NP approval. There are specific meetings to deal with this issue ("Conferenza Unificata").
5.4	Budgetary aggregates targeted in the DPEF are: State sector borrowing requirements, GG budget balance (gross and net of interest expenditure), GG debt and State sector debt. All targets are set in percent of GDP. The last DPEF (for 2009–2013) presents also details on revenue and expenditure items for the period 2009–2013 consistent with the targets and in line with the fiscal measures approved in June with the Decree Lawn. 112.
5.8	All official documents on public finance released by the Government contain an evaluation of compliance with respect to previous documents and reasons for deviation if any.
5.9	The Governments should clearly explain to the NP the reasons for deviations
5.10	Medium term targets are revised annually with the new DPEF. If major changes in the macro scenario occur after the presentation of the DPEF in the NP (June), an update of this document may be released in September at the time the draft Budget Law is being finalized.

Lithuania

Question	
5	Every year the Government approves the main preliminary indicators of the national budget for a period of three years. These indicators are forecasts rather than fiscal targets and are published in May (see first question Q2).
5.1	The balance budget target of the Budget Law must be the same or similar to the balance computed with the medium-term budgetary indicators.
5.3	There are agreements and co-ordination mechanisms between the central and local governments on municipal debt.
5.4	Net borrowing limits in nominal terms are also targeted.
5.8	Monitoring is by fiscal impact assessment. The Law obliges NP to discuss CO on the Lithuanian SCP every year before adopting a budget for the next year. EU fiscal monitoring system is merged with the national one. GOV reports to NP.
5.9	Discretionary actions. The Law foresees that incase revenues are lower than expected, expenditure can be on hold until a corrective budget is approved.
5.10	Revised every year, approved simultaneously with the Budget.

Luxembourg

Question	
5	While the government has no quantified medium term budgetary framework, the Government Programme for the Period 2004 to 2009 specifies that In the course of the legislative period, public expenditure growth has to be maintained at a rate compatible with the medium term economic growth prospects. The target is thus implicit. /Public investment is planned over the medium-term (4-year framework) in a second budgetary document. However, this medium-term framework is a planning document listing investment projects and projected expenditures for the CG. It does not as such set targets or binding ceilings for investment.

Latvia

Question	
5	There are two Medium Term Budgetary Frameworks (MTEF) providing projections rather than targets:: 1- The Medium Term Macroeconomic Scenario and Fiscal Policy, which includes information on macro developments and tax revenue forecast for a 3-year period. 2- The Statement of Medium Term Macroeconomic Developmnet and Fiscal Policy (attached to the Budget Law). This includes fiscal policy prospects and forecasts (several budgetary aggregates), EU financing and medium-term State budget expenditure trends.
5.1	The target for the next year state budget balance is set taking into consideration the macroeconomic development scenario, estimated state budget revenues, estimated baseline budget as defined in the Medium Term Macroeconomic Development and Fiscal Policy Framework.
5.2	Some estimates for the GG sector are provided for informative purposes.
5.3	There are no coordination mechanisms.
5.8	Government reports to NP.
5.10	There is no special procedure followed.

Malta

Question	
5	The MTBF is set in the Budget Speech identifying budget balance and debt targets. The first year of the MTBF is approved by the Parliament. The targets are revised annually with a view to ensuring a sustainable fiscal position.
5.1	The Budget Speech in the NP sets out multi-annual targets. The annual Budget, which sets out next year's target, is the first year of these multi-annual framework and is approved by the Parliament.
5.3	The GG sector is made up of the CG and the LG. The Department for LG coordinates between Local Councils and MF.
5.8	The Budget Office monitors monthly expenditure and revenue developments.
5.9	Intervention through adjustment within ministries. If required Cabinet's intervention on a government-wide level.
5.10	Adjustments to take into account unforeseen circumstances.

The Netherlands

Question	
5	The MTBF relies on a 4-year budgetary planning, on which the SGP is based. Expenditure ceilings in each budget play an important role. These ceilings are set in real terms and cover the CG and the SS (including health care). Automatic stabilizers on the revenue side are allowed to work fully. The economic forecasts underpinning the setting of these ceilings are based on a realistic scenario. A deficit figure close to 2% is used as a alert signal, and it means the implementation of measures on both the income and the expenditure side. Targets included in the MTBEF are set and revised when a new government arrives in office.
5.1	Expenditures plans in the budget remain within the real expenditure ceilings. Revenues may vary with the cycle. The result is the deficit or surplus.
5.3	The Cabinet is responsible for the two sectors covered by the MTBF.
5.8	MF is responsible for reporting on the respect of the MTBF targets to NP in all regular budgetary memorandums.
5.9	A deficit close to 2% should imply the adoption of corrective measures.
5.10	A new cabinet can change the medium term objectives in its coalition agreement.

Poland

Question	
5	A medium term path of GG balance and debt are included in the Budget Law. A debt management strategy relying on a 3-years forecasts for GG debt developments attached to the draft budget submitted to NP.
5.1	When a new medium-term path is adopted and departs significantly from the previous one, an analysis about the main factors behind this changes is carried out.
5.3	The Law establishes that when GG debt ratio exceeds certain limits (50%, 55% and 60%) corrective measures must be adopted by the State and LGs.
5.8	Data on State budget revenues and expenditures as well as Treasury Securities is available on daily basis and reported by MF. These reports are usually published on a monthly basis. Reports on a quarterly basis on GG balance and debt are also released.
5.9	Annual revisions are made to the targets.
5.10	They are revised annually when the budget law is being prepared.

Romania

Question	
5	The MTBF is prepared annually, during budgetary process, and it covers the interval $[t, t+3]$ , where $t$ is the year for which the budget is drafted. The targets for $[t+1, t+3]$ are not binding.
5.3	The MTBF is prepared annually, during budgetary process, and it covers the interval $[t, t+3]$ , where $t$ is the year for which the budget is drafted. The targets for $[t+1, t+3]$ are not binding.
5.8	Mecofin monitors budget execution and in forms the Government and Parliament about how the execution meets the current year's targets.
5.9	If a risk to deviate from those targets is identified (before actually happened) the corrective measures are taken through the Budget Law or through amending budgets, depending on the time period when the risk has been identified.
5.10	The medium-term targets can be revised every year in the context of budgetary planning.

□ Sweden

Question	
5	MT Expenditure Framework (t+1, t+2, t+3) for CG and pension system (outside budget) excluding interests. Also: 1% surplus for the GG over the cycle. No direct connection between both.
5.1	In the Spring Fiscal Bill and Budget bill the 3-year figures are included. Parliament endorses (i.e. sanction without formally approved) the medium-term allocation of spending. Ceiling levels for t+1, t+2, t+3 is included in the budget for information.
5.2	Old pension system outside budget.
5.3	No formal mechanisms since territorial gov. not included. However, inter-relationship between layers to fulfill GG surplus rule and balanced budget rule for LG
5.8	National Financial Management Authority provides medium-term forecasts for expenditure and revenues.
5.9	Expenditure ceiling always respected since its introduction in 1997. Surplus over the cycle open to interpretation.
5.10	A new third additional year is added at the beginning of each year. The gov. can propose changes to previously approved exp. ceilings. All information contained in the budget.

□ Slovenia

Question	
5	Fiscal targets of the MTBF are included and updated in the Budget Memorandum (Budget Law) approved in September by the GOV and subsequently by the NP. It includes targets for the next two consecutive years and fiscal projection for the third year.
5.1	The multi-annual targets are the basis for the budget preparation and are generally the same.
5.3	LG need the approval of the MF for borrowing, so there is a permanent coordination between them. The Budget Memorandum includes consolidated figures (deficit and debt) for the GG sector.
5.4	For CG, GG, and LG debt level. For LG, the debt level is determined according to a fiscal rule (stock of debt for a local government must not exceed 20% of revenues and the payment of principal and interest must not exceed 5% of revenues generated).
5.8	They are monitored in the context of the SCP.
5.9	The existing budgetary procedure allows to adjust the first and second yearly budgets due to changing economic circumstances. Thus, the government can decide the suspension of new commitments. In case of lower than expected revenues, the government can reduce expenditure, and if the short fall is higher than a given ceiling it can only carry-out spending up to a limit set up by the Budget Execution Law.
5.10	They may be revised every year in May (Budget Memorandum). GOV proposes and the NP adopt 2 year budgets. If macroeconomic scenario changes at the time of implementing the 2nd year budget, then a revised budget with different targets for the 2nd year is prepared.)

Slovak Republic

Question	
5	MTBF consists of a multi-annual (3 years) GG balance. It is drawn up annually and includes projected revenues and expenditures that are binding for the 1st year and indicative for the 2nd and the 3rd. There is no 1 time-schedule for revising the MTBF targets. Since its adoption, there has not been changes in the targets, but when a new GOV arrives in office they can be revised.
5.1	Targets of the MTBF are fully incorporated in the Budget Law.
5.3	No coordination mechanisms. Territorial governments have to set fiscal targets in accordance to fiscal rules. LG can only run a deficit in the capital balance while the current accounts must be balanced. Deficit for capital expenditures is regulated by numerical rules on indebtedness.
5.7	The MF publishes twice a year (end of 2nd and 3rd quarter) a report on fiscal developments and assesses whether the fiscal targets will be achieved or not.
5.8	If in the report by the MF observes a risk of slippage, the report itself should contain measures to restore the fiscal situation.
5.9	Medium-term target setting (GG balance) is a political decision and there is no special procedure. So far, there has been no revision (result were better than expected).

United Kingdom

Question	
5	Two elements: (1) Golden rule: over the economic cycle, the GOV will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending. (2) The sustainable investment rule: public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held over the economic cycle at a stable and prudent level. Other things being equal, net debt will be maintained below 40% of GDP over the economic cycle. These two rules that form the MTBF were set up in 1997. GOV has to adopt and announce its fiscal policy objectives and rules, provided these are consistent with the fiscal principles laid out in the Code. The Code requires that GOV states and explains its fiscal policy objectives and the rules by which it intends to operate fiscal policy over the life of a NP, and that GOV must restate these in each Budget.
5.1	The Budget preceding a Spending Review sets an overall envelope for public spending that is consistent with the fiscal rules for the period covered by the Spending Review. That overall envelope is then divided up between government departments, giving them fixed three-year budgets. The remainder of public spending is managed on an annual basis. This consists of programmes which are large, volatile and demand-led, and which therefore cannot reasonably be subject to multi-year limits. The biggest single element is social security spending. This Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) is reviewed twice a year as part of the Budget and Pre-Budget Report process.

5.3	No coordination mechanisms.
5.4	The golden rule is set over the economic cycle to allow fiscal policy to support monetary policy in maintaining stability through the operation of automatic stabilisers. Progress against the rule is measured by the average annual surplus on the current budget as a percentage of GDP since the cycle began in 1997-98. The sustainable investment rule states that public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held over the economic cycle at a sustainable and prudent level. Other things being equal, net debt will be maintained below 40% of GDP over the economic cycle.
5.8	Progress against the fiscal rules is updated at the time of the Budget and PBR. The judgement on whether the rules have been met is based on national accounts data produced by the independent Office of National Statistics (ONS).
5.9	However, the GOV is meeting its strict fiscal rules on the basis of cautious, audited assumptions.
5.10	The Code for Fiscal Stability says that the GOV may change its fiscal policy objectives and operating rules, provided that: a. any new fiscal policy objectives and operating rules also accord with the five principles of transparency; stability; responsibility; fairness and efficiency; and b. the reasons for departing from the previous objectives and operating rules are stated.

## 다. SCP(Stability and Convergence Programme)의 준비 및 위상

### (1) Questionnaire

6. Please provide a general description of the process followed for the preparation of the SCP (e.g. Ministries, departments, bodies other than government involved). Please mention when the preparation of the programme starts and ends:
7. If there is a national medium-term budgetary framework setting targets or ceilings for various general government components (revenue, expenditure, deficit, debt), how is the preparation of the SCP connected with this framework? Notably, are budgetary targets included in the SCP always identical to those included in the national medium-term framework?
  - 1) Targets are the same
  - 2) Targets are usually the same, but may differ sometimes
  - 3) Targets usually differ
8. How are fiscal targets for regional and local governments set? Is there any coordination/consultation mechanism in order to involve sub-national governments in the preparation of the SCP?
  - Yes, there is coordination mechanism between all levels of general government /for some general government sub-sectors
  - No coordination mechanism
9. Please provide information on the degree of involvement of the National Parliament in the preparation of the stability / convergence programme:
  - 1) The SCP is not sent to Parliament before its publication.
  - 2) The SCP is sent to Parliament before its publication, but there is no formal presentation, and no discussion.
  - 3) The SCP is sent and presented to Parliament by a Member of the government. There is a discussion, but not followed by a vote on the SCP.
  - 4) The SCP is formally sent, discussed and approved by Parliament, which has the possibility to amend it.
  - 5) The SCP is not formally sent or subject to the approval by Parliament, but is derived from a document including the main medium-term macroeconomic and budgetary projections that was previously approved by Parliament. Please describe the situation, and at what time in the year this document is adopted:

10. Does an independent fiscal institution ('Fiscal Council') intervene in one way or another in the preparation of the SCP?

- No.
- Yes, the fiscal institution:
  - Prepares macro forecasts
  - Prepares fiscal forecasts
  - Other (please specify)

11. How would you qualify the reaction of the press and the media when the SCP is publicly released? Specifically, please compare the media coverage to when the budget is presented:

- 1) Important media coverage
- 2) Some media coverage
- 3) Low media coverage

## (2) Summary Information

Country	7	8	9	10	11
Austria	2	N	4	Y	2
Belgium	2	Y	3	Y	3
Bulgaria	2	Y	2	N	2
Cyprus	n/a	N	3	N	1
Czech Republic	2	N	5	N	3
Germany	1	Y	3	N	1
Denmark	1	N	3	N	3
Estonia	1	Y	1	N	1
Greece	.	N	3	N	1
Spain	2	N	3	N	2
Finland	1	Y	3	N	3
France	C	Y	5	N	1
Hungary	n/a	N	3	Y	1
Ireland	1	N	1	N	3
Italy	2	N	5	N	3
Lithuania	2	N	3	N	1
Luxembourg	n/a	Y	3	N	3
Latvia	1	N	5	N	3
Malta	1	N	5	N	3
The Netherlands	1	Y	5	Y	3
Poland	2	N	1	N	3
Portugal	n/a	N	3	N	3
Romania	2	N	2	N	1
Sweden	1	N	5	N	2
Slovenia	1	N	3	N	3
Slovak Republic	1	N	3	N	2
United Kingdom	1	See 9	4	Y	3

### (3) Additional Information

#### Austria

Question	
7	The preparation of the SCP is strongly connected with the two frameworks described previously. The targets of the ASP are crucial in order to establish the medium term scenario of the SCP until t+3.
8	Fiscal targets for RG and LG are set in the ASP. The targets of the ASP are used to build up the medium term scenario of the SCP. Very little additional coordination is needed.
9	There is a discussion in Parliament's Budget Committee and formally also voted. However, the discussion (and the vote) always takes place after the update has been submitted to the EU.
10	End-June, the Austrian Government Debt Committee delivers an extensive analysis of the situation of public finances to MF that takes the SCP as a starting point. In November/early December, the same institution releases a report that includes recommendations for the conduct of budgetary policies taking into account the current macroeconomic outlook.
11	Press conference by MF. The press coverage is however less intense than for the CO or the EU press release on the assessment of the update.

#### Belgium

Question	
7	[Answer not clear. It seems they are linked but they are not necessarily the same.]
8	RG and LG are not directly involved in the preparation of the SCP. However, the fiscal targets for territorial GOV [RG, LG] are those stemming from the HCF recommendations and negotiations within the CC (GG tiers negotiations).
9	The SCP is sent to NP when the budget for t+1 is discussed. Both discussions may take place simultaneously.
10	Although indirectly, HCF is involved through long-term projections for the budgetary cost of ageing and recommendations on fiscal targets for LG and RG.

#### Bulgaria

Question	
7	The targets are generally the same but the SCP is prepared at a significantly later stage than the MTFP and thus, takes into account also potential revisions to the MTFP with the progress of the budget procedure.
8	The SCP draws heavily on the coordination process between the various government tiers within the overall budget procedure. It uses agreements, achieved during this process, which are included in the MTFP and the draft budget for the next year. In addition, the SCP is prepared and discussed by a working group, led by the AEAF, which also includes representatives from the NSSI, the NHIF and various line ministries, but not from municipalities.

Cyprus

Question	
8	Local governments are expected to present balanced budgets. Most of their current and capita expenditure is financed by the Central Government budget.

Czech Republic

Question	
7	Fiscal targets for general government balance in the SCP are consistent with the targets with in the national medium-term outlook.
8	There are no targets for LG. LG provide data for the purpose of notification of the GG deficit and debt.
9	The macro scenario and the Medium Term budgetary of the State Budget and the MTEF, on which the SCP is based, are voted (separately) by the NP.
11	The SCP is published on the MF internet pages ( <a href="http://www.mfcr.cz">www.mfcr.cz</a> ).

Germany

Question	
7	However, budgetary planning is based on a cash-based revenue and expenditure calculation. For the SP this is converted according to the ESA 95 standard.
8	According to the constitution the federation and the Laender are autonomous in their budgets and independent from each other. A legally non-binding co-ordination of the budgetary and financial plannings occurs within the framework of the Financial Planning Council, in which both the federation and the Laender are represented.
11	However, as the budget debates in the Bundestag are being spread over a longer time horizon and as all policy areas are being discussed, media coverages of the central government budget is much more extensive.

Denmark

Question	
7	The SCP is always consistent with the medium-term framework.
8	Local government are not formally involved in the preparation of the SCP. However, agreement between CG and LG on overall expenditure and tax levels are based on the targets in the MTBF, which are then used for the SCP.
9	The government presents the SCP, Commission assessment and expected CO to NP Committee of Fiscal and EU Affairs.
10	The Danish Economic Council (DEC) is not involved in the SCP, but it releases opinions on the MTBF on which the MTBF is based.
11	However, large media coverage for economic policy and MTBF issues.

Estonia

Question	
7	SCP is prepared 6 months after MTBF is adopted but both contain the same Medium Term Objective (MTO), policy priorities and targets. However, MTBF is based on MF spring forecast and the SCP on the summer forecast (or on an updated of this summer forecasts). As a result, there may be differences in nominal figures.
8	Local governments are directly involved in the SCP preparation. They are requested to respect the two fiscal rules on debt developments that apply to this subsector.

Greece

Question	
7	There is no MTBF.

Spain

Question	
7	The medium term targets (MTT) approved by the Parliament are the main benchmark for the SCP preparation. But the SCP also takes account of the latest economic and budgetary developments and data. Therefore each SCP update makes an explicit reference to the MTT and explains the differences when necessary.
8	There is no any formal coordination mechanism. However, the objectives for regional and local gov in the SCp are those of the MTBF, which have been negotiated between centram and regional and local government within the FFPC and NCLA respectively.
9	There is no legal obligation, but Mecofin presents the SCP to the NP.

Finland

Question	
7	Usually, spending limits included in the SCP are in line with the spending limits agreed in March. Some differences may exist because the SCP can contain some additional expenditure estimates considered previously in the Budget Law in September, and some foreseeable on-budget spending pressure.
8	LG estimates are based on the views of the Advisory Board for Municipal Economy and Administration and on the overall macroeconomic developments presented in the Programme. The Advisory Board consists of delegates from MF, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Social Welfare and Health, Ministry of Education and the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities.
9	However, the contents of the SCP is presented to the NP during the drafting period.
11	Typically low media coverage. However, the 2007 SP was covered by the media extensively following a statement on the SP by MF to the NP.

France

Question	
7	In principle targets are the same. However, the SCP may sometimes update the budgetary and macro information by taking into account more recent data.
8	The recently set up "Conseil National des Finances Publiques" (2006) coordinates the different GG layers.
9	The MTBF, on which the SCP is based, is annexed to the State Budget Law when this is discussed in the NP.

Hungary

Question	
7	The budget law determines the ESA primary balance figures for the next three years which are identical with the figures presented in the December 2006 SCP.
10	The Convergence Council gave its opinion in the course of the 2006 SCP preparation. This Council is made up of independent experts from the private sector.

Ireland

Question	
7	The formulation of medium-term budgetary policy is in accordance with the requirements of the revised SGP.
8	The government sets the borrowing limit for local authorities. There is no consultation with local authorities on this limit.
11	The SCP is released at the same time the Budget is presented to the NP. The Draft Budget draws more attention. Increasingly, importance is attached to the concept of general government balance as opposed to the more traditional measure of the Exchequer Balance.

Italy

Question	
7	In general the SCP targets are the same as those in the DPEF. In case of deviation, the government presents to the NP a document containing the new balance budgets projections.
8	The coordination/consultation mechanism works only for the preparation of the DPEF as explained in the previous sections.
9	The SP is in line with the DPEF (presented in June) and/or its updates (usually presented in September/October), which are approved by the Parliament.

Lithuania

Question	
7	The information contained in the medium-term planning frameworks is taken into account when setting the SCP's fiscal targets.
8	Every LG leading or in pursuance of the main preliminary indicators of the national budget, long-term development strategy of the state, the strategic plans approved by itself can set fiscal targets themselves. Organic budget law requires to balance municipal budgets.

Luxemburg

Question	
6	The SCP is prepared in September and drafted at the beginning of October of t-1 by the Public Finance Department in the Ministry of Finance, and subsequently coordinated with other Ministries. Account is taken of the very latest forecasts concerning the evolution of the various components of the government. The draft SCP is submitted to the Government for adoption and transmitted by mid October to the National Parliament where it is discussed but no vote is taken. As soon as it is approved at cabinet level, it is published on the internet site of the Ministry of Finance.
8	Given the structural surplus of 2% of GDO for the SS, no overall targets is set for this sub-sector. However, most sub-schemes (e.g. healthcare) have internal rules which are essentially based on a balanced budget requirement. With respect to local authorities, prevailing law regulates strictly their borrowing capacities and are monitored by the Ministry of Interior.

Latvia

Question	
7	Overall, fiscal targets in the SCP are in line with the national medium term budgetary documents. However, the different accounting methodologies have to be taken in to account.
8	SCP includes the estimation of LG fiscal targets by MF.
9	Saeima is informed about SCP after the adoption of the Programme at the Cabinet of Ministers. The SCP is based on the Budget Law submitted to Saeima not earlier than October 1 and later adopted.
11	More attention of press is paid to the national budget which usually comes before the SCP.

Malta

Question	
7	The SCP is built upon the targets included in the Budget Speech.
8	Local Councils account for a minor part of the GG.
9	The SCP is based on the Budget Speech (i.e. the MTBF), which coincides with the Budget Law for year t+1 and is presented to the Parliament.

The Netherlands

Question	
7	They are identical with respect to the MTBF objectives.
8	LG (e.g. provinces and municipalities) are independent legal entities but must register a balanced budget on a full accrual basis. Expenditure by LG is influenced by grants from the CG. In 2004, an agreement was reached between CH and LG on a national stabilisation plan. It was agreed that when the GG deficit breaches the value of 2,5 % of GDP, a deficit of 0,5 % of GDP on ESA 95 basis will be relevant for LG sector as a whole.
9	The Budget Memorandum sent to the Parliament includes MTBF figures and underlying macro projections .
10	The CPB prepares the macro economic projections underlying the budget figures (on which the SCP is based) and is consulted for the preparation of the SCP.

Poland

Question	
7	Usually targets are the same, but some differences may exist due to more recent data availability when preparing the SCP (the medium term framework prepared for the Budget Law is sent to the Parliament by the end of September, whereas the SCP is submitted to the EU by the end of November).
8	Targets for LGs are prepared by MF on the basis of the information gathered in the preparation of the Budget Law and some updated data available when preparing the SCP. LGs are not directly involved in the preparation of the SCP and no coordination mechanisms is into operation.
11	Analysts (banks) and main newspapers and TV mention the SCP, but it does not trigger any public debate (including politicians from the opposition parties).

Portugal

Question	
9	MF presents the SCP and there is a debate in a plenary session. NP neither votes nor amends the SCP. However, in the light of the Parliamentary discussion, the government may introduce changes. The final version of the SCP has to be sent to NP before being submitted to the EU.
11	The press coverage remains modest although has recently increased due to the EDP for Portugal. Most measures contained in the SCP have already been announced.

Romania

Question	
7	Because of different reporting methodologies: ESA 95 for SPC and budgetary for national medium-term framework.
8	Data from the annual budget planning process is considered.

Sweden

Question	
7	MTBF, SCPs and Budget Law have in general the same targets.
8	There is no any formal coordination mechanism. The balanced budget requirement is laid down in the Local Government Act.
9	The government informs the Parliament's Standing Committees of Fiscal Affaires and EU Affaires on the content of the SCP.
10	The Risk bank gives its opinion on a preliminary draft.
11	The media coverage is rather modest, but it is mentioned by some papers.

Slovenia

Question	
7	Budgetary targets in the Budget Memorandum and in the SCP are identical.
8	LG are not directly involved in the preparation of the SCP. They are taken into account indirectly through the Budget Memorandum that includes relevant information.
10	However, the IMAD provides macro forecasts to be used in budgetary preparation for the Budget Memorandum, on which the SCP is based.

Slovak Republic

Question	
14	This was the case of the first draft 2009–2011 GG budget preparation. Taking into account the CO from 12th February 2008, the budgetary targets were made more strict (in 2008 GG deficit from 2.3% of GDP to 2.0% of GDP and in 2009 GG deficit from 1.8% of GDP to 1.7% of GDP).

United Kingdom

Question	
7	The fiscal framework is consistently applied in the SCP.
8	No coordination mechanisms.
9	The SCP is formally approved by the NP.
10	The key assumptions underlying the fiscal projections are audited by the National Audit Office under a three-year rolling review process to ensure that they remain reasonable and cautious.
11	There is relatively low media coverage at the time of the publication of the SCP. However, it is drawn from the PBR, the main elements of it get high media coverage at that point.

라. SCP에 대한 이사회 의견의 수용(Follow-up to the Council Discussion on the SCP)

**(1) Questionnaire**

12. Please specify whether the Council Opinion on the SCP is:
- 1) Formally discussed within the government (e.g. in the Council of Ministers)
  - 2) Is not discussed within the government
13. The Council Opinion on the SCP is:
- 1) Not formally presented to Parliament
  - 2) The Council Opinion is presented to Parliament, but there is no discussion. Presentation is done by:
    - Prime Minister
    - Finance Minister
    - Others (please specify)
  - 3) The Council Opinion is formally presented to Parliament. Moreover, there is a discussion (e.g. intervention by the Finance Minister, followed by questions and answers).
  - 4) Other (please specify)
14. How would you qualify the follow-up given to the Council Opinion, especially if it includes policy invitations:
- 1) Concrete actions are generally immediately taken if there are policy invitations in the Council Opinion. Please provide examples:
  - 2) Generally, there is no immediate concrete action. If this is the case, please specify the reasons for the absence of action following the invitation by the Council (e.g. impossibility of introducing corrective budgetary measures outside the 'normal' budgetary calendar)
  - 3) There is no immediate action, but the Council opinion is taken into account in the preparation of the budget for the following year
  - 4) Other (please specify)
15. How would you qualify the reaction of the press and the media in your country when the Council issues its Opinion on the Programme? Specifically, please compare the media coverage to when the budget is presented:
- 1) Important media coverage
  - 2) Some media coverage
  - 3) Low media coverage

## (2) Summary Information

Country	12	13	14	15
Austria	1	3	4	1
Belgium	2	1	4	2
Bulgaria	1	1	3	2
Cyprus	1	1	3	1
Czech Republic	1	2	3	2
Germany	2	4	2	1
Denmark	2	3	4	3
Estonia	1	3	3	3
Greece	1	1	3	1
Spain	2	1	3	3
Finland	1	4	4	3
France	2	4	3	1
Hungary	2	1	3	1
Ireland	2	4	4	2
Italy	2	1	3	1
Lithuania	1	3	3	1
Luxembourg	1	2	3	3
Latvia	1	4	3	3
Malta	1	1	3	1
The Netherlands	2	3	3	3
Poland	2	2	3	3
Portugal	1	3	4	3
Romania	2	4	3	2
Sweden	2	1	4	3
Slovenia	1	1	3	1
Slovak Republic	2	4	3	3
United Kingdom	1	3	3	3

### (3) Additional Information

#### Austria

Question	
14	Any of the options may be possible depending on the content and the strength of the CO. In 2000, there was an immediate reaction involving substantial change of the medium term budgetary strategy.
15	Headlines of daily newspapers and online media, report on national TV.

#### Belgium

Question	
12	Discussed among the relevant MIN, departments involved in its preparation, and the EFC BE member.
14	CO impact depends on budgetary situation and its policy recommendations. CO is one element more taken into for the next budget and SCP.

#### Bulgaria

Question	
12	The CO on the SCP is discussed both at an expert level and at a political level by deputy ministers.

#### Czech Republic

Question	
12	Discussed in the debriefing of the Ecofin Council meeting.
13	Relevant NP committees are informed about the most recent CO within the presentation of the updated SCP (given usually by the Deputy MoF). The main conclusions of the CO are presented to NP as a part of the explanatory memorandum to the following year's draft State Budget. So far, there has not been any specific discussion on the CO itself.
15	Steadily improving situation.

#### Germany

Question	
13	CO is sent officially to the Bundestag. Whether there is a discussion or not depends on a Bundestag's decision.
14	CO may influence next year's budget preparation.

Denmark

Question	
12	No formal discussion. However, the presentation to NP of the SCO, Commission assessment and expected CO is prepared by MF and coordinated with other ministries.
13	Not presented in the NP.
14	CO for DK does not contain policy recommendations.

Greece

Question	
12	It is discussed for the Ecofin meeting.
13	The CO is presented and discussed in the Parliament Committee for European Union Affairs when dealing with issues related to Ecofin meetings.

Spain

Question	
12	Whenever relevant, the Mecofin may consider the CO for its policy measures.
14	Recommendations may be taken into account for next year's budget in the next MTBF. Particular attention to sustainability issues. Apart from that, latest CO contain few policy invitations.

Finland

Question	
12	The Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs of the CoM discusses the SCP and adopts a common view on the draft of the CO to be discussed at the Ecofin meeting.
13	The Commission's assessment and the draft CO on Finland's SCP is submitted to the Grand Committee of NP in connection with the Ecofin preparations.
14	No immediate action has so far been needed since the CO has not challenged the budgetary policy conducted in SF.

France

Question	
12	However, internal discussions among Ministries on the CO drafts in order to prepare Ecofin meetings.

Hungary

Question	
12	However, the last CO is taking into account by the GOV when preparing teh next SCP.

Ireland

Question	
12	The CO on Irelands' SCP are generally favourable.
13	The SCP Update is published with the Budget on Budget Day. Since 2007, the Minister for Finance engages each Spring with the Parliamentary Finance and Public Services Committee on the economic and fiscal background to the current and following two budgets as set out in the SCP and informed by the CO.
14	The CO on the Dec. 2007 stability programme invited Ireland to maintain firm control over expenditures and to improve the long-term sustainability of the public finances by implementing further pension reforms. These policy invitations and other aspects of the fiscal surveillance process (e.g. Euro group fiscal orientations) are taken into account in the conduct of budgetary and economic policy.

Italy

Question	
14	The CO represents de facto a constraint for policy decisions taken when the new budget is presented.
15	In the last few years, being Italy in an excessive deficit position, the CO has had a wide media and press coverage. The presentation of the budget has however a wider and longer media coverage than the CO

Lithuania

Question	
12	Fiscal responsibility Law obliges the Government to present to the NP the measures that are necessary to implement EU Council policy invitations.
13	It is discussed in ordinary procedure for preparation official positions for Council. Minister or Vice-minister presents official position to European affairs parliament committee.
15	It depends on contents of an update (especially on "additional measures").

Luxembourg

Question	
12	The MF informs the CoM and presents the recommendations/policy "invitations".
14	As a rule, i.e. if there are no significant macroeconomic or fiscal imbalances in the short term which would warrant immediate action.
15	Traditionally, it is the Commission assessment and its press releases that draws more media attention.

Latvia

Question	
13	NP is informed about the CO content.

Malta

Question	
14	Government is ready to consider policy invitations by the Council.

The Netherlands

Question	
13	The CO is part of the Ecofin minutes that is sent to NP and discussed in the Parliamentary Committee for public finances in a questions and answers session.
15	Major newspapers devote attention to the CO in their economic section.

Poland

Question	
12	GOV position on the CO is presented to the European Committee of the Council of Ministers (including undersecretaries of State responsible for EU matters).
13	Once the European Committee of the CM (including undersecretaries of State responsible for EU matters) has approved the GOV position on the CO, this position is sent to NP for informative purposes. Unlike Council decision and recommendations on the excessive deficit procedure, the SCP and the CO were not subject to discussion between 2004 and 2006.
14	No immediate actions are taken. The next update of the SCP aims at responding to at least part of the Council policy invitations. CO is taken into account in the preparation of the budget for the following year.
15	CO is mentioned by some analysts, newspapers and TV, but no public debate takes place.

Portugal

Question	
13	The CO of the latest SCP is discussed in April in the context of the Budgetary Policy Steering Committee.
14	Recent CO have emphasized the implementation of policy measures included in the SCP that have effectively been implemented.
15	Some visibility for just one or two days in the press

Romania

Question	
12	It is informally discussed within the government.
13	The MF informs GOV on the main provisions of the CO

Sweden

Question	
12	Probably discussed informally
13	At the preparation-meeting in the Parliament's Standing Committee of European Union Affaires just before the relevant ECOFIN meeting, the Minister comments on the assessment by the Commission and on the views in the draft CO. Thereafter there is a discussion in the Committee.
14	It is hard to see if there is an influence from CO to policy actions. Normally no policy recommendations for Sweden
15	But at some occasions, especially if there has been critical remarks in the CO, there has been some media reaction.

Slovak Republic

Question	
13	The CO on the SCP is not formally presented to NP. However, the European Affairs Committee of the NP is formally informed about the content of the CO.
14	This was the case of the first draft 2009–2011 GG budget preparation. Taking into account the CO from 12th February 2008, the budgetary targets were made more strict (in 2008 GG deficit from 2.3% of GDP to 2.0% of GDP and in 2009 GG deficit from 1.8% of GDP to 1.7% of GDP).

United Kingdom

Question	
12	The Cabinet approves the content of the SCP at the time of the PBR. More generally, the Ministerial Committee on European Policy determines UK policies on EU issues, and oversees UK relations with other member states and principal partners of the EU.
13	CO for the UK are deposited for scrutiny in NP in line with standard comprehensive scrutiny procedures for EU legislative and non-legislative documents. The CO are considered by both the House of Commons' European Scrutiny Committee and the House of Lords' EU Select Committee. The Opinions are accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and the Scrutiny Committee can request additional information if they have any further questions.

마. SCP실행의 감독(Monitoring the Implementation of the SCP)

**(1) Questionnaire**

16. Apart from the information contained in the update of the SCP, does the government carry out any regular public assessment of the implementation of the previous updates of the SCP?

- Yes (please specify)
- No, the implementation of the previous updates is only discussed in the SCP

17. Is the implementation of the previous update of the SCP discussed in Parliament?

- 1) Yes, in a formal session for this purpose
- 2) Indirectly through other sessions
- 3) No

18. Does an independent fiscal institution ('Fiscal Council') participate to the monitoring of the implementation of the SCPs?

- 1) Yes. Please describe the institution involved and its role:
- 2) Informally/indirectly (please specify)
- 3) No

## (2) Summary Information

Country	16	17	18
Austria	Y	1	1
Belgium	Y	1	1
Bulgaria	N	2	3
Cyprus	Y	3	3
Czech Republic	Y	3	3
Germany	N	2	1
Denmark	N	3	3
Estonia	N	3	3
Greece	N	3	3
Spain	N	2	3
Finland	N	3	3
France	Y	3	3
Hungary	N	3	3
Ireland	Y	2	3
Italy	N	3	3
Lithuania	N	2	2
Luxembourg	Y	3	3
Latvia	N	3	3
Malta	Y	3	3
The Netherlands	N	3	3
Poland	N	3	3
Portugal	N	3	3
Romania	N	3	3
Sweden	N	3	3
Slovenia	.	3	3
Slovak Republic	N	3	3
United Kingdom	Y	1	1

### (3) Additional Information

#### Austria

Question	
16	MF and GOV Debt Committee regularly address the issue.
17	The discussion takes place in NP budget committee. The MF has to respond to the questions of the Committee members. It is left to their discretion if they want to discuss implementation or not, but usually this is part of the debate.
18	The GOV Debt Committee monitors on an ongoing basis the implementation of the SCP and the ASP.

#### Belgium

Question	
16	If the fiscal target in the t+1 budget law has been kept in the SCP, monitoring of the budget implementation in t+1 implies monitoring of the SCP.
17	If the fiscal target in the t+1 budget law has been kept in the SCP, monitoring of the budget implementation in t+1 implies monitoring of the SCP.
18	HCF issues a report on the fulfillment of the SCP.

#### Cyprus

Question	
16	There is a monitoring every three months but it is not made public.

#### Czech Republic

Question	
16	A brief assessment of the previous SCP implementation is included in the State Budget documentation.

#### Germany

Question	
17	In the course of the debates in the Bundestag on the federal budget a discussion on the implementation of the previous SP is possible.
18	In the annual report of the Council of Economic Experts and in the common forecast of the research institutes (both independent institutions) the fiscal policy strategy and especially the reduction path set out in the SP are being commented.

Denmark

Question	
16	However the GOV frequently releases implementation reports on the MTBF on which the SCP is based.
17	However implementation of the MTBF on which the SCP is based is discussed in the NP.
18	The DEC releases reports on the MTBF on which the SCP is based.

Spain

Question	
16	In contrast, the objectives of the previous MTBF is assessed by the gov to evaluate their degree of fulfillment.
17	Implementation of the previous SCP is discussed in June when the new MTBF is submitted to NP.

Hungary

Question	
16	GOV was committed to report regularly on the progress made in the implementation of the SCP.
17	It is only discussed in the debate on the new SCP.
18	The "Convergence Council" gave its opinion in the course of the 2006 SCP preparation. The Council is made up of independent experts from the private sector.

Ireland

Question	
16	In the Pre-Budget Outlook (October).
17	However, since 2007, MF engages each Spring with the Parliamentary Finance and Public Services Committee on the economic and fiscal background to the current and following two budgets asset out in the SCP.
18	While it is not formally mandated to monitor the SCP implementation, the "Economic and Social Research Institute" (ESRI) publishes independent analyses and recommendations regarding budgetary policy.

Italy

Question	
16	However, being the targets set in the SP in line with the DPEF, the Government assesses its Planning Document throughout the year.

Lithuania

Question	
17	MF may be invited by the Committee of the NP to report on the implementation of SCP.
18	An independent economist assesses the programme implementation voluntary or by invitation of the Parliamentary opposition.

Luxembourg

Question	
18	The Central Bank prepares an opinion on the SCP.

Malta

Question	
16	The Budget Speech contains an assessment of the implementation of the previous SCP.

Poland

Question	
16	Implementation of reforms included in the SCP are included in the information attached to the Draft Budget Law.

United Kingdom

Question	
16	PBRs and Budgets provide updates on outturn years as well as projections going forward. The End of Year Fiscal Report (EYFR) describes fiscal developments in the previous two financial years, and sets these in to an historical context.
17	The fiscal and economic projections and policy changes outlined in the SCP are discussed in PBR and Budget debates in NP.
18	Through the NAO's role in auditing the key assumptions under the three-year rolling review process. By their nature, these reviews are backward-looking.

## 바. 예산과의 연계성(Connectedness to Budget/SCP)

### (1) Questionnaire

19. Could you please briefly describe how the preparations of the annual budget and of the SCP are articulated?
20. Please indicate whether the SCP and the Budget are prepared by the same department of the Ministry of Finance
- 1) Same department
  - 2) Different department (please specify)
21. Please indicate whether the accounting and reporting rules used in the SCP and in the Budget are the same
- 1) Yes, they are the same
  - 2) Different rules apply (please specify)
22. Is the SCP (or a document including the main medium-term macroeconomic and budgetary projections that will be the basis for the preparation of the SCP) annexed to the Budget?
- No, the SCP (or a preliminary version that includes the main figures) is not annexed to the Budget.
  - Yes, the SCP (or a preliminary version that includes the main figures) is annexed to the Budget. Please specify when this annex is prepared and made public.
23. Are the budget targets for years  $t$  and  $t+1$  always identical in the budget and in the SCP?
- 1) Yes
  - No, they are different because of
    - 2) Different times of adoption
    - 3) Different accounting rules
    - 4) Other reasons (please specify)

## (2) Summary Information

Country	20	21	22	23
Austria	2	1	N	1
Belgium	1	2	Y	1
Bulgaria	2	2	N	2
Cyprus	1	2	N	1
Czech Republic	2	2	Y	3
Germany	2	2	N	3
Denmark	2	2	N	2
Estonia	2	1	N	1
Greece	2	1	N	1
Spain	2	2	N	2
Finland	2	2	N	1
France	2	1	Y	1
Hungary	.	2	Y	1
Ireland	1	1	Y	1
Italy	2	1	N	1
Lithuania	2	2	N	1
Luxembourg	1	1	N	1
Latvia	1	2	N	3
Malta	2	1	N	1
The Netherlands	1	1	N	1
Poland	2	2	N	4
Portugal	2	1	N	1
Romania	2	2	Y	2.3
Sweden	2	1	N	1
Slovenia	1	2	Y	1
Slovak Republic	2	1	N	1
United Kingdom	1	1	Y	1

### (3) Additional Information

#### Austria

Question	
20	The budget is prepared by the Budget Directorate in the MF, while the SCP is prepared by the Economic Policy Division that belongs to the MF's Directorate of Economic Policy and Financial Markets.

#### Belgium

Question	
19	The initial inputs for SCP preparation are those for the budget law (t and t+1). Information on long-term issues annexed to the budget is the same as those included in the SCP (ageing).
21	The SCP is based on ESA95 and EDP rules, while the budget is based on budgetary accounting. Different definitions of GG.
22	Economic information and assumptions and prospects for t and t+1 are the same in the budget and in the SCP. Information and policy issues on ageing that are included in the SCP are annexed to the draft budget.

#### Bulgaria

Question	
19	The budget parameters in the SCP are identical to the parameters set in the draft budget for the next year submitted to the National Assembly by the CM.
20	SCP is prepared by the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting, and the budget is prepared by the Budget Directorate within MF.
21	The planning of the Budget and of the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework is based on national methodology, close but not similar to the GFS86 methodology. The SCP uses MF data on budget execution to convert these figures into the ESA95 methodology.
23	The figures for year t are always identical. The early deadline for the SCP submission to the EC means that the SCP would be based only on a budget draft for t+1 rather than on a budget adopted by the NP which makes possible differences in the budget targets between the SCP and the actual budget in case of budget update, taking place between the drafting of the SCP and the actual adoption of the budget for t+1. Such a case, however, is not very likely as budget targets are usually set well in advance and are rarely changed during the budget procedure.

Cyprus

Question	
19	The budget remains fundamentally based on an incremental budgeting mechanism for expenditure items and only a consolidated revenue forecast based on existing tax policies is prepared. A document detailing economic developments in the previous year and prospects for the coming one is presented by the Planning Bureau and MF each year, and document is released shortly before the Draft Budget presentation by MF. This document is derived from the SCP and keeps consistency with the medium term projections.
21	The budget is based on a cash basis and it only covers the CG.
23	However, the Budget Law does not include explicit fiscal targets, but it is compiled taking into account non-binding guidelines for certain expenditure categories of the Central Government. Local authorities are expected to prepare balanced budgets.

Czech Republic

Question	
19	The SCP is consistent with the Budget's macroeconomic scenario and Medium Term outlook.
20	Both the State Budget and the SCP are prepared in a close cooperation of the Financial Policy Department, the State Budget Department and the Tax Policy Department of MF.
21	The State Budget is based on cash accounting while the SCP applies the accrual-based ESA 95 methodology.
22	The medium-term budgetary outlook, relevant macroeconomic scenarios and GG sectors' fiscal performance are annexed to the Budget Law. The SCP is based on this information that is submitted to the NP for information.
23	In principle, the only difference may stem from the different methodologies used.

Germany

Question	
19	The budgetary planning and the status quo of the medium-term planning for the federal budget are directly transferred into the SP.
20	The Federal Budget is elaborated by the Division for the Federal Budget. The SCP is worked out by the Division for Fiscal Policy (in agreement with the Division for the Federal Budget and the Division for European Policy).
21	For the budget cash accounting is applied. For the SCP the ESA 95 methodology is adopted.
22	However, the Financial Plan (MTBF), on which the SCP is based, is submitted to the NP together with the Draft Budget.
23	The targets are made consistent at the time of preparing the budget and are possibly updated.

Denmark

Question	
19	Budget is prepared on the basis of the MTBF, which in turn also determines the SCP (mainly through allocation of real consumption growth). The MTBF has a central role.
20	The SCP is prepared by the Macroeconomic Policy Center, while the budget is prepared by the Center for Expenditure Policy. Both are highly coordinated.
21	The SCP is based on ESA-95 and EDP rules, while budget is based on budgetary accounting. Besides, the definition of the GG sector is not the same in both methodologies.

Estonia

Question	
19	Annual budget and SCP have different calendars. The SCP is prepared after the finalizations of the Draft Budget Law. However, both documents are closely content related.
20	Budget Department responsible for the budget preparation, and Economic Analysis Department responsible for SCP. However, they are coordinated.

Greece

Question	
19	The SGP provides the macro framework, assumptions and targets for the budget preparation. In turn, the budget provides the breakdown of budgetary items for the SCP.
20	Budget Law: GAO. SCP: Council of Economic Advisors and the MAD

Spain

Question	
19	The budgetary cycle starts in (t-1) with the SCP, which is the reference for the MTBF in t. This MTBF (t) forms the basis for the t+1 budget taht can revise the targets of the latest SCP (t-1).
20	The SCP is prepared by the Secretary of State of Economy in collaboration with the Secretary of State of Finance and Budget. The draft Budget is prepared by the Secretary of Finance and Budget with some involvement of the Secretary of State of Economy.
21	The SCP is based on ESA 95 figures. The budget is based on budgeting accounting rules. Corresponding adjustments and correlation mechanisms between the two exists.
22	However, the macro scenarios and fiscal objectives of the MTBF (on which the SCP is largely based), are annexed to the Budget Law.
23	They can defer as a result of the revision of macro assumptions, updated information on budgetary execution or the adoption of new economic policy measures.

Finland

Question	
19	Short-term economic forecasts are included in the draft budget. The SCP is prepared thereafter on the basis of this budget proposal and the related economic forecasts.
20	The Annual budget is prepared by the Budget Department, while the SCP is drawn up by the Economics Department. However, there is a close cooperation between them.
21	The SCP is prepared on a national account basis, while the budget is based on budgetary accounting.
22	However, medium term projections are annexed to the decision on spending limits.

France

Question	
19	They are closely connected since the SCP is mainly based on the MTBF that has to be submitted to the Parliament together with the Budget Law. Therefore, both the SCP and the Budget Law are largely based and connected to the same multiannual budgetary planning.
20	The MTBF (included in the RESF annexed to the Budget Law) and the SCP are prepared jointly by the Treasury and the Budget Directorate. The latter is responsible for the budget preparation.
21	The MTBF and the SCP is based on ESA95 figures. The budget is based on budgeting accounting rules.
22	The MTBF involved in the "Rapport Economique et Sociale" (RESF), on which the SCP is based, is annexed to the Budget LAW for the Parliamentary discussion and approval.
23	In general they are identical, but they may differ like in 2005 due to the "Pèbureau rapport" on debt issues published in September. The government wanted to incorporate some recommendations from this report into the SCP.

Hungary

Question	
19	The adoption of the SCP by the Governments takes place when the 2nd stage of the Parliamentary discussion on the Draft Budget Law starts (end November). In addition, the 2007 Budget Law contains ESA 95 primary balance figures for the period 2008-2010 that are identical to those of the SCP.
21	The SCP is prepared by the Economic Policy Department (EPD), while the budget is prepared by the Budget and Financial Policy Division (BFPD). Nevertheless, the EPD contributes to the budget preparation by providing the macroeconomic scenario, and the BFPD provides the budgetary figures to the SCP. In addition, the budget law itself determines the ESA primary balance figures for the next three years are identical with the figures presented in the SCP.
22	The macroeconomic scenario and the budgetary figures of the budget and the SCP are basically the same. However, some differences may appear as a result of new available information.

Ireland

Question	
19	The SCP is published simultaneously with the budget presentation in the Parliament and is included in the budget documentation. Both documents are intrinsically linked and consistent with each other. The key budgetary aggregate in the budget is the GG balance.
21	Although the budget mainly follows a cash flow basis, the key budgetary aggregate is the GG balance on a national account basis. The budget also includes a table showing how the national exchequer balance translates in to the GG balance.
22	The SCP is annexed to the Budget and is made public with the publication of the Budget.

Italy

Question	
19	In September, the Government presents the Budget Law to the NP including the margin of manoeuvre to achieve the budgetary targets contained in the DPEF (adopted in July). In October the preparation of the SCP starts and is consistent with the DPEF, the Forecasting and Planning Report (RPP) and the Finance Law presented to the NP. Usually the fiscal measures included in the Finance Law presented to the Parliament in September and reported in the SP in November change after NP approval by the end of the year.
20	The annual budget is prepared by the State General Accounting Department ("Ragioneria Generale dello Stato"), while the SCP is prepared by the Department of Treasury.
21	The rules are except for collective consumptions and social transfers in kind that accounted and reported according to an economic-functional classification.

Lithuania

Question	
19	Annual budget is incorporated into the SCP. Both are based on the same macro forecast.
20	The budget is prepared by the Budget Department while the SCP is prepared by the Fiscal Policy Department.
21	Unlike the SCP, the budget is not prepared on a ESA 95 basis.
23	Most of the time they are the same. Deviations on extra measures are quantified in line with the Code of Conduct

Luxembourg

Question	
19	The processes are fully integrated (since the 2008 draft budget) ,i.e. there is full coherence between 1st September notification, draft budget and SCP. SCP is presented shortly (1-2weeks) after presentation of draft budget. Also since 2008 draft budget, a "volume III" is prepared which presents in detail the passage from the working balance of central government to the ESA95 balance.
20	The budget is prepared by the "Inspection générale des Finances"(IGF) which, in legal terms, is under the authority of the Minister responsible for the Budget. The SCP is prepared by the Public Finance Department in the Ministry of Finance together with the IGF and in close collaboration with representatives for the other sub-sectors of general government.

21	The national budget is setup according to the budgetary accounting system, while the SCP is based on ESA95 standards. Since 2008 the annual budget contains a special volume explaining how the bridge between the two accounting systems is to be taken.
22	The SCP is not a part of the national budget. However, SCP and budget are transmitted practically at the same time to the national Parliament. They both serve as a reference when major national decisions are taken jointly with representatives of the employers and the employed.

#### Latvia

Question	
19	Overall budgetary targets set in SCP are connected with the Budget Law, Budget Explanations and the Medium Term Macroeconomic Development and Fiscal Policy Framework (all documents are included in the package of draft budget law). The preparation of the SCP starts when the Budget Law is submitted to Saeima.
21	The budget is prepared on a cash flow basis, while fiscal aggregates in the SCP is based on ESA 95 figures.
22	The budget explanations which contain the description of the medium-term macroeconomic scenario are annexed to the draft budget law package.
23	The budget targets basically has to be identical in the budget and in the SCP. As was mentioned before, the difference between the accounting principles has to be taken into account.

#### Malta

Question	
19	The SCP is built upon the annual budget and the medium term targets contained in the Budget Speech.
20	The budget is prepared by the Budgetary Operations Division, whilst the SCP is compiled by the Economic Policy Division, Budgetary Operations Division and Treasury (all of them from MF).

#### The Netherlands

Question	
19	The SCP is integrally based on the annual budget and on the CPB forecasts underlying this budget. Only if major events with budgetary consequences occur after the Budget Law is approved could involve some differences.
22	But the SCP is fully based on the budget figures and its macro assumptions and forecasts.

Poland

Question	
19	The SCP should generally be consistent with the medium term path included in the Draft Budget Law submitted to the Parliament. Some modifications can however be introduced based on latest macroeconomic and fiscal developments.
20	The Financial Policy, Analyses and Statistics Department is responsible for the preparation of the SCP (although other departments or ministries also participate, such the Social Affairs Ministry for the long-term projections). The preparation of the whole document containing the draft budget is entrusted to the Budget Department, while the Financial Policy, Analyses and Statistics Department is responsible for macro forecasts, revenues projections and GG balance.
21	Draft budget figures are based on cash methodology, although forecasts for the general government data included in the draft are prepared according to ESA 95 and EDP rules.
23	The update should generally be consistent with the medium term path included in the justification of the draft budget act. Some modifications however are made basing on the latest data on the macroeconomic and fiscal performance in the current year (the draft budget act is sent to NP by end-September, whereas the update of the SCP has to be prepared before 1 December).

Portugal

Question	
19	The Draft Budget Law for t+1 takes as a starting point the targets included in the latest SCP (t-1). In turn, the following SCP update is prepared shortly after the Draft Budget for t+1, which ensures coherence between both documents in terms of underlying assumptions and measures to be taken.
20	The main responsibility for the Budget lies with the Budget General Directorate (DGO). The Office for Planning, Economic Policy and International Affairs (i.e. Gabinete de Planeamento, Estratégia, Avaliação e Relações Internacionais, or GPEARI) is responsible for the drafting of the Budget Report and is also in charge of SP, under the direct guidance of the MF cabinet. Both entities work in close cooperation in the elaboration of these documents.
21	Although the Budget Law relies on cash figures, the Budgetary Policy Steering Report contains information on ESA95 basis fully comparable with the SCP figures.

Romania

Question	
19	The SCP's preparation starts after the main figures of the Draft Budget are set, but sometimes the SCP is submitted to the EC before the Parliament approves the Budget.
20	Revenue Estimation and Macroeconomic Analysis Directorate has to deliver the final SCP, but it works very closely with the Budget Directorate during the whole process.
21	ESA 95 for SPC and budgetary/cash for national medium-term framework.
22	The medium term budgetary framework is prepared together with the annual draft budget and are made public when the Cabinet approves the draft budget (by October 15th)

Sweden

Question	
19	The preparation of the SCP formally starts when the budget bill is presented to the parliament (mid-September). The budgetary framework, targets, ceilings and forecasts in the SCP are fully identical to those considered in the budget bill.
20	Budget Department responsible for the budget preparation, and Economics Department responsible for SCP. However, they are coordinated.
21	The budget is according to budget definition (mainly cash), but expenditures and revenues according to ESA are also an important part.
22	The SCP is prepared after the budget presentation. However, information on the MTB F is included in the budget.

Slovenia

Question	
19	Budgetary targets in the budget and in the SCP are the same.
20	The same departments of the MF contribute to the draft budget and the SCP.
21	Budget on a cash basis. SCP on a ESA 95 basis.
22	The Budget Memorandum, on which the SCP is based, is annexed to the budget.

Slovak Republic

Question	
19	The preparation of the budget and the SCP are closely coordinated through the GG budget (MTBF) that heavily influences both documents.
20	The SCP is prepared by the Institute of Financial Policy from the MF. The budget is prepared by the Budgetary Policy Section.
23	Generally they are identical or almost identical. The NP can introduce some changes in the Budget Law that can give rise to some slight differences. However, the NP changes cannot increase the GG deficit.

United Kingdom

Question	
19	All the data included in the UK SCP is sourced from the PBR, and is therefore entirely consistent with that stage of the budgetary process. The public finances projections in the PBR have a different status from those produced at the time of the Budget. They represent an interim forecast update and not necessarily the outcome that GOV is seeking.
22	The content of the SCP is drawn from the PBR, and is therefore fully integrated into the PBR.
23	Yes, they are the same for the PBR, though because the Budget is produced at the end of the financial year, there may be differences at that point.

## 사. 추가경정예산(Supplementary and Corrective Budgets)

Note: Corrective or supplementary budgets are understood to include all legal instruments that allow the government to change its initial fiscal plans during the course of the budgetary year (e.g. changes in the budget balance target or in the expenditure and revenue aggregates considered in the approved Budget Law). Laws or measures aimed at correcting possible slippages from initial plans can also be considered as supplementary budgets. Other laws having purposes different from those mentioned above are not covered (e.g. labour market reforms, health care reforms), even if they have budgetary implications. End-year 'cleaning' budget laws are not covered, unless they have a significant impact on fiscal variables.

### (1) Questionnaire

24. Could you please specify the frequency of corrective budgets in your country (excluding the end-year cleaning budgets)?
- 1) Very rare
  - 2) Relatively rare (1 every 4-5 years)
  - 3) Frequently (1 every 2-3 years)
  - 4) Very frequently (almost every year)
  - 5) Every year (there is a mid-term revision of the budget), please describe how this works:
25. If the corrective budgets are rare, could you please specify the main reasons for that? Notably, are there legal or other sorts of obstacles to the implementation of such budgets?
26. What are in general the motivations for implementing corrective Budgets?
- New government in office
  - Correction of identified slippages
  - Change in economic forecasts
  - Other (please specify)
27. Are the macro and budgetary forecasts included in the budget revised at some point in the year? If yes, could you please provide details on the information included in the revised forecasts and the moment in the year when they are made public?

- a) year
- b) revised forecasts

28. Is there a link between such revisions and the implementation of supplementary / corrective budgets?

- 1) Yes, in case of major deviation identified, a supplementary budget is required to achieve the targets of the budget
- 2) The identification of risks to budgetary execution can trigger the preparation of a corrective budget (no obligation)
- 3) Other (please specify)
- 4) No

29. Are there special rules / limitations for the preparation of supplementary / corrective budgets (e.g. as regards Parliament approval)?

## (2) Summary Information

Country	24	27	28	29
Austria	4	Y	2	N
Belgium	5	Y	1	Y
Bulgaria	1	N	2	Y
Cyprus	5	Y	.	N
Czech Republic	4	N	2	Y
Germany	3	Y	2	.
Denmark	5	Y	4	Y
Estonia	4	.	1,2	N
Greece	1	N	3	N
Spain	1	Y	.	.
Finland	5	Y	3	N
France	5	Y	2	.
Hungary	4	Y	2	Y
Ireland	1	Y	4	N
Italy	3	Y	2	N
Lithuania	4	.	2	N
Luxembourg	1	Y	2	N
Latvia	5	Y	3	N
Malta	5	Y	2	N
The Netherlands	4	Y	3	Y
Poland	1	Y	2	Y
Portugal	3	Y	4	Y
Romania	5	.	.	.
Sweden	1	Y	3	N
Slovenia	3	Y	1	Y
Slovak Republic	5	Y	2	N
United Kingdom	1	Y	2	N

### (3) Additional Information

#### Austria

Question	
24	One or two amendments p.a are common because of: changes in the macro scenario, natural disasters, important economic reforms that require large majorities in the NP (e.g. pensions) and because they cannot be taken into account when the annual budget is prepared. Amendments due to new policy initiatives take place at any time during the budgetary year.
26	Deviations from the budget proposal can occur because of unexpected economic developments (e.g. natural disasters).
28	Limited discretionary authority of the MF to increase or shift authorized expenditures provided additional revenues are available. Any increase or shift in expenditure requires the approval by the NP of a supplementary Budget Law. If revenues are lower than expected, a special budget has to be submitted to NP that authorizes additional borrowing. The MF is requested to inform four times a year to the NP on the adherence to spending limits, borrowing developments and other liabilities.

#### Belgium

Question	
24	If the monitoring of budgetary implementation in t+1 shows deviations, a corrective budget can be proposed before May (t+1) and discussed and approved by NP before July.
26	They are mainly due to changing macroeconomic conditions and/or unexpected developments in revenues and expenditures.
27a	February and September, both t+1.

#### Cyprus

Question	
24	Once or twice every year.
27a	Mid year.
27b	The macro and budgetary forecasts are recalculated twice a year and if required are revised.
28	Required the approval by the Parliament.

Czech Republic

Question	
26	Budgetary slippages and unforeseen events (e.g. floods)
27b	Macro forecasts by MF are revised quarterly but they are not incorporated in the budget and, therefore, they are not systematically used to justify corrective budgets.
28	The risk of slippages more than revised forecasts justifies the preparation of a corrective budget.
29	In general, corrective budgets with an impact on approved expenditure, revenues and balance are subject to NP approval. Authorized by GOV, MF may: permit additional spending if this is partially offset by savings in other area; allow reductions of budgeted revenues if the balance does not change; agree corrective budgets due to co-financed projects with the EU.

Germany

Question	
24	Supplementary budgets since 1990: 1990 (German reunification): 3 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2002,2003, 2004: one supplementary budget each year.
26	In the early 90s they were caused the consequences stemming from the reunifications. Afterwards, they were mainly due to changes in the expected macroeconomic developments and their budgetary impact (mainly labour market conditions).
27b	Revenue and expenditure developments are permanently monitored by MF. In case of supplementary budgets, the new macroeconomic conditions are taken into account.

Denmark

Question	
24	Normally, these changes are not significant. The NP finance committee approves the corrective budget: there is a reserve fund for unforeseen expenses.
26	Unforeseen events. Normally, no connection between corrective budgets and forecasts revisions.
27a	In the year t+ 1 in May, August and December.
27b	MF releases macro forecasts in May, August and December. December 2006 forecasts for 2007 reflects budget figures for 2007. Subsequently, these forecasts are revised in May, August and December 2007. Forecasts are public.
28	In general there is no link
29	Approved by NP.

Estonia

Question	
24	Corrective budgets contain mid-term revision deemed necessary by the government as well as budgetary adjustments stemming from changing macroeconomic conditions (especially on the revenue side and revenue related expenditure).
26	Changes in economic conditions and macro forecasts, and corrections in ministerial action plans.
27b	Macro and fiscal forecasts are prepared twice a year: March and August. The March forecast is the basis for the MTBF (and first outline of the budget), while the August forecast serves as an input for the Budget Law and is published before the government approves the Budget Law.
28	If revised forecasts provide new revenue figures, then the budget can be modified. This is also linked to revenue-dependent expenditure. Legislating supplementary spending based on a higher revenue forecast is the main cause of supplementary budgets in Estonia. The draft of a supplementary/corrective budget must be presented to the Parliament at least 2 months before the end of the budget year. All other limitations are similar to those for the annual Budget Law (specifically, Parliamentary proposals to increase spending in the draft of a supplementary/corrective budget must be off set by a similar expenditure reduction in other items in order not to alter the budget balance).

Greece

Question	
25	There are no legal obstacles, but there is a permanent monitoring of budgetary implementation by the NP.
26	New government in office.
27b	Macro forecasts might be revised in mid-year and made public through a report.
28	In general, macro forecast revision do not alter budgetary implementation unless these are major changes caused by factors outside the government control.
28	Supplementary or corrective budgets must be approved by the NP.

Spain

Question	
25	There is a contingency fund included in the CG budget for unforeseen expenditures. In case there is a deviation of the initial balance target (e.g. due to lower revenues than expected), the law requires the elaboration of a 3-year rebalancing plan.
27a	In Q2 (t+ 1) when the new MTBF is prepared.

Finland

Question	
24	There are normally between 1 and 3 supplementary budgets each year. In addition, both the supplementary and current budgets can be amended. In particular, the current budget is usually amended before the NP approved it.
26	Higher than expected revenues due to positive economic developments, and higher than anticipated expenditures because of external events (e.g. peace keeping forces in a foreign country, higher number of students or unemployed) must be budgeted according to the principle of unity.
27a	Spring, summer and fall.
27b	Both the ordinary and supplementary budgets are always based on the most recent macroeconomic forecasts from the Economic Department. The spring and autumn supplementary budgets are based on a revised macro forecasts. The information included in the new set of forecasts is as comprehensive as the information given in the ordinary budget
28	Changes in budgetary forecasts due to a revised macro forecasts are budgeted in the next supplementary budget.
28	All rules applied to the ordinary budget are also applied to supplementary budgets. These supplementary budgets also need the NP approval and expenditure is included in the spending limits.

France

Question	
26	The law allows the government to adjust public finance management throughout the year in order to take into account latest economic developments. NP must agree. In general, when there is a change in the parliamentary majority, a corrective or supplementary budget is prepared.
27a	In March of t+1 revised forecast for t+1 are released. In end-June of t+1 during the Parliamentary discussion on budgetary policy, forecasts for t+1 can be updated again. Finally, in end October of t+1, the State Budget Law for t+2 may again revise forecasts for t+1.
28	Not answered.

Hungary

Question	
24	Usually, in autumn there is an amendment of the current year's budget law. However, the balance budget figure hardly changes (there is a limit specified in the Organic Budget Law).
26	Identifies deviations or autorisation for extra expenditures.
27a	Budgetary forecasts are revised monthly.
27b	Revision contains the 20-25 most important items.
28	The Organic Budget Law stipulates that the Government has to submit a supplementary budget to the NP if the budget balance during the year deviates from the originally planned figure by more than 5 % of the total expenditure figure. If the deviation is in between 2.5 % and 5%, the Government has to submit an amendment. This amendment is treated as a normal legislative procedure, while the supplementary budget is considered as a budget-legislation procedure that is much more complicated and lengthy).

Ireland

Question	
24	The last corrective budget was in 1981.
25	Although there is no legal obstacle to prepare a corrective budget, there has been no need to resort to them.
27a	In October with the Pre-Budget Outlook.
28	If need be, supplementary budget must be approved by the NP as the annual budget.

Italy

Question	
26	Deviations from the previously established fiscal targets.
27a	September.
27b	When forecasts are revised, the Government updates also the Economic and Financial Planning Document (DPEF).
28	Corrective measures need NP approval.

Lithuania

Question	
24	Procedures for preparing corrective budgets are the same as the rules for annual budgets.
26	Changes in economic and revenues forecasts.

Luxembourg

Question	
25	No need.
27	It is difficult to answer the question since the last corrective budget dates back to the 1960s. If a corrective budget had to be implemented now, it would be based on as many macroeconomic and budgetary data as possible.

Latvia

Question	
24	The procedure to approve a corrective budget is similar to that applied to annual budgets.
26	Revision of economic and budget revenue forecast due to changing economic conditions and budget execution.
27b	Every corrective budget must be accompanied by revised forecasts that include the same information as those of the annual budget.
28	Usually, the supplementary budget is implemented to distribute additional State revenues.

Malta

Question	
24	Although budget balance targets are retained, adjustments can be made.
26	Unforeseen expenditure.
27a	Mostly revised in Spring.
27b	However, they are not made public.
29	Supplementary budgets have to be approved by the NP.

The Netherlands

Question	
24	The Budget is amended twice. The 1st amendment of the Budget for year t takes place in May(t), and the 2nd autumn(t). The final "budget acts" for year t are presented to Parliament in May(t+ 1). All changes, whether due to execution of the budget (windfalls and setbacks) or due to corrective measures should be incorporated in the "budget acts" at the two regular moments mentioned previously.
26	The Budget is amended twice. The 1st amendment of the Budget for year t takes place in May(t), and the 2nd autumn(t). The final "budget acts" for year t are presented to Parliament in May(t+ 1). All changes, whether due to execution of the budget (windfalls and setbacks) or due to corrective measures should be incorporated in the "budget acts" at the two regular moments mentioned previously.
27b	The 1st amendment of the budget (May) includes also a revised set of forecasts by the CPB. The 2nd amendment in autumn again includes a revised set of forecasts by the CPB.
28	They are linked to supplementary budgets through the two amendments of the budget.
28	Parliamentary approval for proposed amendments of the budget needs Parliamentary approval. The Parliamentary amend the budget by increasing or decreasing the amounts the government is allowed to spend. In practice, amendments by the Parliament normally contain provisions to compensate for additional spending.

Poland

Question	
25	There is a strict regulation.
26	Worse than expected macro and fiscal developments may be the reasons behind the preparation of a corrective budget. A major political change in the government can also cause the preparation of a corrective budget. In case of risks to achieve the targets of the Budget Law during the budgetary year, GOV (after receiving a positive opinion from the Parliamentary Commission of Budget Finances) can freeze expenditures planned in the Budget Law by issuing a special decree.
27a	They may be revised during the budgetary year due to changing economic conditions.
27b	Normally they are used internally (within MF and GOV) until the adoption of the next draft budget in September.
28	Subject to approval by the NP.

Portugal

Question	
26	In recent years corrective budgets have only taken place when a new government takes office (2002 and 2005). In the 1990s corrective budgets were more frequent, often in the wake of expenditure slippages.
27a	In April, the Government submits to the Parliament the Budgetary Policy Steering Report, that includes a revision of forecasts (both macro and budgetary) attached to the latest Budget Law.
27b	Normally, changes are not of sizeable magnitude.
28	The government is entitled to introduce some changes in the initial budget without the Parliamentary approval. However, expenditure increases financed by either a revenue wind fall or a higher deficit require Parliamentary approval. In contrast, the government can authorize expenditure increases financed by higher own revenues of public services and agencies.

Sweden

Question	
24	Corrective budgets affecting SCP are very rare. Supplementary budgets are regularly proposed in connection to the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill.
25	The "top-down" approach for budgeting gives little need for corrective budgets.
27a	Mid-April.
27b	New set of forecasts included in the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill submitted to the Parliament.
28	The supplementary budget presented in the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill is consistent with new set of forecasts presented in the bill.

Slovenia

Question	
26	Change in economic forecasts.
27a	IMAD releases forecasts twice a year (Spring and Autumn).
27b	Every time there is a supplementary budget, this is submitted together with a new set of revised forecasts.
28	The existing budgetary procedure allows to adjust the first and second yearly budgets due to changing economic circumstances. Thus, GOV can decide the suspension of new commitments. In case of lower than expected revenues, the government can reduce expenditure, and if the short fall is higher than a given ceiling it can only carry-out spending up to a limit set up by the Budget Execution Law. The Budget Execution Law also sets limits for GOV discretion in adjusting expenditure figures due to changing economic circumstances.

Slovak Republic

Question	
24	The MF may change binding limits of the line ministries upon their request. However, the overall deficit figure can not be higher than budgeted. In case of higher incomes, total expenditures can be increased, but only by 1% of the total spending previously budgeted.
26	The main reasons are "shifts" within the total spending limits (e.g. between goods and services and wages) or delimitation between ministries.
27a	Thrice a year, in January, June and September.
28	If the new forecasts for the current year seems to be worse than anticipated in teh Budget Law, the government may cut down expenditures in order to achieve fiscal targets.

United Kingdom

Question	
25	There is no legal bar to having more than one Budget in a year. However, the increased stability of the economy, esp. since the introduction of the new monetary and fiscal frameworks, has reduced the need for more frequent changes of fiscal policy instruments.
27a	Autumn in the Pre-Budget Report
28	It might be a link, but this would be very unusual.

## o}. Additional Comments

### Denmark

Question	
ADD	Strong link between Budget, MTBF and SCP.

### Estonia

Question	
ADD	Supplementary budgets for increasing spending through higher than expected revenues.

### Spain

Question	
ADD	Strong link between Budget, MTBF and SCP. But MTBF is rolling.

### Sweden

Question	
ADD	Strong link between Budget, MTBF and SCP. But MTBF is rolling.